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UNCONSCIOUS BIAS AND SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS:
THE CASE FOR A QUALIFIED EVIDENTIARY EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY PRIVILEGE
Deana A. Pollard*
Abstract: Recent breakthroughs in social psychology have resulted in the ability to
measure unconscious bias scientifically. Studies indicate that prejudiced responses are largely
unconscious, the result of normal cognitive processing and stereotypical associations of which
the prejudiced subject may be completely unaware. The studies also indicate that a subject's
awareness of the discrepancy between her conscious, egalitarian value system and her
unconscious prejudice is a critical step towards the convergence of her cognitive functioning
and her egalitarian viewpoints. Antidiscrimination legislation requires a showing of intent to
discriminate to obtain relief in all but a small percent of circumstances. The result is a legal
framework that does not, and cannot, properly redress most instances of discrimination. While
the use of unconscious-bias testing may be more effective than antidiscrimination legislation
in identifying and redressing the cognitive phenomenon of discrimination, evidence law does
not support its use because test results are not privileged against discovery in discrimination
lawsuits. This Article argues that in light of the enormous potential social benefit of
unconscious-bias testing, a qualified evidentiary privilege should be recognized to encourage
its use.

We live in a racially fragmented society. Although the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled formal segregation unconstitutional in 1954,' our society
remains segregated in housing, education, employment, and virtually
every other indicator of socioeconomic well-being and status.2 Racial
tension is high and unlikely to change as long as we fail to take seriously
the ever-present threat that oppression and injustice necessarily pose to
any society.3 Americans are inundated with race-conscious news items,
*Attorney, Ivie, McNeill & Wyatt, Los Angeles. University of California, Berkeley,
LL.M.;
University of Southern California, J.D.; University of Washington, B.A. I am grateful to my dear
friend Erwin Chemerinsky for his consistently generous advice and support. I also owe thanks to the
following people, all of whom gave me input or support in relation to this Article: Mitar Vranic,
Laurent Mayali, Linda Krieger, Anthony Greenwald, Gloria Pollard, and Cee Cee, Kris & Kyle
Moore. This Article is dedicated to my darling son Ryan Pollard, who at the tender age of two
demonstrated angelic patience for his mom's long hours at the computer-I pray that your future
includes a more harmonious world.
1. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer, UnderstandingAffirmative Action, 23 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 921,958-89 (1996).
3. Although I frequently refer to race-based social issues, the same analysis applies to
discrimination and attitudes based on gender, culture, religion, and sexual preference. Race-based
issues have received substantial public and government attention in recent years and exemplify the
problem of automatic stereotyping addressed in this Article. This Article discusses racial and other
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work and school sensitivity training, and even race- and ethnicity-related
voter propositions. A mentality of "taking sides" along racial lines has
emerged with vigor in recent years.
The resultant racial tension finds a forum for expression in highprofile litigation. When high-profile cases involve race, they become a
microcosm of society's racial rift. High-profile cases have manifested
and intensified the racial divide, and polls indicate that people's
perceptions and opinions of these cases are highly correlated with race.'
Meanwhile, a conservative U.S. Supreme Court has eroded protection of
minorities and women in particular, and civil rights generally, over the
past twelve years.' No doubt inspired by the Court's "majoritarian"
treatment of civil rights and deference to government action, plebiscites
have begun to dismantle affirmative action programs all over the
country, which promises to perpetuate, and probably worsen, racial and
cultural tensions.
Employment discrimination certainly contributes greatly to the disparity in socioeconomic status between white men and all other Americans.
Gainful employment, after all, is the cornerstone of economic security
and is the necessary precursor to adequate housing, health care, and
educational and social opportunities. The proliferation of employment
forms of discrimination interchangeably, as social psychology research indicates that racial
minorities and women suffer similar disadvantages on account of stereotyping or unconscious
discrimination. See infra Part III.
4. For example, the 1991 Rodney King beating and the riots following the acquittal of the Los
Angeles police officers exposed the depth of our country's racial divide. During the 1994-95 O.J.
Simpson murder trial, public views on O.J. Simpson's guilt or innocence cut along racial lines.
According to a Harris poll of February 11, 1995, 61% of whites believed O.J. Simpson was guilty,
while 68% of blacks believed he was innocent. Similar race-based discrepancies emerged in a Los
Angeles Times poll taken in September 1994. See News Analysis: Simpson Jury Could Defy
Conventional Wisdom Trial: Majority ofBlacks on Panel May Prove to Be a Wild CardRather Than
a Plusforthe Defense, Experts Say, L.A. Times, Nov. 5, 1994, at Al.
5. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43 (1989).
Justice Kennedy joined the Court in February 1988, and became the fifth vote in a number of
conservative opinions hostile to civil rights. See id. at 45.
6. The U.S. Supreme Court has allowed the majority to determine minorities' rights issues,
contrary to the High Court's traditional antimajoritarian role, which is secured in part by the
Justices' life tenure. For example, in Washington State and California anti-affirmative-action
initiatives have received popular support, rendering state employers and educational institutions
unable to consider race in hiring, contracting, or admissions. See infra notes 129-33 and
accompanying text. Legal challenge to California's anti-affirmative-action Proposition 209 was
summarily defeated in federal court, and the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari. See
Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1141
(1997). See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1995).

A Privilege for Unconscious-Bias Testing
discrimination litigation over the past ten years parallels our country's
increased racial tension. Employment discrimination cases are often as
hotly contested as the typical divorce case. This intensity of emotion
results both from fundamentally different perspectives on the role
minority status plays in employment decisions and from the severing of
the bonds that formed while the now-adverse parties worked together.
Typically, the defendant's indignation at the accusation of discrimination
is strikingly juxtaposed with the plaintiff's adamant belief that she was
victimized by discriminatory foul play. Inevitably, the loser is shocked
by the jury's verdict and left to deal with the burden of disillusionment
and heartfelt injustice. Considering that equalizing employment
opportunities is a necessary step toward equalizing economic and other
opportunities, we cannot begin to resolve this country's racial problems
without focusing on the effect of discrimination in employment.
Research on unconscious bias and employment discrimination may
provide some insight into the relational dynamics of discrimination.
Some legal scholars rely on empirical psychology studies to show that
intentional, conscious discrinination is only a small fraction of
workplace discrimination and that most discriminatory acts result from
unconscious stereotyping and cultural biases that never enter into the
decisionmaker's conscious mind-hence the outrage felt by defendants
when accused of intentional discrimination.7 Thus, these scholars argue
that the requirement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII)8 mandating that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted
with intent to discriminate deprives Title VII of the ability to redress the
majority of situations involving discrimination. Scientific studies show
that uncovering unconscious bias may explain why minorities remain
disadvantaged in employment.
Thanks in part to advances in computer technology, recent breakthroughs in social psychology demonstrate that unconscious bias can be
objectively measured. The most exciting research shows that
unconscious bias may be reversed for subjects holding conscious
egalitarian views once the unconscious bias is brought to the subject's
7. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 6; see also David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent
Discrimination, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 899 (1993). All discrimination claims other than disparate impact
cases require the element of purpose or intent to discriminate. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h (1994). Title VII is the most comprehensive and commonly
litigated federal employment discrimination statute.
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attention. Some social psychologists are creating unconscious-biastesting services that soon will be available to corporate employers.
Unconscious-bias testing of employees could be a substantial step toward
identifying situations in which discrimination is likely to occur, setting
up preventative measures, and actually reversing discriminatory
attitudes. If employers were to conduct unconscious-bias testing, they
could use the results to counter unconscious tendencies through
education or reassignment of biased supervisors. However, because
courts recognize no evidentiary privilege protecting employers'
unconscious-bias test results from disclosure, employers are unlikely to
utilize such tests out of fear of their use in employment discrimination
litigation.
This Article argues for the recognition of a privilege for unconsciousbias testing to encourage its use in equal employment opportunity efforts.
Solving the problem of unconscious bias is the necessary predicate to a
more racially just society. Yet courts have abandoned the "self-critical
analysis" privilege for voluntary self-critical analysis in the employment
context, a privilege which probably would have protected unconsciousbias testing.9 To encourage effectively the use of unconscious-bias
testing, a new evidentiary privilege is needed to protect the test results
from discovery.
Part I of this Article explains that unconscious bias is rampant and
may precipitate most discriminatory actions. Part II discusses the
inadequacy of current law to prevent and redress discrimination
motivated by unconscious bias. Part III argues that employer testing of
unconscious bias is essential to prevent the influence of unconscious bias
in employment decisions. Part IV explains why an evidentiary privilege
is essential to encourage employers to test for unconscious bias. Part V
discusses the current law's failure to recognize a self-critical-analysis
privilege in employment that would encompass unconscious-bias testing.
Part VI argues that a qualified self-critical-analysis privilege for
unconscious-bias testing is consistent with privilege theory and advances
the policies underlying the formerly recognized self-critical-analysis
privilege in the employment context. Part VI also discusses ways to
discourage employer abuse of the privilege. Finally, Part VI rebuts
objections to unconscious-bias testing based on the First Amendment
9. The self-critical-analysis privilege has been asserted in a number of contexts to prevent
discovery of companies' candid self-assessments. The privilege has been recognized in the
employment context but has fallen into disfavor in recent years. See infra Part V.

A Privilege for Unconscious-Bias Testing
right to freedom of beliefs and state and federal constitutional rights to
privacy.
I.

THE NATURE OF UNCONSCIOUS BIAS AND AUTOMATIC
STEREOTYPING

As recently as the early 1980s, psychology researchers considered
explicit measures of people's conscious attitudes toward minorities,
generally through self-reporting, ° as reliable evidence of the extent of
societal prejudice. Revolutionary insights in social psychology have
revealed that a person's conscious replies to prejudice questionnaires are
only part of the story, and indeed, how progressive a person appears on
the surface may bear little or no relation to how prejudiced she is on an
unconscious level."
In the past ten years, researchers have devoted substantial empirical
attention to the distinction between explicit and implicit mental processes
in relation to racial and other forms of bias.' z Breakthroughs in understanding how the normal mind categorizes information have allowed
researchers to identify an individual's unconscious bias and automatic
stereotype activation. Advanced computer technology has enabled testing
for biased reactions toward stereotyped minority groups that occur very
quickly on a cognitive level beyond conscious control. Although explicit
prejudice is on the decline, as measured by progressive societal norms
and popular awareness of discrimination, the problem of stereotyping on
an implicit level is worse than researchers had imagined.'3
Some social psychologists believe that stereotyping is a manifestation
of "in-group/out-group" dynamics and the human instinct to identify
with a group or clan.' 4 When traditional groups such as villages and
tribes broke down, people were inclined to classify themselves along
race and class lines. Part of the nature of "in-group/out-group" dynamics

10. See John F. Dovidio et al., On the Nature ofPrejudice: Automatic and ControlledProcesses,
33 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 510,511 (1997).
11. See Annie Murphy Paul, Where Bias Begins: The Truth About Stereotypes, Psychol. Today,
May-June 1998, at 52, 53; see also Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social
Cognition:Attitudes, Self-Esteem, andStereotypes, 102 Psychol. Rev. 4 (1995); Telephone Interview
with Anthony G. Greenwald, Professor of Psychology, University of Washington (Feb. 14, 1999).
12. See Dovidio et al., supra note 10, at 511.
13. See Paul, supra note 11, at 53.
14. See id. at 53-54 (quoting New York University Professor John A. Bargh).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 74:913, 1999

is the tendency to see members of one's own group as individuals, but
out-group members as an undifferentiated, stereotyped mass. 5
Stereotypical assumptions activate automatically and implicitly, often
contrary to conscious beliefs. Unconscious processing controls the
manifestation of "implicit attitudes" and "automatic stereotypes" in
outward behavior. 6 Individuals may not be aware of the implicit
attitudes, and therefore they may be unable to act consistently with their
personal beliefs about how they should feel, or even how they want to
feel, about minorities.
Unconscious attitudes are usually exposed with response latency
measures of activation, a methodology where the subject is timed while
she makes stereotypical and counter-stereotypical associations between
target group members and descriptive words. 7 It takes slightly longer (in
terms of milliseconds) for an unconsciously biased individual to
associate positive descriptive words with a member of a disfavored group
than for the individual to associate positive descriptive words with other
persons. 8 This discrepancy in time is due to the differences in cognitive
barriers in making the connections. Implicit attitudes discovered via
latency testing may be empirically unrelated to self-reported explicit
prejudice. 9 Thus, people with no conscious bias may be processing
information with substantial unconscious bias. Indeed, a discrepancy
between response latency measures of unconscious bias and self-report
tests of conscious bias is expected to be manifest for socially sensitive
issues such as racial attitudes, because despite our collectively held
unconscious biases, our societal norms say we should not stereotype
people.
The immediate ancestor to automatic stereotyping was the cognitive
revolution of the 1970s, in which social scientists' view on how people
categorized and processed information changed radically and produced
"social cognition theory."" ° After decades dominated by the study of
15. See id.; see also Krieger, supranote 6, at 1194-95 & nn. 149-51.
16. Implicit attitudes and automatic stereotyping are "introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately
identified) traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action
toward social objects." Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 11, at 8.
17. For a more detailed description of response latency testing measures, see infra Part III.B.
18. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition:
The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1464, 1477 (1998).
19. See, e.g., Margo J. Monteith, Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses: Implications for
Progressin Prejudice-ReductionEfforts, 65 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 469,469-70 (1993).
20. See Telephone Interview with Anthony G. Greenwald, supra note 11.
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observable behavior and a premise that prejudice was motivational in
origin, scientists began focusing on the more mysterious inner workings
of the human brain's processing activity. Computers enabled scientists to
measure discrepancies in reaction time down to the hundreds of milliseconds and to display data quickly. At the same time, studies on human
cognitive processing were beginning to illuminate how stereotypes were
processed. As a result of these advances, social cognition theory holds
that (1) stereotyping is part of an essential cognitive process that all
people use to help perceive their surroundings efficiently; 2' (2) once
constructed, stereotypes unconsciously affect judgment about members
of the stereotyped class by operating as "schemas"--expectancies that
"fill in" missing information about a person or event to guide our
behavior during social interaction;' and (3) this process is beyond the
decisionmaker's conscious control.'
The cognitive approach found that categorization and evaluation are
normal and important parts of human intelligence.24 This rejected the
conclusion of European researchers of the Nazi Holocaust who theorized
that only repressed, authoritarian persons with internal conflict created
by inadequate parenting were guilty of stereotyping.' Social cognition
theory discovered that categorization allows us to simplify our complex
environment and predict future events based on incomplete information-an efficient and generally effective manner of information
processing. Prior research indicated that each time we categorize objects
or people we progressively intensify our internal stereotypes because we
reaffirm the perception that members of a certain category are more
similar than they actually are and that members of different categories
are more dissimilar than they actually are.26 Stereotypes result from
"categories that have gone too far," using personal characteristics such as
race or gender as a proxy for personality traits such as hostility,

21. See id.
22. See Mark Chen & John A. Bargh, Nonconscious Behavioral Confirmation Processes: The
Self-Fulfilling Consequences of Automatic Stereotype Activation, 33 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol.
541,541 (1997).
23. See Krieger, supra note 6, at 1187-88 & nn.1 12-14. The Krieger article also contains more
information on the cognitive origins of stereotypes. See id. at 1190-98.
24. See Telephone Interview with Margo J. Monteith, Professor of Psychology, University of
Kentucky (May 11, 1999).
25. See id.
26. See Krieger, supra note 6, at 1189.
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intelligence, or weakness.27 This cognitive approach to bias thus
established an understanding of the normal human categorization process
and created the foundation on which implicit bias and automatic
stereotyping theories were built.
The cognitive model holds that the conscious mind connects conspicuous characteristics with stereotypes and that those connections through
repetition become unconscious. Although we may not choose to view
women as intellectually incompetent sex objects or blacks as violent
criminals, the media bombards us with these images, impressing
stereotypes onto our cognitive processing that likely affect our
behavior.2 8 Children are inundated with media and cultural stereotypes
before they have the cognitive abilities or life experiences to challenge
these images. 29 The profundity of the problem is apparent from
psychological research indicating that once these cognitive connections
are formed, they are automatically triggered by the slightest interaction
with a target group member. From the cognitivists' viewpoint, the cycle
perpetuates itself with no conscious choice by the biased individual.
Indeed, some psychologists flatly question the concept of free will in
light of research on stereotypes, because behavior often follows
unconscious beliefs even though conscious and unconscious beliefs may
be very different; thus "free will" may be nothing more than the
application of unconscious assumptions."
In 1989, social psychologist Patricia Devine challenged the
cognitivists' views that stereotypes (unconscious assumptions) and
prejudice (consciously held beliefs) were interrelated and that prejudicial
behavior was an inevitable consequence of normal cognitive processes.3
Devine distinguished between a person's cognitive knowledge of a
27. Paul, supra note 11, at 53 (quoting New York University Professor John A. Bargh).
28. There is some question about whether automatic stereotyping in fact results in discriminatory
behavior. However, most current studies have found that unconscious bias does in fact affect our
judgment toward stereotyped group members as well as our resulting verbal and physical
unconscious reactions, which in turn create "behavioral confirmation" and perpetuates the cycle of
prejudice. See infra Part III.A.
29. Note that social psychologists' belief that unconscious bias is produced through popular
media messages that create "schemas" in our unconscious minds undermines the "marketplace of
ideas" concept underlying the First Amendment. Choice is the cornerstone of the marketplace
concept, and if we are not free to choose what messages we internalize, the concept collapses
theoretically. See infra Part VI.D.2.
30. See Paul, supranote 11, at 55 (quoting New York University Professor John A. Bargh).
31. See Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled
Components, 56 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 5, 5 (1989).
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cultural stereotype and the person's individual beliefs, which may or may
not be consistent with the stereotype. 2 She argued that although
stereotypes and personal beliefs have some overlapping features, they are
conceptually distinct cognitive structures.3 Her research on human
information processing distinguished between automatic responses
(mostly involuntary, spontaneous activation of associations developed
through repeated activation in the memory) and controlled responses
(mostly voluntary, controlled, intentional responses requiring active
attention).34
Devine posited that because stereotypes are fixed at an impressionable
young age, they are more "accessible" as a cognitive function than values
and personal beliefs formed later through conscious evaluation."
Because members of a society experience common socialization,
including exposure to racial and other biases, consciously biased people
("high-prejudiced people") and those who espouse more egalitarian
views ("low-prejudiced people") demonstrate equal activation of societal
stereotypes under conditions when no time exists for personal beliefs to
interfere with the unconscious, automatic response.3 6 However, unlike
prior researchers, Devine posited that any person whose automatically
activated stereotypes and personal beliefs conflict can break the
automatic response cycle by inhibiting the old stereotypical beliefs while
intentionally activating newer, more egalitarian beliefs.37 This process
concurrently makes the egalitarian beliefs more and more accessible and
the prejudiced responses less and less accessible.3"
Devine's research found that automatic stereotype activation is
equally strong for low- and high-prejudiced people and that in the
absence of controlled processes both groups exhibited similar stereotypecongruent, or prejudice-like, responses.39 However, other research, both
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 6. Devine's dissociation of automatic and controlled responses is consistent with
other current conceptions of racial prejudice, suggesting that while traditional forms of prejudice are
direct and overt, contemporary forms are indirect and subtle and are therefore harder to identifyeven by the racist.

35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 6-7.

38. See id. at 7.
39. See id. at 8-12. Devine's methodology of exposing her subjects to a race or gender trait to
prime the stereotyping response has been criticized as failing to differentiate between the category of
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before and after Devine's 1989 study, suggests that controlled processes
can inhibit the effects of automatic processing when the implications of
automatic processing conflict with a low-prejudiced person's goal of
establishing or maintaining a nonprejudiced identity. 4 Devine disputed
the automatic-processing theorists who credited responses that were not
consciously monitored over consciously mediated responses for determining the extent of societal prejudice, and she argued that conscious
processes were the key to escaping and changing the degree of societal
prejudice.4'
In contrast to skeptics who thought that prejudice and racism were
intractable, Devine analogized unconscious bias to a "bad habit" that can
be "broken." 42 To break the bad habit of unconscious negative and
automatic discriminatory attitudes, a person must consciously activate
unbiased beliefs each time a stereotype is automatically triggered.4 3 The
more the individual does this, the more accessible the unprejudiced belief
becomes, and at some point the egalitarian belief's accessibility will
"rival" the automatic response." This process requires intention, attention, time, and effort, and, like breaking a bad habit, is no easy task.
Devine's 1989 study was a turning point in social cognition theory.
The argument that unconscious attitudes and self-reported prejudice may
not be directly related departs from earlier cognitive theories of the
creation and perpetration of prejudice. Devine's research has received
substantial attention in social psychology literature and has sparked
numerous subsequent studies attempting to clarify the nature and
relationship of unconscious bias, prejudice, and discriminatory
behavior.45 Yet while it seems intuitive that unconscious bias would
affect overt judgments and acts, this is not necessarily clear.46 Although
persons primed and the stereotype primed per se. See, e.g., Lorella Lepore & Rupert Brown,
Categoryand Stereotype Activation: Is PrejudiceInevitable?, 72 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 275,
283-85 (1997). This impacts whether high- and low-prejudiced people harbor and activate the same
stereotypes about minority groups because, as Lepore and Brown found, priming the category of
persons produced different stereotype activation than priming the stereotype per se. See id. at 284.
By priming both, Devine may have confounded stereotype and category automatic activation.
40. See infra Part IIM.A.
41. See Devine, supra note 31, at 15.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 16.
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., Chen & Bargh, supra note 22; Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 11; Monteith, supra
note 19.
46. See Dovidio et al.,
supra note 10, at 511-12.
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Devine's research suggests that prejudice is akin to a "bad habit" that is
amenable to correction by a willing subject once the automatic
component is recognized, other research has indicated that unconsciously
activated associations and stereotypes influence but do not dictate
behavior.47 Although the link between conscious bias and prejudiced
actions is not yet fully understood, Devine's theory is optimistic in
positing that while negative attitudes toward racial minorities and other
targeted groups nest in our unconscious minds and become activated
without our consent or conscious knowledge, racial bias is not inevitable,
immutable, or perennial. Exposing and understanding the unconscious
component to bias may be a leap toward understanding how to produce
nonprejudiced attitudes both explicitly and implicitly.
There is growing inconsistency in the psychology literature about the
relationship between conscious attitudes and unconscious, automatic
stereotype activation.48 When given enough time to control their
responses, high-prejudiced people will exhibit more stereotyping than
low-prejudiced people. The controversy relates to circumstances where
high- and low-prejudiced people are thought to be unable to control their
exhibited behavior-when purely unconscious, automatic stereotyping
manifests itself because the subject has no time to modify her responses
based on her personal beliefs. Some researchers have found a significant
relationship between conscious attitudes and stereotype activation, and
some have not.49 While high- and low-prejudiced people demonstrate
equal knowledge of cultural stereotypes, 0 the groups may differ in the
strength of their associations between stereotypic traits and particular
cultures. 5' High-prejudiced people are more likely to use stereotypes
consistently and repeatedly activate negative stereotypes, resulting in
more developed associations that are highly accessible and of sufficient

47. See infra note 49.
48. See, e.g., Kerry Kawakani et al., Racial Prejudiceand Stereotype Activation, 24 Personality
& Soc. Psychol. Bull. 407; 414 (1998).
49. The researchers (Devine, Greenwald, Benaji, and others) found that although low- and highprejudiced people showed significant stereotypic associations for blacks, the effect was stronger for
high-prejudiced people, which may reflect a high-prejudiced individual's higher frequency of
activating stereotypes as well as greater strength and endorsement (extremity) of stereotypes. See
Russel H. Fazio & Bridget C. Dunton, Categorization by Race: The Impact of Automatic and
Controlled Components ofRacial Prejudice,33 J. Experimental Psychol. 451,468 (1997); Lepore &
Brown, supranote 39, at 283-84.
50. Both groups are exposed to the same societal stereotypical images via, inter alia, the media.
51. See Kawakami et al., supra note 48, at 413-14.
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strength to produce automatic activation.52 Conversely, low-prejudiced
people engage in less stereotyping and develop weaker associations that
are cognitively less accessible, resulting in a lesser likelihood of
automatically activating cultural stereotypes. 3
In any event, whether or not consciously held views have a direct
affect on cognitive processing, conscious knowledge of unconscious bias
unquestionably can initiate conscious and unconscious mental
processes54 that mitigate prejudice, based on the person's knowledge,
guilt, and motivation to change her discovered unconscious bias. This
motivational approach to lessening the effects of societal, collectively
held biases has led a number of social psychologists to believe that a
critical first step toward eradicating discriminatory belief systems may be
making people aware of discrepancies between their conscious ideals and
unconsciously held negative stereotypes. A person who truly wants to
be fair and just in relations with others will be motivated to behave in
more egalitarian ways upon discovering the discrepancy between her
conscious beliefs and her unconscious bias. Social psychologists have
developed a number of theories to describe the way in which a person's
emotional reaction upon conscious recognition of unconscious bias can
motivate that person to control subsequent spontaneous stereotypical
responses and behave in less-prejudiced ways in the future. 6 Indeed,
conscious efforts to suppress stereotypically biased reactions may per se
inhibit automatic activation of stereotypes over time.5 ' The greatest
potential for creating a just society may lie in our individual willingness
to recognize and work toward eradicating our own unconscious biases.
Unconscious-bias testing promises at least to help eliminate unjust
discriminatory viewpoints and unlawful discriminatory practices in the
workplace. Although we have little or no control over our unconscious
bias, company personnel can at least take it into account when making
52. Seeid. at414.
53. See id.; see also Lepore & Brown, supra note 39, at 283-85.
54. Indeed, the idea that motivation to be a truly fair-minded person may be spurred by awareness
of one's unconscious bias relative to one's conscious beliefs, and that the process by which bias and
prejudice are reversed may also be a mix of conscious and unconscious mental activity, would
predict complicated and divergent empirical results when psychologists attempt to categorize these
highly intertwined mental processes as "unconscious and automatic" or "conscious and controlled."
55. See, e.g., Devine, supranote 3 1, at 6; Monteith, supra note 19, at 470-7 1.
56. See Monteith, supranote 19, at 470.
57. See Irene V. Blair & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Automatic and ControlledProcesses in Stereotype
Priming,70 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1142, 1159 (1996).
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important employment decisions. If knowing" about unconscious bias
disturbs us and challenges our assumptions about ourselves, that
negativity may motivate us to change the way we process information on
a cognitive level and reverse our cognitive bias over time. 8 As a result,
we progress towards more egalitarian treatment of stereotyped groups.
We also likely make substantial, albeit painful, progress towards creating
justice from where it must originate-in our hearts and minds. Although
progress toward achieving racial justice is especially urgent now with the
apparent demise of affirmative action, the law presently lacks the tools to
resolve the problem of unconscious bias.
II.

CURRENT LAW FAILS TO ADDRESS ADEQUATELY THE
PROBLEM OF UNCONSCIOUS BIAS

Social scientists and legal commentators agree that existing
antidiscrimination legislation, such as Title VII, is ineffective to redress
most instances of discrimination.59 Social psychologists generally agree
that many acts of discrimination are perpetrated without conscious
knowledge of. bias at any point in the decisionmaking process.'
Exhorting people to cease discrimination is not enough because it fails to
affect the organized bedrock of cognitive bias." Equal employment
training, political protest, public scorn, and even civil liability work on a
conscious level only. Some social psychologists believe that the only
way to get rid of stereotypes is to strike at their roots in the unconscious
mind.62 To the extent that disparate treatment liability under Title VII
requires proof of intent to discriminate, existing federal law fails to
redress the most prevalent form of discrimination-the discrimination
that results from unconscious, unintentional bias.63
States across the country are dismantling one traditional remedy for
discrimination that bypasses cognitive processes-affirmative action.'
Affirmative action programs designate opportunities to minorities
58. See infra Part III.A.
59. See Greenwald et al., supra note 18, at 1464-65; see also Krieger, supra note 6;
Oppenheimer, supra note 7.
60. See supraPart I.
61. See Paul, supranote 11, at 52 (quoting Yale Professor Mahzarin R. Banaji).
62. See id. (quoting Yale Professor Mahzarin R. Banaji); Telephone Interview with Anthony G.
Greenwald, supranote 11.
63. Almost all Title VII cases are disparate treatment cases. See infra note 70.
64. See Paul, supra note 11, at 52.
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without judging them in relation to whites and are thus insulated from the
perverse influence of unconscious bias. Some studies demonstrate that
affirmative action may foster a balanced workforce and interaction with
minority group members, both of which are the necessary predicates to
eliminating stereotypes.65 However, because the majority of people
(primarily whites) do not want affirmative action,66 other empirical
studies demonstrate that affirmative action may exacerbate intergroup
tensions.67 In any case, debate over the efficacy of affirmative action may
be obsolete, considering that it appears to have lost the support of the
courts and the public.
A.

Title VII

The jurisprudential construction of discrimination, by omitting any
recognition of unconscious bias, bears little in common with the actual
phenomenon it purports to represent.68 In most cases, Title VII and state
statutes modeled after it69 require proof of conscious, discriminatory
intent to state a claim and obtain relief for employment discrimination.7"
65. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika:IntergroupRelations After Affirmative
Action, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 1251, 1274-76 (1998).
66. See infra notes 129-30, 151-54, 156-60, and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
68. See Krieger, supra note 6, at 1217. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801
(1973), the Court appeared to recognize the breadth of Title VIl's coverage by stating that Title VII
"tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise." Nonetheless, in subsequent cases, courts
have generally been tolerant of all but the most egregious and overt forms of discrimination.
69. For example, the California antidiscrimination statute is modeled after Title VII, and
California courts use federal case law interpreting Title VII to construe the state statute. Compare
Cal. Gov't Code § 12940 (West 1998), with 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h (1994). See Greene v.
Pomona Unified Sch. Dist., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 770 (1995) (holding that because state and federal
antidiscrimination statutes are identical in their objectives, California courts look to federal law to
interpret analogous provisions of state statutes); see also Pereira v. Schlage Elec., 902 F. Supp. 1095
(N.D. Cal. 1995). Washington State has a similar approach. CompareWash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180
(1997), with 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h. See Hollingsworth v. Washington Mutual Savings Bank, 37
Wash. App 386, 390, 681 P.2d 845, 848 (1984) (holding that Washington law against discrimination
substantially parallels federal law against discrimination embodied in Title VII and thus in
construing Washington statute Washington courts look to interpretation of federal law); see also
Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co., 66 Wash. App. 510, 521 n.9, 832 P.2d 537, 545 n.9 (1992), aftd,
123 Wash. 2d 93, 864 P.2d 937 (1994).
70. The exception is disparate impact cases, which are often prohibitively expensive to bring and
constitute less than two percent of Title VII cases, and, in any event, are impossible to bring under
most factual employment settings because of the practical need for a substantial group of employees
suffering from the same discrimination. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing
Nature of Employment DiscriminationLitigation,43 Stan. L. Rev. 983, 998 & n.57 (1991).
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The result is that Title VII is a useless mechanism for redressing what
some psychologists deem the most insidious and prevalent form of
discrimination: unconscious stereotyping. Title VII's current analysis
fails both our minority citizens, who are often unable to prove
discrimination because it is defined inappropriately, as well as our
corporate employers, who face discrimination lawsuits routinely and are
often found blameworthy even when they are not guilty of intentional
wrongdoing. Worse yet, society at large takes sides on the issue of
employment discrimination and racism. This creates more tension, more
attention to the issue, and ultimately more racism.7 Current law cannot
effectively address the problem of unconscious bias.
Traditional constitutional case law and perhaps an unconscious bias
among white justices explain the central role of proof of intent in Title
VII jurisprudence. Professor Krieger argues that the reason for the
antiquated model of discrimination under Title VII is that psychological
understanding of the causes of discrimination has evolved radically since
the time of the promulgation of Title VII and its state law analogues.72
However, the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to Title VII may have
more to do with its historical approach to discrimination under the
Constitution than the state of the art of psychology. In Washington v.
Davis,73 the Court clarified that a discrimination claim brought pursuant
to the Equal Protection Clause requires proof of intent or purpose to
discriminate. 7' Reviewing cases dating back to 1880, the Court demonstrated that the Equal Protection Clause has never protected against
disparate impact where discriminatory purpose was not shown.' The
Court then struck down an extension of the Title VII disparate impact
analysis found in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.76 to discrimination cases
brought under the Equal Protection Clause.77 While underscoring the fact
that discrimination analysis under Title VII and the Constitution are
different, the Washington v. Davis Court also emphasized the historical
requirement of showing intent in discrimination cases-a requirement
71. The more this controversy is raised in our consciousness, the more we can expect people to
take sides and reaffirm positions, exacerbating already-prevalent stereotypes and making them more
accessible in the future, which will likely produce even greater racial division and tension.
72. See Krieger, supranote 6, at 1173-77.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Seeid.at 239.
See id. at239-41.
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
See Washington, 426 U.S. at 238-41.
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that had been entrenched in discrimination analysis for at least eightyfour years prior to the enactment of Title VII. 7t This historical intent
requirement, coupled with the fact that before Title VII overt racism was
legal and rampant, may explain the Court's unwillingness to recognize
little other than intentional discrimination in Title VII analysis. This is in
spite of its recognition of a theory of unintentional Title VII liability in
Griggs and the Griggs statement that "Congress directed the thrust of the
Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the
motivation."7 9 Indeed, at the time Title VII went into effect, most
discrimination was overt; it is partly because of Title VII that
discrimination has moved underground, making intent harder to prove.80
White Americans with political power historically have felt that unjust
racial outcomes are acceptable if unintended. The Washington v. Davis
rule embodies a distinctively white way of thinking about racial
discrimination that holds intent to be an essential element of racial
injustice." Whites tend to trust in race neutrality more than nonwhites,
and, because of their stake in maintaining the racial status quo, they tend

78. See id. at 239 (citing Strunder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)).
79. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. Note also that even after Griggs, the Court began to retreat from the
theory of unintentional liability under Title VII. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust,487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988), stated:
The distinguishing features of the factual issues that typically dominate in disparate impact
cases do not imply that the ultimate legal issue is different than in cases where disparate
treatment analysis is used.... [T]he necessary premise of the disparate impact approach is that
some employment practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in
operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.
(citation omitted). This language seems to indicate a retreat from the Griggs decision, which had
recognized disparate impact discrimination unrelated to intent and indicates that the disparate impact
test was simply an alternativeway of showing discriminatory intent. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 654-56 (1989), the Court adopted O'Connor's position in Watson and
attempted to retreat from the unintentional standard set forth in Griggs. However, Congress
responded with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, restoring disparate impact analysis to a strictly
unintentional standard. See Oppenheimer, sqpranote 7, at 935-36.
80. In 1944, 55% of white adults polled felt that whites deserved the first shot at employment
opportunities over blacks. See id. at 904-05. By 1963, 85% purportedly favored equal employment
opportunity, and by 1972, seven years after Title VII took effect, 97% supported equal employment
opportunity. See id. This shows both that intentional discrimination was a big concern prior to Title
VII and that now covert or unconscious discrimination is a bigger problem-if 97% truly believed in
equal employment opportunity, discrimination would be much less prevalent than it is.
81. See Barbara J.Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement ofDiscriminatoryIntent, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 953, 968 (1993).
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to favor retaining the intent requirement in spite of its demonstrated
failure to effectuate substantive racial justice.82
Although it is unlikely that social psychology literature has had a
meaningful influence on the Court's intent requirement in interpreting
Title VII, Professor Krieger's research demonstrates that Title VII
analysis has been remarkably consistent with the psychological
understanding of discrimination at the time Title VII was promulgated;83
however, Title VII analysis fails to correspond with more contemporary
theories. Recognition of the growing inconsistencies between social
psychologists' explanation of how discrimination occurs and current
Title VII analysis warrants modifying Title VII's models of liability to
redress discrimination more effectively.
Before the promulgation of Title VII in 1963, social scientists had a
different view of how discrimination takes place than social
psychologists generally accept today. Title VII analysis is consistent with
social psychologists' earlier belief that discriminatory acts were a direct
result of "prejudice," which was understood as consisting of three
components: (1) beliefs about the attitude object, such as a person (the
cognitive component); (2) feelings toward the attitude object (the
affective component); and (3) behavioral dispositions toward the attitude
object (the behavioral component).' During the 1970s and 1980s, a twocomponent model was advanced, in which prejudice was defined as a
"learned disposition consisting of... (1) negative beliefs or stereotypes
([the] cognitive component), and (2) negative feelings or emotions ([the]
affective component)." 85 Under this two-component approach, the
behavior component was viewed as an independent construct called the
"behavioral intention," consisting of a consciously formed intent to act
toward the attitude object in a particular way.86 Thus, discrimination was
believed to be the intentional behavioral manifestation of prejudice. 7
Title VII jurisprudence incorporates three assumptions about human
inference and judgment that reflect the now-obsolete understanding of

82. See id. at 968-69.
83. See Krieger, supranote 6, at 1173-77.

84. See id.
85. Id. at 1176. (quoting Jack Levin & William C. Levin, The Functions of Discriminationand
Prejudice66 (1982)).
86. See id.at 1176.

87. See id.
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discriminatory processing.88 First, the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII severely limits its usefulness to redress
discrimination because it fails to support claims for discriminatory
actions based on unconscious bias. This assumes that intergroup
discrimination results from motive or intent to discriminate; by equating
intent and causation, stereotype discrimination is considered a product of
discriminatory motivation. 9 Thus, federal courts have held Title VII's
section 703"° to require proof of disparate treatment caused by purposeful
or intentional discrimination under a disparate treatment theory of
liability.9 The discriminatory intent requirement applies both in
"pretext" cases brought under the paradigm of McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,2 and
in "mixed motive" cases brought under the 1989 U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins.93 Although the mixed-motive
paradigm was ostensibly created to allow Title VII plaintiffs to state a
claim upon a finding that stereotypes "infected the employer's
decisionmaking process," it failed to move away from equating causation
and intentionality-requiring conscious, discriminatory animus, and
conflating motive, intent, and causation.94 Thus, Justice Brennan's
88. Seeid. at 1166-67.
89. See id. at 1166.
90. Section 703(a) provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge an individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 17 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). Note
that this language could reasonably be interpreted as requiring proof of causation without intent, but
this is not how the courts have interpreted it. See Krieger, supra note 6, at 1168.
91. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 516-17 (1993). Note that this
interpretation under Title VII is inconsistent with the court-imposed intent requirement of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), in which unconscious application of stereotyped
assumptions of age-based inability or performance problems are actionable. See Krieger, supra note
6, at 1168 (quoting Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1981)). In
contrast to Title VII, the ADEA's language, which is nearly identical to that of Title VII, has been
interpreted to differentiate between unconscious bias and conscious discrimination, although this
difference may be supported in part by the fact that the ADEA establishes two tiers of liability, one
for a violation per se and the other for liquidated (double) damages for "willful" violation. See 29
U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994). However, there are a few Title VII cases in which courts have recognized
unconscious bias and plaintiffs have won. See Krieger, supra note 6, at 1169.
92. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
93. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
94. See Krieger, supra note 6, at 1171. In Price-Waterhouse, the plaintiff, a senior manager, was
denied partnership in spite of a very successful record because of her "macho" personality. See
Price-Waterhouse,490 U.S. at 234-35. Her superiors had told her to take a "charm school" course,
to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
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plurality opinion and Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in
Price-Waterhouse allow plaintiffs to use proof of stereotypical
statements to show intent but do not allow plaintiffs to rely on
stereotyping per se to support a cause of action.95
The second problem of Title VII jurisprudence is that the disparate
treatment paradigm limits disparate treatment analysis to an all-ornothing finding of intentional discrimination. After the plaintiff presents
the elements of a prima facie case,96 the defendant has the burden of
simply producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment decision.97 The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to
prove by a preponderance of evidence that discrimination motivated the
employer to take the adverse action.98 The plaintiff can meet her burden
of proof directly by presenting evidence (such as overt slurs) that
discrimination was more likely than not the reason for the adverse action,
or the plaintiff can meet her burden indirectly by showing that the

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason proffered is unworthy of credence,
or a "pretext" for discrimination.9 9 The pretext basis for establishing

liability is based on the notion that people generally, and particularly in
business settings, do not act arbitrarily. Thus, when an employer's
proffered reason is not believable, it is presumed that the decision was
based on illegitimate reasons, such as race or gender. 00 This "pre-

sumption of invidiousness" permits plaintiff to win without any direct
evidence of discrimination.

hair styled, and wear jewelry." Id. Plaintiff was clearly a casualty of discrimination based on
stereotyping, but the Court focused on the employer's conscious state of mind-intent rather than
motive. This is in spite of circuit court opinions distinguishing motive (what prompts a person to act
or fail to act, which could include stereotypes) and intent (the state of mind with which the act is
done or omitted). See, e.g., Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1066 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Black's Law Dictionary 727 (5th ed. 1979)). For more analysis of the Price-Waterhouseplurality
opinion, see Kreiger, supra note 6, at 1172-73.
95. See Krieger, supranote 6, at 1172.
96. The elements of a prima facie case are: (1) plaintiff is a member of a protected class (such as
female or a racial minority); (2) plaintiff was qualified for the position she held; (3) plaintiff suffered
an adverse employment decision (for example, termination); and (4) plaintiff's position remained
open or was later filled by someone with similar qualifications. See, e.g., Burdine,450 U.S. at 253 &
n.6; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Of course, the elements are
modified depending on the factual circumstances of the adverse employment action.
97. See Burdine,450 U.S. at 248.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 256.
100. See Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,577 (1978).
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Because overt racism and sexism are on the decline and employers
have become sophisticated about discrimination law, direct evidence of
discriminatory animus is rare. Many plaintiffs must resort to proving
discrimination indirectly by presenting evidence that the defendant
fabricated pretextual reasons for the adverse decision in order to hide its
true discriminatory purpose. The plaintiff must prove that defendant is
not only bigoted, but is lying to the court and jury-a difficult burden to
meet when the defendant is unaware of the unconscious bias and a jury
can see the real shock and indignation at being accused of bigotry and
perjury.
The current analytical paradigm for disparate treatment leaves no
room for the reality in most employment discrimination cases in which
the employer believes in its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse decision, but in fact operated under the unconscious direction of
cognitive bias and stereotyping. The current analysis shortchanges both
parties because it creates an absurdly difficult burden of proof for the
plaintiff, who will often lose in spite of the discriminatory treatment, and
unfairly casts the defendant as villain, often imposing punitive damages
to "punish" behavior not engaged in intentionally.''
A third fundamental problem with the current jurisprudential model in
disparate treatment cases is its assumption that decisionmakers are aware
of their biases and consciously consider them when making an allegedly
discriminatory decision. For example, in Price-Waterhouse, the plurality
opinion held that the words "fail or refuse" in Title VII's section
703(a)(1) mean that the protected status must have been a factor in the
decision at the actual moment it was made.'0° Justice O'Connor's
concurrence would require even more of the plaintiff-a showing ' 0of3
"direct evidence of discriminatory animus in the decisionalprocess."
For O'Connor, "stray remarks" demonstrating stereotyped beliefs made
outside of the timeframe of the decisionmaking process are insufficient
per se because they do not show that the discriminatory attitude actually
motivated the decisionmaker to make the decision at the actual time the
decision was made." 4 It is rare for a person affected by unconscious bias
to be aware of the bias at all, let alone to manifest it in unambiguous
101.

See Krieger, supra note 6, at 1177-80.
102. See Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989); Krieger, supra note 6, at
1182-84.
103. Price-Waterhouse,490 U.S. at 278 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
104. See id. at 277; see also Krieger, supranote 6, at 1183-84 & n.88.
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terms at the time of the decision. Indeed, greater awareness of one's
unconscious bias lowers the risk that the bias will manifest in discriminatory words or acts." The proof requirements for showing
decisionmaker bias in mixed-motive cases are nearly impossible for
plaintiffs to meet, and they reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the
human cognitive process.
Not only is Title VII ineffective to redress the real life phenomenon of
discrimination, but current disparate treatment theory may actually
exacerbate discriminatory animus and intergroup tension. Due to the
intent requirement and all that entails, the plaintiff's necessary pleadings
generate defensiveness and resentment. 6 People dislike accusations of
intentional wrongdoing when they think they have done nothing wrong.
This normal human response to an accusation of intentional
discrimination, when no such intent was actually involved and when
coupled with litigation costs, engenders distrust of minorities claiming
discrimination. Title VII's convoluted analytical history (also a result of
the "lack of fit" between Title VII's models of liability and the discriminatory process it attempts to redress)" 7 has contributed to resentment toward Title VII plaintiffs because it is confusing and fails to
instruct defendants properly on how to avoid liability. 8 This resentment
causes people to "notice" race and other protected statuses more, making
protected statuses more salient and thereby exacerbating the vicious
cycle on both conscious and unconscious levels. In sum, Title VII is
failing both practically and normatively.
Professor Krieger suggests a number of reforms to Title VII analysis
to deal more appropriately with the more common form of employment
discrimination-cognitive bias. First, she advocates eliminating the
pretext model of individual disparate treatment and replacing it with a
"motivating factor" analysis similar to that set forth in PriceWaterhouse. 9 Evidence of stereotyping, the biasing effect of solo status
(for example, being the only Latino in a company), and better treatment
105. See supra Part II.A.
106. That is, the plaintiff must produce evidence of race- or gender-inappropriate language and
deeds to demonstrate intent. This produces feelings of betrayal on the part of the defendant, who
often honestly does not believe her off-color remarks are relevant.
107. For a thorough analysis of the incoherence of Title VII's liability theories originating from
their failure to recognize the unconscious aspect of most instances of discrimination, see Krieger,
supra note 6, at 1218-37.
108. See id. at 1239-40.
109. See id. at 1241-43.
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of similarly situated Caucasian employees could result in liability
without proof of intentional wrongdoing or proof that the employer is
lying about its reasons for the adverse employment decision. Second,
courts should differentiate between intentional and unintentional forms
of disparate treatment by setting up a two-tiered liability scheme for
"willful" versus unintentional discrimination, similar to that set forth in
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)."0 These are
possible ways to redress unconscious bias immediately because they
depart analytically from the all-or-nothing proof-of-intent scheme
currently in place but do not require legislative amendment to the statute.
David Benjamin Oppenheimer has similarly addressed Title VII's
ineffectiveness and the need for a different model of liability. Professor
Oppenheimer has suggested a negligence model of discrimination
liability under Title VII.L' Professor Oppenheimer argues that under both
the Griggs disparate impact theory and the Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody. 2 less-discriminatory-alternative theory, employers' Title VII
liability is already implicitly based on a negligence standard." 3 Thus,
Title VII liability can arise either as a result of the negligent adoption of
an employee selection device that has a discriminatory impact not
required by business necessity, or Title VII liability can arise as a result
of the negligent adoption of a discriminatory device that may be justified
by business necessity but is not the least-discriminatory alternative." 4 By
explicitly reaffirming these standards of liability in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Congress clarified that intentional discrimination was only part
of the conduct Title VII seeks to redress and that Title VII is concerned
with the consequences of discrimination, which are the same regardless
of motive or intent. "' This lends support to the theory 6that Title VII
liability could be explicitly based on a negligence theory."
In addition, cases establishing an
protected class members and to
demonstrate that liability need not
disparate impact, but rather on a
110. See id. at 1243; supranote 91.
111. See Oppenheimer, supra note 7, at 900.
112. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
113. See Oppenheimer, supra note 7, at 931-36.
114. See id. at 931.
115. See id. at 935-36.
116. See id.

employer's duty to accommodate
prevent workplace harassment
be premised on intent, or even
negligence-type failure to take
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affirmative steps to prevent harassment." 7 Oppenheimer concludes that
employers who treat minorities and women less favorably than white
men breach their duty not to discriminate and should be held liable under
a negligence theory.'
Oppenheimer thus proposes that when an
employer knows or should know that discrimination is occurring, the
employer should be held negligent if it fails to act to prevent the
discrimination." 9 Negligence liability should similarly attach when an
employer breaches its duty to avoid making employment decisions by
means that have a discriminatory effect-for example, by failing to find
less-discriminatory alternatives and failing to examine its own motives
for evidence of stereotyping.
Oppenheimer presents two examples of an employer's affirmative
duty to prevent negligent discrimination. First, when a protected class
member is denied employment, the rejection should act as a "triggering
device" requiring the employer to review the decision for possible
discriminatory motives."o However, research has shown that people are
unable to define the reasons for their unconscious-bias decisions, based
upon "ultimate attribution error," "aversive racism," and other ways of
denying our own prejudice, part conscious and part unconscious.' 2 '
Social psychology research indicates that most people operating under
unconscious bias will fail to identify their bias. However, objective
unconscious-bias testing exposes the existence and probable impact of
unconscious bias on personnel decisionmaking, helping the employer to
recognize discriminatory attitudes that may result in discriminatory
conduct. Unconscious-bias testing thus enhances and makes legitimate
the application of a negligence standard of liability under Title VII by
giving the employer objective data which in turn gives rise to an
affirmative duty to act to prevent discrimination. In other words, while
117. Seeid. at 936-69.
118. See id. at 967.
119. See id. at 969.
120. Id. at 970.
121. People are often completely unaware of their own motivation, and when confronted with
reasons for their actions they will state reasons consistent with their actions, although those stated
reasons may be completely divorced from their real unconscious motivation. See Telephone
Interview with Margo J. Monteith, supra note 24; see also Krieger, supra note 6, at 1206-07 &
nn.206-11, 1245 & n.376. The theory of "Aversive racism" explains the phenomenon whereby
people create unprejudiced, rational reasons for their actions because they are unwilling to believe
their actions were motivated by prejudice. See, e.g., Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The
Aversive Form of Racism, in Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism 61-69 (John F. Dovidio &
Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986).
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aversive racism and other tendencies to disbelieve discrimination is
happening might prevent a finding that an employer "knew or should
have known," unconscious-bias-testing results establish employer
knowledge, and if combined with employer failure to act, negligence.
Second, Oppenheimer suggests that when an employer has created
procedures that fail to correct for unconscious discrimination, the
employer should be subject to liability for negligent discrimination if
discrimination results. 2 ' However, inadequate guidance exists on what
specific steps employers can take to avoid the effects of unconscious
bias. At present, without an objective measure of unconscious bias and
an understanding of how to mitigate its effects, employers would have to
"guess" at both the source of bias and the means to mitigate it
effectively. Thus an imposition of an affirmative duty is unworkable and
123
could even exacerbate intergroup anxiety and discrimination.
Unconscious-bias testing, however, would provide employers with
objective data on which to justify removing decisionmaking authority
over minority employees and applicants from specific biased persons,
thus lessening the potential for unfair evaluations or discipline. An
employer's failure to take appropriate action based on test results would
constitute negligence.
As proposed herein, the privilege for unconscious-bias testing is
qualified and would be lost by failure to take corrective action in
response to test results. Thus, although the privilege intends to encourage
unconscious-bias testing with the expectation of confidentiality, its
higher purpose is to encourage more egalitarian employment practices.
So to the extent an employer fails to act reasonably in response to test
results, it will lose the privilege's protection and the test results could
then be used as proof of knowledge and failure to act, that is, negligence.
Unconscious-bias testing may thus provide notice to employers that
discrimination is likely to occur without intervention, creating a duty to
act to prevent discrimination and supporting a negligence theory of
liability. In addition, if and when unconscious-bias testing becomes
widely used, the relationship between test results and discrimination will
become more clear, which will help to define further employers' duty of
care and perhaps also lead to additional ways to identify discrimination
objectively. Of course, while unconscious-bias testing may provide a
solid basis on which to base negligence liability, simply recognizing a
122. See Oppenheimer, supra note 7, at 970.
123. See Krieger, supranote 6, at 1246-47.
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negligence theory of liability under Title VII will encourage
unconscious-bias testing, as it is one way in which employers can
exercise care to avoid discrimination.
B.

Affirmative Action

Other than employment discrimination lawsuits, affirmative action has
been the primary tool for redressing and controlling employment
discrimination. This antidiscrimination device may be particularly
effective to combat unconscious bias because, as social psychologist
Mahzarin R. Banaji puts it, it "bypasses our unconsciously compromised
judgment."'24 That is, affirmative action is more effective than other
means of preventing discrimination because it does not depend upon the
employer's attempting not to consider race. As the research demonstrates, race is constantly considered, if only unconsciously. Because
attempting to "ignore" race equates to disadvantaging racial minorities, it
is necessary to consider race simply to counter the ubiquitous effect of
racial bias and to create equal opportunity."2 Theoretically, affirmative
action should remain in place until research demonstrates that racial bias,
both conscious and unconscious, has been virtually eradicated from our
society-a far cry from the current empirical statistics. Affirmative
action works to create more equal opportunities; the loss of affirmative
action will mean perpetuation of discrimination and an unjust status quo.
However, the empirical evidence regarding the effect of affirmative
action on intergroup relations is conflicting. Compelling research
indicates that, at least in certain situations, affirmative action exacerbates
intergroup tensions, increases stereotyping, and creates a sense of
injustice among whites. 6 On the other hand, other empirical research
has found that a racially balanced workforce involving cooperative,
individuating contact is necessary to eliminate intergroup bias-a racial
balance that can be achieved quickly through affirmative action.'27 In any
case, the debate over affirmative action may be on the brink of
obsolescence, as affirmative action is currently threatened with
extinction, leaving the questionable efficacy of Title VII with its

124. Paul, smpra note 11, at 52 (quoting Yale Professor Mahzarin tM Banaji).
125. See Krieger, supra note 65, at 1287-88 (arguing that because we are unaware of our
unconscious bias, we must consider race to avoid discriminating).
126. See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text; see also Krieger, supra note 65, at 1258-76.
127. See Krieger, supra note 65, at 1275-76.
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"colorblind" approach to discrimination as the only mechanism left to
fight discrimination in employment." 8 The reasons for affirmative
action's recent institutionalized rejection underscore the need for
alternative proactive measures to control discrimination in general and
the need for unconscious-bias testing in particular.
That affirmative action is on its way out is apparent; it has lost the
support of both the courts and the majority of Americans. For example,
in 1996, California voters passed Proposition 209 and amended their
state constitution to preclude affirmative action in public education,
contracting, and employment.2 9 Washington State voters approved
virtually identical statewide legislation in 1998, making affirmative
action illegal in state and local government employment, contracting, and
education. 30 Other states have already begun to follow suit, encouraged
no doubt by the fact that California's Proposition 209 survived legal
challenge, culminating with the U.S. Supreme Court's refusal to grant
certiorari.'
Proponents of similar federal legislation will also be
encouraged,' and in conjunction with the Court's recent "unprecedented
assault" on affirmative action, it appears at this time to be destined for
extinction.'33
128. See infra note 142.
129. On November 5, 1996, Proposition 209 won California voter approval by a narrow margin,
amending the California Constitution. See Dave Lescher, Battle over Prop.209 Moves to the Courts,
L.A. Times, Nov. 7, 1996, at Al. The amended section now reads: "The state shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting." Cal. Const. art. I, § 31.
130. Virtually indentical to California's Proposition 209, Washington State's Initiative 200, which
provided for a ban on preferential treatment based on race, ethnicity, and gender in state and local
government employment, contracting, and education, went to the Washington voters on November
3, 1998, and passed by a margin of 58% to 42%. See Initiative 200-New Battle Begins: Interpreting
Law, Seattle Times, Nov. 4, 1998, at B1.
13 1. See Krieger, supra note 65, at 1254-55 & nn.3-7.
132. See, e.g., id. at 1255 & n.8.
133. Erwin Chemerinsky, What Would Be the Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action?,
Symposium on Race Relations in America, 27 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 313, 314 (1997). In 1978, the
U.S. Supreme Court first ruled on affirmative action in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and the Court held without a majority opinion that "set asides" for
minority students were impermissible. In 1989, the Court held that strict scrutiny was the proper test
for evaluating a city's race-based affirmative action program. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989). The Court extended that holding to federal government affirmative action programs
in 1995. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213-37 (1995) (overruling Metro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which held that intermediate scrutiny was the proper test
for "benign" classifications, that is, race-based affirmative action). Race-based affirmative action
programs thus face a presumption of unconstitutionality and must meet the strict scrutiny test of
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The goals of affirmative action have not been met. The statistics that
originally gave rise to affirmative action remain compelling. Affirmative
action was born out of the factual reality that minorities historically have
faced and continue to face considerably inferior public education, underrepresentation in programs of higher education, limited access to housing
and lending (both mortgage and business), vastly different treatment by
the health care community (resulting in increased risk of a variety of
dangerous and terminal medical conditions), and a disproportionate
likelihood of living in poverty, or at least, with substantially less

economic power than white men.'34 Similarly, women continue to earn
substantially less than men, yet pay more for products and services and

face objectively proven discrimination in health care and economic
opportunities.' 35 Indeed, women of all races earn substantially less than

men. White women earn less than black men, and minority women face a
"synergistic" discrimination based on the intersection of their minority
and gender statuses, causing them generally to earn substantially less

than either minority men or white women. 36 There is simply no question
that gross disparities continue to exist between white males and all other
groups in -terms of employment opportunities, economic advantage,
political power, and almost every other indicator of social status.

Civil rights activism of the 1960s increased awareness of the depth
and breadth of racial and gender injustice and led to efforts to combat it,

including affirmative action. The arguments for affirmative action
include

remedying past

discrimination,'

- enhancing

diversity,'38

being narrowly tailored and necessary to achieve a compelling government interest, the same test to
determine the constitutionality of allegedly race-based discrimination. Note, however, that consistent
with the intermediate scrutiny applied to claims of gender-based discrimination, see Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976), the intermediate-scrutiny standard is the test for gender-based affirmative
action plans. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
134. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supranote 133, at 313-14; Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 958-96.
135. See Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 966-73, 978-89.
136. See id. at 966-73; see also Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Cleaning Up/Kept Down: A Historical
Perspectiveon RacialInequality in "Women's Work,"43 Stan. L. Rev. 1333, 1333-34 n.5 (1991).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (upholding court order for one-forone hiring and promoting of blacks and whites until effects of past discrimination were eradicated as
appropriate measure for past discrimination); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding
federal law setting aside public-works money for minority businesses based on congressional finding
of history of discrimination in construction industry).
138. In Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314, Justice Powell argued that colleges and universities have a
compelling interest in having a diverse student body. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Court has
also held that government preferences to minority businesses in licensing of broadcast stations are
permissible because they enhance diversity of viewpoints. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
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4
providing role models, 3 9 increasing the political power of minorities, 1
and generally enhancing wealth, services, and opportunities to
minorities."' Arguments against affirmative action include claims that it
is unconstitutional, as the constitution requires "colorblind" application
of the laws; 142 it is unfair because it is not based on merit; 43 and it harms
innocent white persons, stigmatizes racial minorities, and increases racial
tension. 4

While these arguments may prove obsolete in light of the U.S.
Supreme Court's tacit support of the majority's ability to vote out

547 (1990), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. 200. In Adarand, the Court overruled Metro
Broadcasting and held that strict scrutiny is the proper test for federal-government-imposed
affirmative action. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. While the Court has not ruled that diversity may
never constitute a compelling interest, at least one circuit has found that diversity cannot be a
compelling interest in education based on Adarand and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989). See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,945-46 (5th Cir. 1996).
139. The Court, however, has held that providing role models is not a valid basis for making racebased employment decisions. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 284 (1986),
the Court declared unconstitutional a lay-off system in which white teachers with more seniority
were laid off ahead of black teachers based upon the assertion that black teachers were needed as
role models for the students.
140. This argument has been unsuccessful in justifying re-drawing election districts to provide
racial minorities with more political power. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Making Sense ofthe Affirmative Action Debate, 22 Ohio N.U.
L. Rev. 1159, 1164-65 (1996).
141. See Chemerinsky, supranote 140, at 1166-67.
142. Id. at 1171-72. The "colorblind" concept that race should not be used to benefit minorities
any more than it should be used to discriminate against minorities finds support in Justice Harlan's
famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Justice Harlan stated that "[o]ur
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.... The law
regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color ....
" Id. at 559. Of
course, the Plessy majority's "separate but equal" doctrine was ruled unconstitutional in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Justice Harlan's quote has been interpreted to mean that
"benign" or "reverse" discrimination based on race, that is, any race-based classification including
affirmative action plans, is unconstitutional as contrary to the "color-blind" mandate unless it meets
the test of strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Richmond, 488 U.S. 469. For an interesting discussion on why
"colorblind" analysis cannot work in light of empirical research indicating that normal human
cognitive processing is far from colorblind, and in fact, a colorblind approach to intergroup relations
is dangerous and will aggravate intergroup relations, see Krieger, supra note 65, at 1276-91. See
also Chemerinsky, supra note 133, at 318-21 (arguing that at times Constitution requires that we
consider color); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Colorblind," 44 Stan. L. Rev. I
(1991).
143. See Chemerinsky, supra note 140, at 1172-73. For an analysis of the construct of "merit"
from a social-psychological perspective, see Krieger, supra note 65, at 1291-302.
144. See Chemerinsky, supra note 140, at 1171-75; see also Krieger, supra note 65, at 1258-76.
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affirmative action, 45 they are relevant to understanding how affirmative
action has come under attack and how affirmative action's legacy
supports the need for alternatives such as unconscious-bias testing. The
most compelling argument against affirmative action is that it is
fundamentally inefficacious; it harms minorities by damaging intergroup
relations more than it helps, with the attendant increased discriminatory
attitudes towards minorities which is manifested, inter alia, in voting out
affirmative action. The irony is that the reason affirmative action has
taken so much heat is the same reason it is so desperately needed. The
practical reality, however, is that as long as most people harbor negative
feelings about affirmative action and its beneficiaries, the net result may
very well be that it hurts minorities (and society in general) more than it
helps. Understanding why affirmative action has come under so much
attack is thus particularly important to creating and evaluating alternatives.
Research regarding the potential effectiveness of affirmative action is
contradictory and unclear. Some empirical research is fairly straightforward in supporting the view that using minority preferences
exacerbates intergroup bias: majority group subjects who believe
employers use preferences in selecting minority and women employees
view the employees (that is, affirmative action beneficiaries) as less
qualified and less capable.'4 6 This perception of affirmative action
beneficiaries tends to entrench and confirm out-group stereotypes, which
are very difficult to change even in the face of disconfirming data.'47
145. That is, the Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari regarding Proposition 209 essentially
gives voters the ability to decide whether affirmative action is acceptable, which means majority
vote controls whether minorities are given equalizing opportunities through affirmative action. This
is consistent with the Rehnquist Court's majoritarian paradigm but is philosophically contrary to the
very purpose of the Court as a nonmajoritarian entity to protect fundamental rights embodied in the
Constitution against majority rule. The Framers explicitly distrusted majority rule and created the
Constitution primarily to shield certain rights from majority control. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5,
at 74-77.
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and
property... and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.
West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). Affirmative action's purpose is to
counteract the unfair deprivation of employment and other opportunities, and it should not be subject
to majority rule.
146. See Krieger, supra note 65, at 1264-65.
147. See infra Part Ill.B; see also Krieger, supranote 125, at 1267-70.
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Perhaps even worse, the use of preferences likely increases the salience
of the out-group characteristic preferred, which in turn increases
attention to the characteristic, increases the number of negative
attributions, and ultimately reinforces stereotypes and intergroup bias. 48
Basically, the extent to which affirmative action beneficiaries succeed is
often attributed to preferential selection, not merit, and negative
stereotypes are thus perpetuated. However, other research shows that
where relatively equal numbers of members of different groups exist,
group membership distinctions become less salient, and cooperative
149
interdependence tasks and social interaction can reduce stereotyping.
Because affirmative action can result in a more equally balanced
workforce quickly, it can create environments in which out-group
characteristics are rendered less salient and stereotyping is reduced. 5
Nonetheless, because the majority of Americans believe that affirmative
action is unfair, unnecessary, or counterproductive, this belief probably
trumps affirmative action's potential. In spite of affirmative action's
potential to create more harmony among various societal groups, the fact
that most Americans do not want it renders it considerably less effective
and possibly even counterproductive.
Ironically, the reasons why most Americans do not want affirmative
action are based on the same type of intergroup dynamics that gave rise
to the need for affirmative action in the first place. In-group/out-group
psychology, coupled with factual ignorance about minorities' plight in
America, has resulted in disdain for affirmative action, which has led to
its demise.
Social psychology research indicates that people's perception of
fairness turns on whose treatment is judged as fair or unfair. 5' When
members of one's own group are rewarded for superior performance,
subjects tend to favor merit-based rewards.' 52 However, when an outgroup member performs better, subjects tend to want to equalize rewards
between the in-group and out-group members.'53 The result is that one's
own group member benefits as much as possible under either set of

148. See Krieger, supranote 65, at 1267, 1274-75.
149. See id. at 1274-76.
150. See id. at 1276.
151. See id. at 1297.
152. See id.
153. See id.
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circumstances.' 54 The logical extrapolation of this research is that the fact
that affirmative action's very purpose is to benefit out-group members
probably creates a sense of injustice on the part of the majority in-group.
It is thus not surprising that the majority of Americans feel this country
has "gone too far" in pushing equal rights. So, in addition to all of the
ways in which unconscious bias, not to mention just plain racism, affect
the majority's perception of minorities, in-group/out-group dynamics
militate against the majority's viewing racial justice as "fair."
In conjunction with the human tendency to harbor biases against
minorities and to favor in-group members at the expense of out-group
members, Americans are woefully ignorant about racial statistics.
Interestingly, popular conceptions about affirmative action reflect a
dissociation between Americans' subjective beliefs and factual reality
strikingly similar to individuals' dissociation between consciously held
racial beliefs and unconscious bias. The striking similarity lies in the
oblivion in which people in our society form opinions on racial issues
and form judgments about out-group members. In other words, society at
large has views about affirmative action and discrimination that are
grossly divergent from reality, a divergence reminiscent of the dissociation between conscious beliefs and unconscious bias first empirically
proven by Patricia Devine.'5 5 This divergence has created impatience and
hostility towards minorities in general and resistance to affirmative
action in particular.
A few statistics relating to the divergence between people's views on
American treatment of minorities and the reality of the American
minority experience are illustrative of the ignorance with which people
form opinions and cast votes on racial issues. For example, minorities are
considerably lacking in medical insurance compared with whites, are less
likely to receive expensive medical treatment for the same illnesses, and
generally receive inferior health care services even controlling for ability
to pay. Yet, sixty-four percent of whites surveyed in 1995 believed that
blacks' access to health care is as good or better than whites' access to
health care (only thirty percent responding that blacks' access is worse),
and fifty-one percent believed access to health care for Hispanics is
better than for white Americans.'5 6 In the employment context, blacks
make considerably less money than whites as a whole (at least twenty to
154. See id. at 1297-98 & n.160.
155. See supra notes 31-47 and accompanying text.
156. See Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 981-84.
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thirty percent less), are more than four times less likely to receive job
offers than white applicants, are disproportionately laid off in times of
economic recession, and had an unemployment rate two to three times
higher than whites between 1970 and 1990 (with the rate generally
increasing over the twenty-year period).'57 Nonetheless, white perception
is quite the contrary. Polls taken in 1995 indicated that a majority (fiftyeight percent) of whites believe that the average American black is as
well off as the average American white in terms of jobs, and seventy
percent of whites believe58that blacks are better off than whites in terms of
risk of losing their jobs.1
Fundamentally, Americans understand neither why affirmative action
is necessary nor the fact that it simply counters discrimination,
equalizing employment opportunities as opposed to giving minorities an
unfair and undeserved advantage. A Newsweek poll taken in 1995 found
that twice as many respondents believed that whites were losing out
because of affirmative action than believed blacks were losing out
because of discrimination.'59 Other polls found that fifty-four percent of
whites believe that America has "gone too far" in pushing equal rights;
thirty-seven percent of whites believe that whites are losing out to
minorities in the workplace due to unfair preferences and that this is a
bigger problem than minorities' facing discrimination and lack of
opportunity for advancement."6 But these statistics are more a reflection
of unconscious bias and in-group/out-group dynamics than a cause for
not supporting affirmative action. That is, simply educating people about
statistics cannot change people's attitudes towards minorities per se. This
is because even with corrected factual understanding, the psychological
processes behind the attitudes will not be affected, and people will tend
to apply stereotypes (such as that black people are lazy)
to account for
' 61
the statistical disparity-one form of "aversive racism."'
Underlying this white perspective that affirmative action "benefits"
minorities to the detriment of whites is the "transparency
157. See id. at 966-73; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 133, at 315-16; Oppenheimer, supra
note 7, at 914-15. Note that one study on high-priced restaurants in Philadelphia found male
applicants five times more likely to receive job offers than female applicants. See Krieger, supra
note 65, at 1303 & n.187. There is simply no question that both minorities and women face extensive
employment discrimination.
158. See Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 972 & nn.325-26.
159. See id. at 958-59 & n.217.
160. Id.
161. See supra note 121.
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phenomenon":"' whites do not "notice" their own race or the "property
interest"'63 being white automatically confers. Whites are constantly
advantaged on account of their skin color but are so accustomed to. this
advantage that it is transparent; whiteness is invisible to whites. Whites'
unawareness of their own race causes them to overlook their automatic
head start in all social realms. By failing to see how whiteness puts them
ahead already, affirmative action is viewed as upsetting the equal playing
field rather than leveling it. Whites view themselves as unfairly losing
out due to affirmative action, instead of unfairly winning without it. They
therefore mistakenly view the noble concept of "colorblindness" as a
truly equalizing paradigm rather than the perpetuation of an unjust status
quo.
As unjustified as most Americans' views may be, they help explain
whites' lack of support for affirmative action and buttress the argument
that affirmative action is bad for society and exacerbates intergroup
relations. Regardless of affirmative action's potential, if the majority feel
that it is unfair, the majority will target affirmative action beneficiaries
with increased negative stereotypes, minorities will become more aware
of their minority status, and the majority will focus more on individual
minorities-all of which entrenches and exacerbates the social
phenomena that create discriminatory attitudes and actions." Thus,
considering most Americans' opinions about affirmative action, it may
increase stereotyping and discrimination. Paradoxically, the loss of
affirmative action will result in fewer minorities and women in the
workplace, making their "token" presence more noticeable and their
minority status more salient, thus increasing the risk of stereotyping.
Furthermore, because studies indicate that juries have a more difficult
time discerning discrimination in individual cases as opposed to in the
aggregate, employment discrimination litigation is even less likely to be
effective.' 65
Not coincidentally, the key to understanding both the need for
affirmative action (in addition to other proactive measures to combat
racial injustice) and our individual biases is reconciling perception with

162. See generallyFlagg, supra note 81.
163. See generallyCheryl L Harris, Whiteness as Property,106 Harv. L. Rev. 1709 (1993).
164. See Krieger, supra note 65, at 1267, 1274-75.
165. See id.at 1305-09 (describing research indicating that when subjects viewed aggregate data
of compensation differentials between male and female employees, subjects were significantly more
able to discern discrimination than when presented with specific case information only).
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reality. The first step in changing our perceptions is to recognize that
they are not reality. This recognition is necessary to begin the process of

creating more egalitarian beliefs from within,

66

which in turn will

become manifest in less stereotyping, better intergroup relations, and
more support for affirmative action or other proactive measures of
combating discrimination. This recognition can be achieved through
unconscious-bias testing.
In sum, regardless of the success of some affirmative action
programs 67 and affirmative action's potential for improving intergroup
relations, as long as the public perceives affirmative action as unfair or
unnecessary and the courts allow the public to determine its applicability
by popular vote, affirmative action cannot and will not be an effective
means for redressing and controlling discrimination and may even
exacerbate intergroup tension and discrimination. Unconscious-bias
testing is an alternative that potentially not only helps control biased
decisionmaking in employment settings but also educates individuals
about their own and others' bias. Recognition of our own unconscious
bias precipitates changes in attitudes toward minorities and ultimately
should drastically change the public's perception of the need for
affirmative action and other types of proactive programs, while
concurrently contributing to their efficacy.'68

166. See infra Part I.A.
167. For example, in 1975, the year after Governor Reagan made California's affirmative action
program official, high-salaried California public employees were 90% white. The minority
classifications of African American, Asian American, and Hispanic each constituted less than 3% of
the high-salaried positions. By 1993, less than 70% of these positions were held by whites, with
African Americans occupying 9.3% of the positions, Asian Americans 9.9%, and Hispanics 11.7%.
See Rebecca LaVally et al., California Office of Research, The Status of Affirmative Action in
California35 (1995).
168. One other way in which individual unconscious-bias testing positively contributes to
people's attitudes is that it creates a sense of personal responsibility, precluding the human tendency
to "diffuse" responsibility. Psychologists have long known that when in groups, people tend to
assume someone else will take responsibility for a necessary action (such as reporting a fire or
crime), a concept known as "diffusion of responsibility." Such diffusion is particularly likely to
occur among people who do not believe they contributed to the need for action. In discussing
affirmative action, most of us have heard the argument: "Affirmative action is unfair... I never
owned slaves.., why should I be punished?!" By exposing the subjects' individual bias, and
hopefully concurrently educating the subjects that they can change if they want to, unconscious-bias
testing makes diffusion of responsibility less likely to occur and forces people to confront the role
they play in the perpetuation of racial injustice.
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III. EMPLOYER TESTING OF UNCONSCIOUS BIAS IS
ESSENTIAL TO ERADICATING EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
A.

The Benefits of Unconscious-Bias Testing

The benefits of unconscious-bias testing are many. Our minds are
programmed to create and perpetuate stereotypes, and unconscious-bias
testing is a way of combating unfair, negative stereotypes in a number of
important ways. The potential societal benefit of unconscious-bias
testing cannot be overstated.
Our minds naturally stereotype. Successfully interacting in a society
requires that we categorize information to retrieve efficiently the right
information at the right time, such as, for example, when discerning from
a distance a dog from a bicycle. Such categorization is considered a
normal and necessary component of efficient cognitive functioning. 69
Stereotypes result from categorizing and constitute schematic knowledge
structures that facilitate the encoding of expectancy-congruent rather
than incongruent information in memory. 7 ' This means that stereotypes
"fill in" missing information and are self-perpetuating, in that data
supporting the stereotype is encoded while data not supporting the
stereotype is discarded. For example, when people learn something about
another person that is not consistent with their preconceived beliefs (such
as a soccer player with a towering IQ), people tend to employ strategies
to undermine the impact of information that "disconfirms" the
stereotype. People may ignore discrepant information or consider it
based on situational causes. The result is that stereotypes are maintained
in the face of disconfirming data.' Furthermore, "forgetting" stereotypes is a "resource demanding mental operation," counterproductive to
the efficiency for which they were created in the first place, and therefore
stereotypes are not amenable to change without intervention.'72

169. See C. Neil Macrae et al., On the Regulation ofRecollection: The IntentionalForgettingof
StereotypicalMemories,72 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 709,711 (1997).
170. See id. "Schemas" fill in missing information about a person or event based on information
presented to generate expectancies about what is going to happen next. These expectancies guide our

behavior during social interaction so we can respond appropriately to social situations. See Chen &
Bargh, supranote 22, at 541.
171. See Macme et al., supra note 169, at 717.
172. Id. at 713-14.
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The way the mind processes memory also discourages stereotype
change. Stereotypes are easy to remember and, in part based on the ease
of retrieval, perniciously hard to forget. Indeed, attempting to "forget"
stereotypes may lead to a "rebound" effect in which the stereotype one
tries to avoid is actually promoted.' This is because stereotypes are so
easy to call up, easy to reinforce, and are called up frequently, and, as a
result, take tremendous mental resources to "forget." In sum, stereotypes
are created as part of our brain's normal operation and are programmed
in such a way that they are particularly resistant to change.'74
Tests uncovering the degree to which individuals engage in unconscious stereotyping benefit society in two general ways. First, simply
identifying persons with extreme tendencies to stereotype arms
employers with information necessary to prevent this unconscious
stereotyping from manifesting in discriminatory actions in the workplace. Job responsibilities calling for subjective analysis of employees'
attitude or performance could be taken away from persons demonstrating
extreme unconscious bias. Alternatively, employers could create a
"check" on personnel decisions and actions taken by these people to
ensure that unconscious bias is not occurring in the decisionmaking
process. While such modifications to the employment decisionmaking
process may be far from perfect, at least the pernicious problem of
stereotyping is exposed and considered rather than hidden from all but
those who feel its painful effects.
Second, and probably more important in the long run, recognition of
unconscious bias may initiate mental processes that actually stop
stereotyping at its origin.' In spite of pessimism concerning controlling
and ameliorating societal stereotypes, recent studies investigating the
degree to which a person's motivations and knowledge of her own
stereotypes can cause her to overcome automatically produced
behavioral effects are encouraging. Scientists are beginning to develop
theories about how stereotypes can be "deautomatized."' 76 In addition to
the obvious and immediate benefit of being able to use unconscious-bias
testing to achieve more fair personnel practices, several theories exist

173. Seeid. at 717.
174. See id.
175. See infra notes 181-220 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 181-220 and accompanying text.
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that support unconscious-bias testing as a step in actually eradicating
unconscious bias from where it originates.'77
Thus, fundamental reasons why unconscious-bias testing is beneficial
to society exist apart from the instant ability to assure that personnel
decisionmakers are not harboring unfair bias and manifesting it against
certain employees. These reasons fall into two major related categories:
(1) actually reversing unconscious stereotyping and (2) interfering with a
well-known interpersonal dynamic called "behavioral confirmation"
through feedback about how unconscious bias affects our outward
behavior. Regarding the first category, recent research has indicated that
even unconscious bias can be reversed once it is identified. For example,
a series of psychology studies imply that when people exhibit more
prejudiced responses than they deem appropriate based upon their
conscious beliefs, they begin a process of conforming their exhibited
behavior to their feelings about appropriate behavior, at least when they
experience guilt as a result of discovering their unconscious bias.'78
Psychologists call subjects' unconscious responses that are more
prejudiced than the subjects' conscious standards "prejudice-related
discrepancies," and few if any researchers would disagree with the
conclusion that these discrepancies are common.179
Both high-prejudiced and low-prejudiced subjects are prone to these
discrepancies. The main difference between the two groups is that lowprejudiced people view their low-prejudice standards as highly important
to their self-concept, experience strong negative consequences of transgressing their own standards (such as guilt and self-criticism), and are
committed to responding consistently with their standards.' 80 Highprejudiced people do not have well-internalized personal standards
regarding prejudice. Thus, they are not motivated in the same way as
low-prejudiced people are to bring their actions into conformity with
their belief system. This is in spite of the fact that they showed even
greater prejudice in unconscious testing than they admitted to in
conscious testing, and thus also have prejudice-related discrepancies.
According to Patricia Devine's research, prejudiced responses persist
among many low-prejudiced people because of spontaneous,
177. See infra notes 181-220 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Devine, supra note 31; Kawakami et al., supra note 48; Lepore & Brown, supra
note 39; Monteith, supra note 19.
179. See Monteith, supra note 19, at 469.
180. See infra notes 193-99.
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unintentional stereotypes that are highly accessible knowledge structures
that can be automatically activated even if they are not actually endorsed
by the person.' Conscious beliefs or attitudes about stereotyped groups
are less accessible and often inconsistent with the stereotypical
associations stored in memory. In order to conform one's behavior with
one's low-prejudiced belief system, one must inhibit spontaneous
stereotype-based responses and deliberately replace them with beliefbased responses.'82 Devine theorizes that achieving control over
prejudiced responses after internalizing low-prejudiced beliefs' 83 is no
easy task and appears to be a gradual process much like breaking a
habit.' s4
Devine's theory relies on prior research about the way we stop
behavior we dislike. In the early 1980s, researcher J.A. Gray created the
"behavioral inhibition system" (BIS) neuropsychological model of
motivation and learning, to explain the mechanisms involved in learning
to inhibit discrepant responses that have resulted in aversive past events,
such as guilt.'85 This model holds that when an unexpected or aversive
event occurs (a "mismatch" or "discrepancy" that causes guilt or selfcriticism), the subject's arousal is heightened, and an automatic,
momentary pausing or interruption of the behavior takes place, which is
similar to an orienting response.'86 Then, the sequence of responses
occurring when the discrepancy was detected is "tagged" with a "faulty,
needs checking" indicator and is given enhanced attention.' 87 In addition,
the subject engages in "exploratory-investigative behavior," searching
for indications of the discrepant response.'88 Thus, Gray argued that the
enhanced attention coupled with the exploratory-investigative process
enabled the subject to identify stimuli and responses that predict the
aversive event.'89 Developing response-contingent punishment "cues" is

181. See Devine, supranote 31, at 15-16; see also supranotes 31-47 and accompanying text.
182. See Monteith, supranote 19, at 469.
183. The lack of motivation for high-prejudiced people means they are unlikely to engage in the
steps necessary to achieve low-prejudice responses, because the first step to making change is
internalizing less-prejudiced conscious beliefs.
184. See Devine, supranote 31, at 15-16.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See Monteith, supranote 19, at 470.
See id.
Id.
Id.

189. See id.
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crucial for acquiring the ability to inhibit future discrepant responses. 9 °
The BIS is activated whenever cues that were previously associated with
response-contingent punishment are present, so that the individual
responds with greater restraint (for example, more slowly) for the
purpose of executing a more desirable response. 9' In this way, people
can self-monitor prejudiced responses provided they are aware of them
and are motivated to do so and eventually break the habit of prejudice
and conform their responses to their conscious belief systems and self92
image.
Based upon this theoretical framework about the human ability to
change automatic responses to conform with more-ideal behavior,
Devine and other researchers believe that the first step in breaking the
habit of prejudice is to make the subject aware of a prejudice-related
discrepancy, an awareness that can be achieved through unconsciousbias testing. 93 Social psychology researcher Margo Monteith postulates
that prejudice-related discrepancies should facilitate the prejudicereduction process among low-prejudiced individuals.'94 She studied lowand high-prejudiced subjects who were led to believe that they had
engaged in prejudice-related discrepant behavior (in this case judging a
gay law school applicant more harshly than a heterosexual applicant) and
determined that, indeed, the results provided "clear, converging evidence
that the discrepancy experience did engage these self-regulatory
mechanisms." '95 In other words, Monteith's research results were
consistent with the theory that once people believe they are engaging in
unfair, discriminatory behavior, they will begin the process of modifying
their own behavior-provided of course that they believe such behavior
is wrong.
In a second experiment, Monteith found that the experience of a
prejudice-related discrepancy (again regarding subjects' self-assessed
inappropriate bias against gay men) improved low-prejudiced subjects'
ability to inhibit prejudiced responses and to respond consistently with
their personal standards.' 96 The results showed that the discrepancy
190.
191.
192.
193.

Seeid. at470-71.
Seeid. at471.
See id.
See Devine, supra note 31, at 15; infra note 201 and accompanying text.

194. See Monteith, supra note 19, at 469-70.
195. Id. at 477.
196. Seeid. at482.
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experience produced negative self-directed affects among low- (but not
high-) prejudiced subjects, who then engaged in heightened self-focus
and a preoccupation with their personal prejudice-related discrepancy.
Theoretically, this would result in the subjects' eventually gaining
control over their discrepant responses. 9 7 Monteith has explained this
process by the following real life example: Suppose you are at a party
and someone makes a racist joke and you laugh. 9 Then you feel guilty
about having laughed at the joke, and you become focused on your
thought processes. All sorts of cues then become associated with
laughing at the racist joke, including the person who told it, the
circumstances of being at a party, drinking, and other factors. The next
time you encounter these cues, a warning signal sounds so that you
remember your guilt from before and therefore slow down your
responses and use greater restraint later in a similar situation. Monteith
calls this process "recruiting," which is gathering conscious, deliberate
choices about one's own behavior to supplant the offensive automatic
response-a process that requires self-awareness and dedication to
egalitarian values.'
According to this model, the initiation of the self-regulatory
mechanisms should produce slower, more controlled, and more careful
responses in future situations when prejudiced responses are possible.
Thus, it is possible for people to inhibit prejudiced responses that are
based on spontaneous stereotype activation and replace such responses
with belief-based responses. 2"
It is critical to this process that subjects recognize that their responses
are discrepant from their personal beliefs. As Monteith stated:
[A] potential first step in promoting change among these
individuals may entail heightening their awareness of the
discrepancy between their prejudiced tendencies and their
egalitarian self-images. Such discrepancy experiences may then
encourage subjects to ascribe greater importance to their personal
standards for responding to stereotyped groups and to embark
eventually on the stages of change described herein.2 ' 1

197. See id.
198. See Telephone Interview with Margo J. Monteith, supra note 24.
199. Id.
200. See Monteith, supra note 19, at 477.
201. Id. at 483 (citation omitted).
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Thus, unconscious-bias testing may be a first step in helping people to
conform their behavior to the type of unbiased person they want to be.20 2
The ultimate impact to society from people's behaving in conformity
with their righteous beliefs has metamorphic potential for creating social
justice.
Other psychological research suggests that there may be scientific
methods for "deautomizing" stereotypical responses. Recent analyses of
stereotype processing have proposed that if a subject deliberately
processes nonstereotypical information, she may be able to overcome
automatic processes that create stereotypic responses. 3 In other words,
increasing a subject's attention to nonstereotypical information may
decrease stereotypic responses, which could make it possible to create an
intentional strategy that directs attention toward counterstereotypic
information and thereby moderates stereotypic priming. 2° That is, the
use of counterstereotypic expectancies may operate to disconfirm a
stereotype by facilitating the processing of counterstereotypic
information." 5
In one experiment, researchers sought to discover whether it was
possible to overcome and moderate stereotyped responses by testing
subjects' response time and accuracy in pairing up words with masculine
or feminine target names.20 6 Each subject was given either a "stereotype
strategy" or a "counterstereotype strategy."20 7 For the stereotype strategy,
the researchers advised the subjects that if the initial word was
stereotypically masculine (for example, ambitious) they should expect
the target to be a male name (for example, Patrick).20 8 If the first word
was stereotypically feminine (for example, perfume), they should expect
the target to be female (for example, Lisa).2' They were told that, most

202. Of course, reducing prejudice through the use of careful self-regulation would be impossible
if the subject chose to rationalize nonprejudiced justifications for her responses, which is an "easier"
way to deal with the cognitive dissonance created by behaving in ways that are inconsistent with
one's belief system. John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner's theory of "aversive racism" states
that many people are unwilling to recognize their prejudiced responses, so they generate
nonprejudiced rationalizations for the responses. See Gaertner & Dovidio, supranote 121.
203. See generallyBlair & Banaji, supranote 57; Monteith, supra note 19.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See Blair & Banaji, supra note 57, at 1149.
See id
See id. at 1150.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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of the time, the first word and target name would match in their gender
association, so expecting stereotypes would help them predict upcoming
events and improve their speed and accuracy.2"' The researchers
presented a 5:3 ratio of stereotypic to counterstereotypic trials.2" For the
counterstereotypic strategy, the subjects were told that if the first word
was stereotypically masculine, they should expect the target name to be
female and vice versa." 2 The same standards for speed and accuracy
were used, and the subjects received a 3:5 ratio of stereotypic to
nonstereotypic trials. 13 Thus, these subjects were motivated to maintain
a counterstereotypic intention because expecting counterstereotypes
improved their performance.
The researchers found that when cognitive constraints were low
(meaning the subjects had time to control their responses), the subjects
with stereotype strategy produced strong stereotype priming, and those
with counterstereotype priming produced a complete reversal of
stereotype priming." ' This data suggests that the subjects were able to
eliminate stereotypic responses with an intentional strategy when
cognitive constraints were relatively low. This result is consistent with
current theories regarding conditions in which controlled processes can
override automatic processes to determine the outcome. This is
significant because the automatic operation of semantic and stereotype
associations is generally believed to be based on long-term learning and
therefore not vulnerable to intervention.2 5 Yet, the researchers were able
to demonstrate that when people have an intentional strategy to expect
counterstereotype associations, the basic automatic stereotype priming
was completely reversed.2" 6
Even more surprising were the results when subjects operated under
high cognitive constraints, meaning the amount of time given to
complete the association tasks is generally believed to be too short to
allow for controlled processes and thus the response is considered

210.
211.
212.
213.

See id.
See id.
Seeid. at 1150-51.
Seeid.

214. See id. at 1154.
215. See id.
216. See id.
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unconscious or "automatic."217 Even under such constraints, subjects
with an intentional counterstereotype strategy were able to moderate
stereotype priming significantly."'
The results powerfully support the concept that stereotype priming can
be controlled through use of intentional strategies. These findings are
significant in exposing the role that other task components may play in
revealing an automatic versus controlled response-for example, the
perceiver's intention, the strength of the underlying association, and the
perceiver's motivation to maintain the strategy.219
While this research is new and not yet well understood, it potentially
opens the door to using scientific means to fight racism and prejudice.
Understanding the relationship between the unconscious and conscious
mind is key, considering the various studies indicating that most
prejudice is not conscious. This type of research provides some hope that
persons who are interested in reversing their own unconsciously held
discriminatory attitudes may soon turn to scientists, who may be able to
provide cognitive exercise therapy to reverse the prejudice that inundates
us all from childhood.220
The second major category in which unconscious-bias testing may
benefit society lies in its potential to moderate another well-documented
problem with stereotypes: they change the perceiver's actions, which in
turn affects the target group member's actions. This concept is known as
the "self-fulfilling prophecy" or the "behavioral confirmation" effect,
and it is the most widely studied expectancy effect in social psychology
because of its enormous importance inreal-life settings such as the work
place, and because its effects are a compelling example of the impact of
217. Previous research has indicated that a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA)-which is the time
participants are given to engage, focus, and commit attention to the prime before the onset of the
target-of less than 500 milliseconds sufficiently constrains cognitive resources to reveal an
automatic process. See id The subjects in this study were given 2000 milliseconds SOA and 350
milliseconds SOA for the low cognitive constraints and high constraints, respectively. See id. In
another experiment, the same researchers lowered the SOA to 250 milliseconds and again found that
the subjects may be able to significantly moderate gender stereotyping under such high cognitive

constraints. See id.
218. See Id.
219. See id. at 1157.
220. As Margo Monteith puts it, children do not have a choice about accepting or rejecting
societal stereotypes about minorities and women because they are acquired well before children have
the cognitive abilities or life experiences to form their own beliefs. These stereotypes come from
cultural influences, media images, and people. See Telephone Interview with Margo J. Monteith,
supra note 24.
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cognitive/perceptual processes in social interaction.2"' As explained
herein, we use schemas to anticipate what a stereotyped group member
will be like, how he or she will react, and how we should behave.222 Our
anticipatory behavior toward the group member influences how the
group member responds; in essence, the anticipatory behavior by the
person operating under the stereotype influences and causes the target
group member to engage in the "expected" behavior, thus confirming the
stereotype regardless of the stereotype's accuracy. 223 These behavior
confirmation processes, which often begin with an implicit association,
provide a powerful explanation for how stereotypes and discriminatory
actions are justified and propagated. While the expectancy may be
conscious, both the source of the expectation (for example, subconscious
stereotyping) and the perceiver's role in producing the confirmatory
behavior are not conscious. 224 This makes it "'particularly difficult to
convince the perceiver that his or her stereotypic beliefs are wrong'
225
because the respondent's actions reaffirm the original stereotype.
The mental processing steps involved in behavioral confirmation are
as follows: First, the group stereotype is the source of expectancies or
"provisional hypotheses" about individual members of that group. 26 The
perceiver then behaves toward the target as though these beliefs were
true.227 These usually negative expectancies then affect the perceiver's
behavior toward the target person in a variety of ways. 2 8 As social
221. See Chen & Bargh, supra note 22, at 541-42.
222. See supranote 170.
223. See Chen & Bargh, supra note 22, at 542.
224. See id. at 543.
225. Id. at 544 (quoting D.L. Hamilton & T.K. Troiler, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An
Overview of the Cognitive Approach, in Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism 150 (John F.
Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1985)). Note also that although the phenomenon of behavioral
confirmation is widely accepted, some researchers have questioned its validity. See id. at 544-45.
The criticism is twofold: first, that the passive social-perceptual activities of the perceiver regarding
the target can be modified with the proper motivation (for example, to be accurate); and second, that
experimental expectancies are assumed to be false whereas in real-world settings, the perceiver's
expectancies may be usually accurate. See id. Laboratory studies may thus maximize the
confirmatory effect and not disconfirmatory effects. See id. However, as noted by Chen and Bargh,
these criticisms do not apply to the nonconscious model of behavioral confirmation because the
behavioral consequences of social perception can produce behavioral confirmation automatically as
a result of stereotype activation, in the absence of any false information to experimental participants
about their target-partners. See id. at 545.
226. Id. at 542.
227. See id.
228. See id.
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psychology researchers Mark Chen and John A. Bargh state, "The target
responds to the perceiver's behavior in kind (for example, with hostility
and coldness begetting hostility and coldness) or even actively conforms
to the perceiver's apparent opinion so as not to disrupt the interaction
(for example, playing the 'stupid foreigner' in order to get one's visa
approved)."229 Finally, according to Chen and Bargh, "the perceiver
interprets the target's behavior in line with the expectancy and encodes
'' °
yet another instance of stereotype-consistent behavior. 3 These
processes thus provide a powerful mechanism for maintaining,
propagating, and justifying stereotypes and prejudiced behavior."
The concept of behavioral confirmation has been accepted by the
social psychology community for more than twenty-five years. For
example, a 1974 study found that Caucasians who interviewed African
Americans and Caucasians displayed different interview styles toward
the two groups: when interviewing African Americans, the interviewers
took less time, made more speech errors, and treated the interviewees
with less urgency. 2 An application of the two objective interview styles
to a group of all Caucasian interviewees demonstrated that Caucasians
subjected to African-American-style interviews performed more poorly
than in Caucasian-style interviews." Race initially affected the interview style, but once the style was produced, anyone subjected to it would
respond less positively-that is to say, anyone would conform
behaviorally to the expected behavior as manifested in the interview
style.1 4 This illustrates the cycle of racism and its tangible and objective
effects.
More recent studies have shown that the original expectancies flow
from unconscious bias that the interviewer cannot control absent
understanding and taking steps to correct for the bias. 5 Unconscious
bias is thus a powerful mechanism for perpetuating and continually
reaffirming prejudice and exerts a ubiquitous impact on social
interaction. 6 Exposing unconscious bias, therefore, has the potential to
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 543.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See id. These objective differences were coded by "blind" raters. See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

236. See id. at 543 & n.2.
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undermine powerfully unhealthy and unfair societal practices and to
break down the machinery that reproduces discrimination continually.
In 1997, Chen and Bargh took the behavioral confirmation model a
step further, positing that the link between the perceptual and behavioral
representations may be entirely unconscious.237 Thus, in contrast to the
traditional model in which behavioral confirmation is mediated by biased
information-gathering and perceptual processes, such as strategically
adopted behavioral strategies, Chen and Bargh's approach hinges on an
automatic, implicit link between perception and behavior.238 That is, the
stereotype activation that results from perceiving a target group member
causes unconscious, automatic behavior consistent with the content of
the activated stereotype. 9 Hence, the entire sequence from the first cue
(such as skin color) that activates a stereotype to its final confirmation is
automatic and unconscious.
Chen and Bargh conducted experiments that supported all aspects of
their unconscious model of behavioral confirmation. They tested whether
the automatic activation of African-American stereotypes directly
produced behavioral confirmation effects as to Caucasian participants.24
In sum, the African-American stereotypes were activated unconsciously,
through subliminal exposure to young male African-American faces
during a computer task.24 However, because the participants were all
Caucasian (NYU students), there was nothing in the experimental
situation which could have produced conscious stereotype activation and
expectancy-confirmation processes, such as actually interacting with
African Americans in the experiment.242 When Caucasian targets
interacted with Caucasian perceivers who had been subliminally exposed
to African-American faces (with the attendant "hostility" stereotype),
their level of hostility increased due to an increase in the perceiver's
hostility resulting from the subliminal priming.243 These findings extend
the psychological understanding of the effects of unconscious stereotype
activation, their effects on interracial relations, and their resistance to
change.
237. See id. at 554-56.
238. See id. at 545.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 548.
241. See id. at 555.
242. See id. at 555-56.
243. See id.
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In real life, Caucasians' unconscious activation of a false stereotype
may create the hostile response by African Americans who accurately
perceive the hostile expression or other indications of the Caucasian's
unconscious stereotype activation and react to it, which in turn reaffirms
the "validity" of the stereotype. Ironically, the perceiver creates the
"evidence" that "confirms" the stereotype. 2' Because the behavioral
confirmation model relies on an initial stereotype or "expectancy,"
uncovering unconscious expectancies theoretically should critically
undermine the entire dynamic, considering that the expectancy
constitutes the first part of the process and also considering the effect of
exposing people to their own prejudice-related discrepancies.24
In sum, in addition to providing better information about our own
unconscious bias, which enables us to make conscious efforts to prevent
it from manifesting in illegal and discriminatory actions, testing for
unconscious bias may be the initial step toward reversing unconscious
bias and the interpersonal dynamics that result from it. The potential
benefits are thus varied and many.
Employers concerned about workplace discrimination should be
allowed to conduct tests for unconscious bias for the purpose of
analyzing its relationship to their employment practices (that is, selfcritical analysis) and for taking steps to produce a discrimination-free
work environment. Social psychologists have just begun to unravel the
mystery of societal prejudice and to identify where prejudice is born and
how and why it has survived, and indeed flourished, throughout history.
If there is any merit to the current psychological understanding that bias
is "locked" in our unconscious minds and exposing it is "key" to
beginning the healing process, then the benefit of encouraging
unconscious-bias testing is potentially socially transformative.
B. Methods of Testing UnconsciousBias
Professors Anthony G. Greenwald of the University of Washington
and Mahzarin R. Banaji of Yale University are leaders in the field of
unconscious-bias testing. They have created a method that is potentially
useful in diagnosing a wide range of socially significant associative
structures, which they refer to as "implicit association testing," or
244. See id. at 555.
245. For a discussion of additional studies relating to intergroup bias, see generally Oppenheimer,
supranote 7.
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"IAT. 2 46 They have conducted research to appraise the IAT method's
usefulness in measuring evaluative associations that underlie implicit
subjects'
attitudes and have found that it is effective to measure
2 47
unconscious bias regarding, inter alia,race, gender, and age.
The tests used by Greenwald and Banaji are typical of the tests used
by automatic stereotype researchers and utilize latency response methods
to measure subjects' response time in pairing up series of attributes
(associative attribute discrimination) with categories to which people
often attach negative or positive associations, that is, stereotypes (initial
target-concept discrimination).2 48 The proliferation of computer use and
the attendant ability to measure response times in milliseconds allows
scientists to obtain data reflecting the extent of the cognitive barriers to
making associations between the attributes and categories of persons.249
Subjects are told to categorize the associations as quickly as possible,
and results that indicate excessive errors or that are otherwise unreliable
are not included in the test results. When an association is more easily
made (such as the association between "flower" and "pleasant"), the
response time is significantly faster than when the association is harder
(such as the association between "insect" and "pleasant")." 0 The
researchers describe this as "superior performance for combinations that
were evaluatively compatible than for noncompatible combinations."2 5'
Apparently, additional and more time-consuming cognitive processes are
required to bridge the gap between "insect" and "pleasant." That is, it
takes additional cognitive processes to overcome cognitive barriers to
associate those two items. The unsurprising research results are that
people generally have a more positive attitude toward flowers than
insects, and they consistently make the connection between "flowers"
and "pleasant" faster than "insects" and "pleasant."

246. Professors Anthony G. Greenwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji have set up a web site in which
users can take the tests in the privacy of their homes to determine their unconscious bias in relation
to gender, race, and age discrimination, among other categories. The web site also describes ongoing
research and contains a comprehensive bibliography of research to date. See Anthony G.
Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Association Test (last modified Oct. 18, 1998)
<http://depts.washington.edu/iat>.
247. See Greenwald et al., supra note 18, at 1464. The Implicit Association Test, or IAT, is
similar in intent to cognitive priming procedures for measuring automatic affect or attitude. See id.
248. See id. at 1464-66.
249. See id. at 1467.
250. See id. at 1468-69.
251. Id. at 1466.
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After determining that the IAT method can effectively measure
implicit attitudes, the researchers applied the same methodology to racial
categories. For example, in one experiment, subjects were tested for
unconscious bias between target-concept categories of "black" names,
such as Lamar, Malik, Ebony, Latisha and Tawanda, versus "white"
names, such as Brandon, Ian, Nancy, Katie and Betsy. 2 The researchers
used unpleasant and pleasant association words such as evil, war, love,
and paradise. The data clearly revealed patterns consistent with the
expectation that white subjects would reveal an implicit attitude
difference between the black and white racial categories.5 Specifically,
whites generally showed an implicit attitudinal preference for white over
black, which was manifested by their faster response times in combining
white names and pleasant words as opposed to black names and pleasant
4

words5

The IAT researchers concurrently conducted explicit attitude tests to
compare with the implicit measures. The IAT measure indicated
considerably stronger relative preference for white than any of the
explicit tests performed, indicating a divergence between the constructs
assessed by the implicit and explicit measures. 5 An important purpose
of the white-black experiment was to determine whether the IAT would
reveal an implicit white preference among subjects who explicitly
disavowed any black-white evaluative preference.
A review of the test results tended to show that the IAT may indeed
implicitly reveal explicitly disavowed prejudice. While a majority of the
white subjects (nineteen of twenty-six) explicitly endorsed a position of
either black-white indifference or black preference, all but one had an
IAT score indicating white preference. 6 These findings buttress the
researchers' theory and expectation that people often have no conscious
bias even though they are making implicit associations unconsciously,
and the IAT can measure this implicit bias, also known as "in-group
preference."" 7 The tests reveal that unconscious forms of prejudice are
at 1473-74.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. In February 1999, when the author took the test over the Internet, 54% of Internet test takers
had shown a "strong preference" for white over black, while only about 10% had "little or no"
preference either way, and another 24% had shown varying degrees of bias against blacks. For
current statistics, see Greenwald & Banaji, supranote 246.
255. See Greenwald et al., supra note 18, at 1477.
256. See id. at 1474-75.

257. See id. at 1476.
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indeed pervasive even though as a society we do not explicitly endorse
prejudice." 8
Prior to the IAT, the most widely accepted method used for assessing
automatic evaluative associations was evaluative semantic priming. 5 9
The similarity between evaluative semantic priming and the IAT
supports IAT's acceptance as a trustworthy and accurate test method. In
evaluative semantic priming, subjects classify series of target words
based on the words' evaluative meaning, and a prime word, which was to
be ignored, preceded each target word. 260 Prime-target evaluative
congruencies facilitates responding to the target, thus producing
variations in response latencies that can be used to measure automatic
evaluation of the prime category. The more a category of words speeds
judgments of positive evaluative targets or hinders judgments of negative
evaluative targets, the more evaluative positivity is indicated for that
category. 26' Evaluative priming studies have used prime stimulus
categories very similar to the target-concept categories used in the IAT.
IAT measures share some important properties with the semantic
priming method. Both procedures measure attitudes as the evaluative
difference between two categories, such as the racial categories of black
and white (known as "target concepts" in the IAT and "priming item
categories" in semantic priming). For example, researchers using
semantic priming methods contrast automatic evaluations evoked by "ingroup" words such as "we" and "us," with "out-group" words such as
"they" and "them," and with prime categories such as "young" and "old"
or racial categories. 262 Furthermore, both procedures juxtapose items
from categories for which an attribute is to be measured ("target
concepts" in the IAT and "priming categories" in semantic priming),
with items that have well-established attribute values, such as hostile,

258. One possible alternative to the implicit racism interpretation of the IAT score is that white
subjects were more familiar with the white names than the black names, and this familiarity
differential could explain the [AT results. However, because this explanation could not apply to the
flower-insect experiment because the negative categories (insects and weapons) had substantially
higher frequency in our language than the words used for positive categories (flowers and musical
instruments), and therefore the researchers concluded that even if familiarity played a role, it could
not fully explain the sets of finding for the studies. See id. at 1477.
259. See id. at 1477-78.
260. See id. at 1477.
261. See id.
262. See id.
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pleasant, love, and war ("attribute categories" in the IAT and "target
items" in semantic priming.)
Thus, the IAT builds upon well-established cognitive bias research
methodology and, although relatively new, should be regarded as a
fundamentally sound research tool for uncovering unconscious bias.
Furthermore, in comparing the research results of the priming method
and the IAT, researchers found that the IAT method has about twice the
priming method's sensitivity to evaluative differences.26
Researchers are also creating other tests to measure unconscious bias.
For example, scientists at Emory University have created a "lie detector"
tool that they claim can uncover racial prejudice.2" These researchers
believe that measuring unconscious bias by observing affective
indicators is more likely to be a consistent and strong predictor of racial
and ethnic attitudes.265 This belief is in accord with that of other
researchers who posit that emotions predict some behavior better than
cognitive-based measures of attitude because the affective system
operates more crudely and processes information more rapidly than the
rational system.266 Thus, involuntary affective measures are more likely
to reflect uncontrolled, automatic reactions to out-group members.267
This lie-detector-type process relies on electromyography (EMG),
which detects tiny mscle movements in the face (affective indicators,
such as cheek and eyebrow activity) that indicate bias just as an
electrocardiogram (EKG) can detect heart murmurs.2 68 Researchers found
that subjects who passed rigorous oral and written tests indicating they
did not hold prejudiced views held unconscious biases, as measured by
invisible muscle reactions to photographs of men and women of different
races. 269 Similar to the IAT test results, these tests produced
discrepancies between subjects' self-reports on bias and facial EMG
270
measures of unconscious bias toward members of other racial groups.

263. See id. at 1477-78.
264. See Eric J. Vanman et al., The Modern Face of Prejudice and Structural Features That
Moderate the Effect of Cooperation on Affect, 73 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 941, 944-45

(1997).
265. See id. at 944.
266.
267.
268.
269.

See id. at 943.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 947.

270. See id. at 941.
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For purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to accept
unconditionally that either the IAT or the EMG test is presently accurate
enough to be a reliable indicator of unconscious bias. What is clear is
that many tests have found discrepancies between people's conscious
beliefs and unconscious biases against minority groups, that currently a
proliferation of social psychology research exists concerning cognitive
bias, and that it is only a matter of time before a generally accepted
scientific testing method is available for common use. This Article thus
proceeds on the assumption that unconscious-bias testing is now, or soon
will be, available for use in testing employees for purposes of uncovering
racial and other bias that, if left unexposed, could lead to unfair and
illegal employment actions. 271
This analysis proceeds on the theory that unconscious bias may be
predictive of discriminatory behavior with the attendant harm to minorities, an assumed link that is supported by most social psychologists at
this time, but remains somewhat controversial.272 But even if the link
between unconscious bias and overt behavior is unclear, what is clear is
that most "unprejudiced" people are unaware of their own unconscious
bias and upon recognizing it are likely to begin the process of converging
their egalitarian views with their mental processes.273 Further, the
proliferation of unconscious-bias testing may accelerate current
psychological understanding of human cognition and prejudice by
generating data on the subject. Fundamentally, the more we understand
about ourselves and other segments of our society, the better equipped
we are to make strides toward creating a more just society for all of its
members. Accordingly, this Article argues that unconscious-bias testing
should be accorded an evidentiary privilege to encourage its use among
employers who are interested in creating a truly discrimination-free
environment.274

271. Importantly, Greenwald and Banaji specifically list such use of the IAT on their web page,
and at least one company is presently being created to offer unconscious-bias testing to employers.
See Telephone Interview with Anthony G. Greenwald, supra note 11; see also Greenwald & Banaji,
supra note 246.

272. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
273. See supranotes 48-57 and accompanying text.
274. For a discussion about free speech and privacy implications of employers' use of such
testing, see infra PartVI.D.
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IV. EMPLOYERS ARE UNLIKELY TO CONDUCT
UNCONSCIOUS-BIAS TESTING IN THE ABSENCE OF AN
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE
Presently, most employers are probably unaware of the fact that
unconscious-bias testing is available or the benefits of its use. But
unconscious bias and discrimination are areas in which social
psychology research is proliferating quickly. As professional services for
conducting unconscious-bias testing are organized and marketed,
employer awareness will increase.
But employers may forgo unconscious-bias testing and sacrifice its
benefits based on risk-management concerns because unconscious-bias
test results have an obvious potential to be extremely damaging in
discrimination lawsuits brought against employers. A factfinder's access
to test results indicating a high level of racist or sexist implicit
associations likely would precipitate a negative emotional response to the
employer and a greater likelihood of finding liability and assessing
punitive damages. No matter how committed an employer is to equal
employment opportunity, the benefits of unconscious-bias testing may be
outweighed by the risk of plaintiffs' accessing this potentially
inflammatory and incriminating data to support an inference of
discrimination.
This Article argues that unconscious bias is technically not relevant to
Title VII disparate treatment analysis and mixed-motive analysis
(because it does not prove intent) and is irrelevant to disparate impact
analysis (which does not consider intent, but rather, relies on proof of a
facially neutral employment test or policy that results in an adverse
impact to a protected class). However, relevance is probably not a valid
discovery objection because test results could be deemed reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of other admissible evidence. Thus,
concerns about misuse of the data in litigation still exist. Furthermore,
judges may not understand the social psychology behind the relationship,
or lack thereof, between unconscious bias and intentionally discriminatory action and may conflate the separate phenomena, finding
unconscious bias probative and admissible on the issue of intent. Thus,
without some clear protection from having unconscious-bias test results
used against it, an employer has substantial reason not to conduct this
testing because of the risk it could pose in litigation.
An evidentiary privilege protecting unconscious-bias testing from
disclosure is necessary to encourage employers to conduct testing. As
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explained more fully herein, making the privilege qualified will prevent
employers from abusing the privilege.
V.

CURRENT LAW FAILS TO RECOGNIZE A PRIVILEGE
PROTECTING UNCONSCIOUS-BIAS TESTING

A.

Introduction

At present, no privilege exists that would protect unconscious-bias
testing from disclosure. However, some federal courts previously
recognized a "self-critical analysis" privilege for corporate equal
employment opportunity self-assessment. Although the self-criticalanalysis privilege is no longer recognized in the employment context, it
is useful to analyze the cases that supported the privilege to determine
the policies that courts once thought justified such a privilege and which
would similarly justify a privilege for unconscious-bias testing.
To understand the policies that have persuaded some federal courts to
recognize the self-critical-analysis privilege in the employment context,
it is necessary to preview the development of the privilege and its
recognition in employment cases. The privilege originated to protect a
hospital's peer-review notes in a medical malpractice case but was soon
expanded into the employment context. It received mixed reactions from
courts from the beginning, with some recognizing the privilege, while
others refused to recognize it or simply failed to address it specifically.
The case law demonstrates the way in which analysis of the privilege
shifted over time until it was rendered essentially null in the employment
context.
Although originally the privilege was grounded in traditional,
utilitarian justifications, the courts quickly began to rely instead on
factors derived from the factual circumstances of prior courts' holdings,
even though the factual patterns that emerged in the case law were
arbitrary and unrelated to the privilege's theoretical bases. In addition to
the tendencies of many courts to look to the facts of prior cases rather
than analyzing the privilege on policy grounds, the cases reflect
fundamental differences of opinion about whether privilege law affects
employers' behavior, whether recognition of the privilege contributes to
Title VII's enforcement objectives, and whether employers are even
interested in achieving a discrimination-free work environment. Many of
the later opinions rely on Title VII's assumed efficacy as a mechanism
for eradicating discrimination by focusing on the plaintiffs need for the
information covered by the privilege to prove motivation and intent.
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Thus, these later opinions many times find that allowing plaintiffs access
to the documents advances Title VII's goals better than does encouraging
employers to address their EEO deficiencies candidly by protecting selfcriticism from discovery. These later opinions express more concern
about supporting Title VII plaintiffs than allowing companies discretion
to self-police in EEO matters, probably in hopes of pushing companies to
eradicate discrimination by threat of litigation. Ironically, the courts'
reliance on Title VII litigation as a means for eradicating discrimination
is unjustified in light of Title VII's analytical framework and proof
requirements, which do not comport with how discrimination really
occurs in most cases.
All this created a confusing and analytically incoherent body of law
relating to the self-critical-analysis privilege. Various federal courts
produced a myriad of decisions representing different models of
privilege analysis. Various "tests" emerged for when the privilege should
apply. A multitude of factual distinctions also emerged to justify
different analyses under different factual scenarios. Ultimately, factually
indistinguishable cases produced directly contrary decisions based upon
different basic assumptions about human nature and different levels of
trust in litigation as a means to redress employment discrimination.275
Some scholars attempted to delineate "criteria" for when the privilege
was accepted:
[F]irst, the information must result from a critical self analysis
undertaken by the party seeking protection; second, the public must
have a strong interest in preserving the free flow of the type of
information sought; finally, the information must be of the type
whose flow would be curtailed if discovery were allowed.276
One scholar added an additional criterion: the general proviso that no
document will be accorded a privilege unless it was prepared with the
expectation that it would be kept confidential.277 However, no single set
275. See, e.g., James A. Flanagan, Rejecting a General Privilegefor Self-CriticalAnalysis, 51
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 551, 554 n.18 (1993).
276. Note, The Privilege ofSelf-CriticalAnalysis, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1083, 1086 (1983).
277. See Flanagan, supra note 275, at 574-76. For other scholarly comment on the self-criticalanalysis privilege, see, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Cynthia M. Hazelwood, Preserving the
Confidentiality ofInternal CorporateInvestigations, 12 J. Corp. L. 355 (1987); Robert J. Bush,
Stimulating CorporateSelf Regulation-The Corporate Self-Evaluative Privilege: Paradigmatic
Preferentialismor Pragmatic Panacea, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 597 (1993); Ellen Deason, The SelfCriticalAnalysis Privilege and Discovery ofAfflrmative Action Plans in Title VII Suits, 83 Mich. L.
Rev. 405 (1984); David P. Leonard, Codifying a Privilegefor Self-CriticalAnalysis, 25 Harv. J. on
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of criteria or court-created test can explain the privilege's life and death.
Some basic principles, however, can be derived by reviewing courts'
analysis from the privilege's inception to its conclusion, and these
principles are helpful in justifying a self-critical analysis kind of
privilege for unconscious-bias testing.
B.

Origins of the Self-Critical-AnalysisPrivilege:Social Benefits

The first case that recognized the self-critical-analysis privilege,
Bredice v. Doctors Hospital,Inc.,27 involved a hospital's peer review of
doctors' procedures and judgment in a medical malpractice action. In
1970, Judge Corcoran of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia first recognized a "qualified privilege" for medical staff
review minutes and reports.279 The plaintiff, whose husband had died in
the hospital's care, moved to compel production of the peer-review
documents pursuant to former Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP)
34, which provided that courts could compel the production of
documents upon a showing of good cause.28 The judge refused to order
production, finding no extraordinary circumstances preventing appli" '
cation of the qualified privilege.28
The court explained that the medical staff reviews were performed
pursuant to the requirements of the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Hospitals, a prestigious organization created to effectuate standardized
hospital practices nationwide, which confers accreditation only to
hospitals that follow its recommendations.2 82 The court found that the
"sole objective" of the staff meetings was to improve the treatment of

Legis. 113 (1988); Stephen C. Simpson, The Self-CriticalAnalysis Privilegein Employment Law, 21
J. Corp. L. 577 (1996); Comment, Civil Procedure: Self-Evaluative Reports-A QualifiedPrivilege
in Discovery?, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 807 (1973); Note, Making Sense of Rules of Privilege Under the
Structural (ll)Logic of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1339 (1992); S. Kay
McNab, Note, Criticizingthe Self-Criticism Privilege, 1987 U. Ill. L. Rev. 675.
278. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
279. See id. at 251.
280. See id. at 249. Note that the federal rules relating to discovery have changed since Bredice,
making discovery much more accessible. Because good cause is no longer required, the Bredice
holding arguably is inapposite.
281. Seeid. at251.
282. See id. at 250. The Commission is a nongovernment entity but serves a quasi-governmental
role by granting accreditation only to hospitals that follow its recommendations. See Allen &
Hazelwood, supranote 277, at 374 n.168.
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hospital patients through critical self-analysis.2 8 Furthermore, the review
committee's work was done with the expectation of confidentiality,
which is essential to the candid and conscientious evaluation necessary to
continued improvement in patient treatment: "[P]rofessional criticism
cannot occur in an atmosphere of apprehension that one doctor's
suggestion will be used as a denunciation of a colleague's conduct in a
malpractice suit."2 The "overwhelming" public interest in continued
advancement in medical care was the stated basis for the qualified
privilege, which protects records of the reviews absent "evidence of
extraordinary circumstances" needed to constitute "good cause" under
FRCP 34 for this type of material.28 Thus, the Bredice court based its
denial of discovery on the social benefit of better health care through
candid analysis of medical judgment and procedures (which can be
achieved only if peer reviews were conducted without fear of disclosure),
as well as the fairness in not forcing disclosure of documents created
with an expectation of privacy.286 Although the court does not mention
Wigmore or the traditional justification for privileges, the bases for its
holding clearly reflect the utilitarian rationale.287
After Bredice, federal courts began recognizing similar privileges to
protect certain self-critical documents based on the policy concerns
expressed in Bredice. The privilege was generally limited to three types
of investigations: (1) confidential evaluations of hospital peer reviews;
(2) internal corporate investigations (such as compliance with environmental laws); and (3) affirmative action/EEO reports. 28' Furthermore, a
few courts recognized the privilege in other contexts, such as police
department investigations of arrests and shootings.289 This Article
focuses on the third type of documents protected by federal case law as
most analogous to an unconscious-bias testing privilege for EEO
purposes. Because the 1975 adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence
(FRE) 501 did not limit privilege analysis to then-existing law, but rather
provided that federal courts must analyze privilege application "in light

283. Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 251.
286. See id at 250-51.
287. For a general discussion of traditional theories of privilege law analysis, see infra PartVI.A.
288. See Flanagan, supranote 275, at 552; see also Note, supranote 276, at 1090. "EEO" as used
herein means equal employment opportunity.
289. See Leonard, supra note 277, at 118 & nn.19, 22 & 23.
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of reason and experience," this Article will consider employment cases
discussing the self-critical-analysis privilege both before and after 1975.
This way it is possible to trace the privilege's analytical precedent and
theoretical justifications for the purpose of formulating a workable and
justifiable privilege rule for unconscious-bias testing that is consistent
with both theoretical privilege law and the courts' prior recognition of
this type of privilege.
C.

Self-CriticalAnalysis in Employment Cases

Early employment cases followed the Bredice court's reasoning by
analyzing how a self-critical-analysis privilege would serve the
traditional, utilitarian justification of encouraging candor, based on the
underlying assumption that recognizing a privilege would impact
employers' conduct-that is to say, the cases used a social benefit
theory. The idea was that recognition of a self-critical-analysis privilege
would encourage frank self-criticism of EEO and AA 9. programs,
resulting in a positive effect on equal employment opportunities because
frank, uninhibited analysis was more likely to pinpoint areas in which
antidiscrimination efforts were not working. The early cases distinguished between "facts" or "objective data" that are not the result of
critical evaluation per se and subjective evaluations or portions of reports
that contained subjective analysis of the company's EEO efficacy,
ordering production of the former group only. During the early years,
some courts operated under the belief that regardless of the fact that the
reports were government mandated, employers had great latitude in how
honestly they prepared the subjective, analytical portions of the reports.
So to encourage honesty, with the expected insight that employers would
gain from fully exploring their own potential wrongdoing and their
attendant ability to identify and correct it, many courts felt that it was
necessary to recognize the privilege.
In Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co.,291 a Georgia district court in 1971
relied on Bredice to apply the self-critical-analysis privilege in the
employment context for the first time.2 9 In Banks, the plaintiffs sought
all documents prepared by the company's EEO team, which was
established in 1970 to study the company's equal employment
290. "AA" as used herein means affirmative action.
291. 53 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
292. See id.
at 285.
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opportunities and to determine the efficacy of the company's affirmative
action compliance program.2 93 Formal written reports were created by the

team pursuant to Executive Order 11,246,294 and Lockheed did not object
to producing these government-mandated reports.295 However, Lockheed

objected when the plaintiffs also sought to discover the team's "actual
report," which included interim reports, other documents, and a candid
self-analysis and evaluation of the company's EEO actions.296
After noting that the information requested was likely protected by the
attorney work product doctrine, the Banks court opined that the "most
critical issue" was whether the plaintiffs should have access to the candid

self-analysis which was prepared "in an attempt to affirmatively
strengthen the company's policy of compliance with Title VII and
'
Relying on the "analogous" Bredice case,
Executive Order 11,246."297
the court held that it would be contrary to public policy to discourage

frank self-criticism and evaluation of affirmative action programs of this
kind.29 Allowing the discovery would "discourage companies such as

Lockheed from making investigations which are calculated to have a
positive effect on equalizing employment opportunities." 299 The Banks
court then constructed the dichotomy between "facts" and "objective
data" on the one hand and subjective analysis on the other, and ordered
Lockheed to produce only the factual or statistical information that was
available to the team at the time it conducted the study."' The team's

293. See id.at 284.
294. Executive Order 11,246 requires nonexempt federal contractors to place nondiscrimination
and affirmative action provisions in contracts with government agencies. See Exec. Order No.
11,246, § 202(1), 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprintedas amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); see
also Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1967) (adding "sex discrimination" to text of Executive
Order No. 11,246).
295. See Banks, 53 F.RD. at 284.
296. See id.
297. Id. at 285. Note that since the court had apparently already decided that the documents were
privileged under the work product doctrine, its self-critical-analysis decision is technically dicta. See
Tharp v. Sivyer Steel Corp., 149 F.tRD. 177, 180 n.7 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
298. Banks, 53 F.R.D. at 285.
299. Id. at 255.
300. See id. An objective-subjective distinction for self-critical-analysis protection was
recognized in other contexts at about the same time. See, e.g., Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D.
316, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (distinguishing between factual testimony regarding suicide incident at
mental hospital and "suggestions for future procedures" in Federal Tort Claims Act case).
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analysis of its EEO program was protected by the "self-critical analysis"
privilege.30 '
Several federal courts soon followed suit, declining to order production of similar EEO documents containing "evaluative" information.
For example, in Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp.,3°2 a Pennsylvania federal
district court relied on the critical-self-evaluation privilege to deny the
plaintiff's request for affirmative action and consent decree materials that
contained the defendant's proposed goals, timetables, and evaluations of
its progress.3 3 The court based its decision on the public policy of
encouraging employers to make candid internal evaluations to meet the
objectives of the affirmative action program. 3' The Dickerson court
noted that although affirmative action plans are required for all
government contractors, the government cannot review in detail the
massive amount of documents received under an affirmative action
program.3" 5 The quality of these documents depends to a great extent on
the good faith of employers in evaluating their programs and establishing
affirmative action goals; if these documents are subject to discovery by
plaintiffs, employers will not be candid and will set goals at minimum
levels. 3 6 Thus, "a decrease in voluntary cooperation could seriously
impair the equal employment opportunity policy. '30 7 The fact that the
reports were government mandated did not change the court's view that
because the government relied on companies' willingness to expose their
mistakes and shortcomings voluntarily and candidly, the contents of the
reports would be greatly affected by the privilege decision.30 8

301. See Banks, 53 F.R.D. at 285.
302. 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1448 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 1976).
303. See id.
at 1449-50.
304. See id. at 1449.
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. Id.(emphasis added).
308. See id.For other cases upholding the privilege, see Rosario v. New York Times Co., 84
F.R.D. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 708 (N.D.
Ga.May 15, 1979) (holding internal EEO-related investigative reports that have not been disclosed
by agency or were otherwise matters of public record not discoverable); Stevenson v. General
Electric Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 746 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 1978); Droughn v. FMC Corp.,
74 F.R.D. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 526 (E.D.
Pa. June 17, 1977); Sanday v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 101 (W.D.
Pa.Dec. 19, 1975) Rodgers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 100 (W.D. Pa.Apr.
20, 1975).
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However, during the same time period following Banks, other courts
summarily dismissed the policy concerns undergirding the privilege-or
failed to discuss them altogether. These courts apparently felt that the

traditional privilege rationale of encouraging candor either did not in fact
affect employers' behavior or was undermined by the fact that other
communications (such as internal corporate memoranda) discussing EEO
problems were discoverable; thus these courts eviscerated the intent of
the privilege and circumvented its purpose. For example, in Ligon v.
Frito-Lay, Inc.3" 9 the court ruled that the plaintiff in an employment
discrimination action was entitled to discover the defendant's AA plans
subject to the district court's initial in camera review for the purpose of
eliminating any privileged matters.31 The court declined to follow the
Banks court's analysis of the need for encouraging candid evaluations
because "disclosure in this lawsuit of affirmative action plans will no
more discourage frank evaluations of companies than will the disclosure
of admittedly discoverable inter-office communications between company officers." ' '
D.

The Split ofAuthority and Courts'Reliance on FactualDistinctions
By 1978, enough employment cases had discussed the self-critical-

analysis privilege for courts to begin addressing the "split" of authority
and begin creating "tests" and "factors" to determine when the privilege
applied, purportedly based primarily on the factual distinctions between
cases applying the privilege and those declining to apply it. Thus, in
Webb v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,312 a Pennsylvania federal district
309. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 722 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 1978).
310. See id.
at 723.
311. Id. (citing Palma v. Lake Waukomis Dev. Co., 48 F.R.D. 366 (D.C. Mo. 1970)). The Ligon
court also noted the conflicting Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cases in which the AA
documents were sought, but found FOIA standards for production unrelated to discovery analysis
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at 722. For additional cases during this period in
which documents potentially covered by the self-critical analysis were held discoverable, see In re
Burlington Northern, 679 F.2d 762 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that issue was whether to issue writ of
mandamus, not whether to recognize privilege per se); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfield, 564 F.2d
663 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that no self-critical-analysis privilege protects documents from
disclosure to EEOC); Thompson v. Sun Oil Co., 523 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 101 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 31, 1978); Ylla v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 754 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 23, 1977); EEOC v. ISC, 16
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 174 (W.D. Mo. June 28, 1977); and EEOC v. Quick Shop Markets,
Inc., 396 F. Supp. 133 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
312. 81 F.R.D. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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court first attempted to identify the parameters of the self-criticalanalysis privilege in the employment context, recognizing that it had not
been applied consistently.1 3 Importantly, much of the fundamental
policy analysis justifying the privilege was "lost" when courts looked to
facts of prior cases rather than properly addressing privilege theory.
In Webb, a Title VII race discrimination class action case, the
plaintiffs brought a motion to compel the disclosure of documents
containing self-critical analysis of Westinghouse's employment policies
and AA programs. 314 The court noted that the self-critical-analysis
privilege was generally raised to shield from discovery reports required
to be filed with the government and that Westinghouse's attempt to
utilize the privilege in relation to the non-government-mandated
documents was essentially a plea to expand the privilege beyond its past
factual applications.3" 5 The court felt it was "required to examine the
source and extent of the defense.., and to define some guidelines for
determining the circumstances which would justify shielding from
discovery items constituting 'self-critical analysis'. '
The court first acknowledged that the theoretical basis for the selfcritical-analysis defense to discovery is rooted in the public policy
recognizing that employers' voluntary compliance with federal EEO
laws is essential to meet EEO policy.3" 7 Employers must be encouraged
to be candid and forthright, and disclosure of self-critical evaluations
would tend to have a "chilling effect" on an employer's voluntary
compliance with EEO laws.3" On the other hand, the federal laws
prohibiting employment discrimination manifest a strong policy of
eradicating discrimination, and plaintiffs must be allowed to obtain the
information to meet their burden of proof in discrimination lawsuits.31 9
Thus, the public policy of encouraging employer candor directly
conflicts with the public policy of eradicating discrimination through
litigation."' As a result, the Webb court found it necessary to limit

313. See id. at433.
314. See id.
315. See id.
Note that in Banks the documents sought were not government mandated. See also
Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 708 (N.D. Ga. May 15, 1979).
316. Webb, 81 F.R.D. at433.
317. See id.
318. Id.
319. See id.
320. See id.
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carefully the situations in which encouraging self-critical analysis
justified nondisclosure.32'
After reviewing the case law that upheld the privilege for affirmative
action plans submitted to the government pursuant to Executive Order
11,246 and for EEO-1 reports, the Webb court stated that the cases'
"major justification" for excluding such materials was that because the
reports are mandatory, public policy requires that employers be
encouraged to be candid and complete in preparing the reports.3"
However, the court agreed with the Dickerson court's analysis that if the
subjective and goal-setting portions of the mandatory reports were
discoverable by the plaintiffs in Title VII suits,3 employers would not be
candid and would set goals at minimum levels. n
The Webb court next observed that in all of the cited cases, the
objective information (such as statistical data) was available to plaintiffs
via other discovery channels and only subjective material was privileged
because the public policy of encouraging candor does not apply to
objective facts. 324 Thus, the court found that as long as the plaintiff is
provided with the objective data, denial of production of the reports
themselves does not really harm the plaintiff's case.3" The Webb court
also found that in cases where subjective materials prepared in the course
of developing mandatory reports were shielded from discovery, the
subjective information was either available through other means or was
privileged on other grounds, which suggested that subjective, evaluative
materials may not always be precluded from discovery.326
Based on the factual circumstances of earlier cases, the Webb court
found three factors as "potential guideposts" for applying the selfcritical-analysis privilege: (1) the materials protected have generally been
prepared for mandatory government reports; (2) only subjective
evaluative materials have been protected, while the objective data in the
same reports have not been protected; and (3) courts have balanced
plaintiffs' need for discovery and denied discovery only when the policy

321. See id. Note that the court assumes that Title VII is an effective means for redressing
discrimination.
322. Id. at 434.
323. See 1d.
324. See id.
325. See id.
326. See id. (citing Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 53 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Wehr v.
Burroughs, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 526 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 1977)).
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favoring exclusion clearly outweighed plaintiffs' need for the information.327 Although the Webb court stated that "[ilt is not possible to
draw a bright line between those situations where disclosure of 'selfcritical analysis' should be compelled, and those where it should be
shielded," the court held that the discovery requested was either not
related to mandatory government reporting or was "objective"
information and therefore "cannot fall within the 'critical self analysis'
'
exemption as defined in this memorandum."328
E.

Policy-BasedCritiqueof Factors

With the pronouncement of its first guidepost based on whether the
self-critical analysis is part of a mandatory government reporting, the
Webb court wasted no time in unmooring the application of privileges
from the theoretical justification for privileges. The privilege is justified
to the extent that candid self-critical analysis will illuminate and enable
the dismantling of discriminatory employment practices. The mere fact
327. See id. Note that the third guidepost clarifies the qualified nature of the privilege and that it
can be overcome by a particular showing of necessity in any given case. One area in which this
balance generally favored plaintiffs was with regard to tenure votes/peer review when discrimination
in the tenure decision was alleged. See, e.g., Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 904-09
(2d Cir. 1983) (§§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 action); In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 432 (5th Cir. 1981);
Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1347 (9th Cir. 1981) (Title VII sex
discrimination case); Jespen v.Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379, 1382-83 (5th Cir. 1980);
Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir. 1977); see also Flanagan, supra note
275, at 557 n.44. Some academic institutions voluntarily adopted open proceedings for tenure
decisions, based on the belief that this encourages review committees to evaluate candidates on
objective criteria that can justify the decision. See Developments in the Law-Privileged
Communications, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1450, 1627-28 & n.203 (1985). Some states passed laws
specifically excluding peer reviews from protection in discrimination suits. See id. at 1627 n.202; see
also Cal. Evid. Code § 1158 (West 1985); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.250 (1985). Of course, in 1990
the U.S. Supreme Court held there is no peer-review privilege in Title VII suits alleging
discrimination in a tenure decision. See University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189-92 (1990).
328. Webb, 81 F.R.D. at 434-35 (emphasis added). Specifically, the court held that the
information requested in the case, such as the names of employees who had made race
discrimination complaints to Westinghouse's management, and information relating to what EEO
training courses were attended by Westinghouse's employees, was "clearly objective data." Id. The
privilege did not apply to objective information about meetings (such as dates, participants, and
subject matter) in which AA, race discrimination, or the litigation were discussed; because "these
discussions do not relate to compliance with mandatory governmental reports, we believe that the
defense of 'self-critical analysis' cannot be asserted." Id. at 435. This information may be necessary
for plaintiffs to prove intent to discriminate. See id. The court upheld its prior order requiring
production of "all studies, whether statistical or otherwise, demonstrating or tending to demonstrate
racial discrimination in any phase of employment at the [defendant's facility]" because they
consisted of "statistical and.., objective" information. Id.
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that the self-critical analysis is voluntary and not government mandated
undercuts its promise to eradicate discriminatory practices. Indeed, the
quality of the voluntary assessments, just as with the governmentmandated reports, is increased when employers are free to conduct
candid assessment. One may expect voluntary self-critical analysis to be
even more responsive to the candid atmosphere created by a privilege
because the voluntary nature of the inquiry evidences a greater
commitment to EEO. If candor leads to insight and better EEO policy,
then self-assessment unrestricted as to content or form and done by free
choice is likely to analyze more vigorously EEO policy, resulting in
more exacting assessment. Moreover, voluntary self-analysis represents
the very basis of the privilege.329 As a practical matter, the primary value
that the government-mandated versus voluntary distinction serves is to
ensure that the investigations are conducted in the public's best

interest.33 From a policy perspective, as long as voluntary selfassessment serves the public interest, the privilege should apply.
The fact that the privilege had generally not been applied to nongovernment-mandated reports 33 t before Webb does not justify Webb's
first guidepost. Ironically, Banks, the first case to invoke the self-criticalanalysis privilege in the employment context, applied the privilege to the
team's reports, not the government reports per se.332

329. The peer review notes in Bredice were not government mandated, and neither were the
team's reports in Banks. See supra note, 278-89, 298, and accompanying text.
330. See Allen & Hazelwood, supra note 277, at 378,
331. See Webb, 81 F.RD. at 434. Note, however, that Banks and Brown v. FordMotor Co., 25
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 708 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 1978) both concerned documents that were not
government mandated. In Brown, the court held that results of internal EEO investigations that had
not been disclosed by a government agency or were otherwise a matter of public record were not
discoverable because disclosure "may tend to discourage voluntary compliance with the selfinvestigation procedures carried out under the antidiscrimination laws." Id. at 710. Later cases held
that the fact that government reports were mandated meant that companies had no choice about
whether to conduct self-assessments, and therefore the privilege was unnecessary to encourage
companies to cooperate. Yet, by this time, the privilege's application only to government reports had
become so entrenched in the case law that companies had stopped arguing for a self-critical-analysis
privilege for non-government-mandated reports or voluntary self-assessment. See infra Part V.E.
332. See Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 53 F.RD. 283, 284 (1971). In that case, Lockheed had
agreed to turn over the reports. Although it could be argued that the Lockheed team's reports were
done as part of an effort to comply with the government reporting requirements, this does not change
Webb's flawed analysis distinguishing mandatory from voluntary reports. One court found that when
a company shows that its analysis "was performed in preparation for a report required by the
government[,]... [t]he
'self evaluation' privilege should apply to it" and declined to embrace the
plaintiff's argument that the privilege applied only to government-mandated reports because "[s]uch
an approach may be overly narrow and thus controvert the purpose behind the privilege to encourage
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Webb's third guidepost-balancing plaintiffs' need for discovery
against policies favoring exclusion-is similarly troublesome.333 The
cornerstone of the traditional, utilitarian privilege justification is that
recognition of the privilege creates a "safe space" in which people can
communicate freely without fear of the communications later being used
against them. To create this safe space and realize the policies of the
traditional justification, the privilege must appear absolute and certainotherwise, the communication may be chilled by the prospect that a court
might decide not to recognize the privilege in a specific case.334 By using
a formal "balancing" approach,335 courts undermine trust in the privilege,
thereby chilling the very communication sought to be encouraged.336 In
fact, some courts used the greater uncertainty in the privilege's
application caused by the balancing test as a basis for holding that no
expectation of confidentiality is possible because the split of authority
provides "notice" that confidentiality is not certain.
The Webb guideposts gained widespread adherence, despite Webb's
confused privilege analysis (mixing utilitarian-based policy with privacybased application) and reliance on prior cases' facts. Webb's "guideposts" were easy to apply. Thus, in spite of Webb's lack of solid
privilege law analysis, which made its guideposts theoretically untenable,
philosophically inconsistent, and destined for failure, most later courts
relied heavily on Webb's "potential guideposts" in deciding whether to
apply the self-critical-analysis privilege and sometimes even referred to
them as "necessary" standards.3 38 Webb's weak privilege analysis
voluntary compliance with the equal employment opportunity laws." Hoffnan v. United Telecomm.
Inc,, 117 F.R.D. 440, 443 (D. Kan. 1987) (emphasis added). The issue in this case arose in the
context of deposition questions regarding the evaluator's analysis, not the documents. See id.
at 442.
333. For criticism of the second guidepost, which this author does not find particularly
troublesome, see Bush, supra note 277, at 609-10.
334. See infra Part VI.A.; see also Note, supra note 276, at 1097 (arguing for absolute privilege
and stating that "to apply the privilege of self-critical analysis in such a [case-by-case] manner is to
risk its evisceration").
335. Balancing is the preferred method for analyzing privileges grounded in privacy, not the
traditional justification. See infra Part VI.A.
336. See infra Part VI.A.
337. Although FRE 501 directs courts to create or develop privileges on a case-by-case basis, a
privilege should not be applied on a case-by-case basis once a privilege is established on utilitarian
grounds. See Bush, supra note 277, at 608; Note, supranote 276, at 1097.
338. See Witten v. A.H. Smith & Co., 100 F.R.D. 446, 451 (D. Md. 1984), aff'd, 785 F.2d 306
(4th Cir. 1986) (referring to Webb's factors as "necessary" standards); Roberts v. National Detroit
Corp., 87 F.R.D. 30, 32 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (noting Webb's "approach appears to strike an
appropriate balance and is in keeping with the public policy arguments"). But see, e.g., Woods v.
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became entrenched in self-critical-analysis case law and no doubt
contributed greatly to the privilege's ultimate evisceration.
F.

O'Connor Factorsand Analysis

Two years after Webb, a Massachusetts federal district court decision
attempted to clarify further the privilege and, in conjunction with Webb,
became the nearly uniform "standard" for determining the applicability
of the self-critical-analysis privilege. In O'Connorv. Chrysler Corp.,339
the issue was whether self-evaluation portions of Chrysler's affirmative
action plans were discoverable. 31 Chrysler raised the privilege of selfcritical analysis.34 1
The O'Connor court first acknowledged that authorities were divided
on whether the self-evaluative portions of AA plans are discoverable.342
According to the O'Connor court, the cases protecting evaluative
portions identified three factors weighing against disclosure: (1) the
materials are protected attorney work product prepared in anticipation of
litigation, (2) disclosure would discourage employees from frankly
evaluating their companies, and (3) disclosure would discourage
employers from candidly reporting the results.343
The O'Connorcourt found the underlying question to be whether the
privilege should enjoy continued recognition and asked whether
confidentiality in critical self-evaluations or disclosure of material
potentially probative of discriminatory intent would better serve equal
employment opportunity policy.3 " The court concluded that subjecting to
discovery affirmative action plan evaluative conclusions would not
necessarily deter or substantially detract from the thoroughness of future
self-evaluations. 34 5 This conclusion was supported by two considerations.
Coca-Cola Co., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 151, 154-55 (N.D. Ga. June 10, 1982) (applying
privilege to protect self-analysis and evaluative portions of AA plans with no reference to Webb

factors).
339. 86 F.R.D. 211 (D. Mass. 1980).
340. See id. at 213-14. Chrysler's AA plan was prepared for the federal government in
accordance with Executive Order 11,246 as amended by Executive Order 11,375. See id. at 214.
341. See id.at213-14.

342. See id. at216.
343. See id. It is not clear how the second and third factors differ analytically. Both appear to be
based on the traditional justification.
344. See id.at 217.

345. See id.
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First, because the employers must prepare the reports regardless of the
privilege,346 the reports will occur even if the threat of discovery is
present.34 7 Second, employers may have significant deterrents to candid
self-evaluations regardless of the possibility of discovery.3 4 For
example, the employee charged with writing the report may be more
concerned about protecting himself or co-workers from discipline than
about exposing the employer to discrimination liability. 349 Thus, the
"additional deterrence of investigation
occasioned by the possibility of
350
discovery may be minute.,
Nonetheless, the O'Connor court recognized that a lack of
confidentiality will cramp the investigative process and ruled that neither
an unqualified requirement of disclosure nor an unqualified privilege of
nondisclosure is justified. The court characterized the situation as the
"clash between highly valued interests" of discovering all facts probative
in a civil claim, of being fair to persons legally required to engage in
self-evaluation, and of encouraging candid government-mandated self" ' Thus, the O'Connor court determined
evaluations.35
that: (1) facts and
data are discoverable; (2) sheer evaluation of facts formulated in
response to the government's requirement of critical self-evaluation is
not discoverable; and (3) where the report combines facts and selfcritical evaluations, the defendant must prepare and disclose a substitute
statement that "includes all of the express or implied recitations of fact,
while omitting part or all of the self-evaluative statements. 352 The court

346. This analysis is directly contrary to the analysis in Dickerson, which reasoned that, although
mandatory, how candid the employer is affects the contents of the mandatory reports, and a decrease
in the degree of employer candor in these reports could "seriously impair" EEO policy. See
Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1448, 1449 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 1976).
347. See O'Connor,86 F.R.D. at 217.
348. See id.
349. See id.
350. Id. Note the similarity of this "additional deterrence" argument to the Independent Counsel's
argument that there is "no harm in one more exception" to the attomey-client privilege in Swidler &
Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1998). In Swidler & Berlin, the Supreme Court held
that this is an improper basis for privilege law analysis under FRE 501, but the Swidler & Berlin
decision did not come down until 18 years after the O'Connordecision. See id.; infra notes 495-500
and accompanying text.
351. O'Connor, 86 F.R.D. at 218. This effectiveness argument is contrary to the court's other
statements that confidentiality will not create more candor (and therefore more effective selfanalysis) because of other "deterrents."
352. Id.
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detailed redaction procedures, including an in camera inspection of
selected samples of the withheld portions.353
O'Connor's "highly valued interest" in fairness to persons legally
required to engage in self-evaluation assumes greater importance in later
cases as a basis for recognizing the privilege. These later courts consider
it unfair to force an employer to create a report that could be turned
against it by a private litigant, a "fairness" argument akin to the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.3 " At the same time,
these courts are not concerned about the effect of the privilege on the
content of the self-evaluations, stating that because they are mandatory
they simply must be done with or without the threat of discovery.
Furthermore, to the extent that the contents are affected by the fear of
disclosure, these courts found other reasons why employers may be
inclined to "fudge" their self-evaluations, such as a report drafter's
concern about his own or his fellow employees' potential discipline.355
G.

Critiqueof O'Connor'sEmpiricalAssumptions, Factual
Distinctions,andFairnessAnalysis

The O'Connor court's analysis does not square with the traditional
justification for privileges. First, its assumption that governmentmandated reports will be completed in the same manner regardless of the
existence of a privilege departs from the reasoning in Dickerson and
privilege theory generally. In Dickerson, the court recognized that the
quality of the government-mandated reports depended on the employer's
"voluntary" compliance and execution of the report in good faith and
with candor.356 The premise of the traditional justification is that
communication is hampered when people are afraid that their
communications will be disclosed and that recognition of a privilege will
affect privilege holders' communications. The force of law alone is not a
reliable means of extracting truth; as other courts have noted, a person
353. See id. Judge Keeton recognized the difficulty of conducting an in camera inspection in a
nonjury case, but apparently felt an in camera inspection of samples was the fairest way to protect

both parties' interests. See id.
354. See id. The regulations require, inter alia, a detailed analysis of deficiencies in utilizing
minority groups and timetables for correction of the deficiencies. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.40(a), 602.10, 60-2.12 (1998).
355. See, e.g., supra notes 349-52 and accompanying text.
356. Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1448, 1449 (E.D. Pa. July 16,

1976).
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forced to testify will likely give false testimony. 7 Thus, the O'Connor
court's assumption that the mandatory reports will be done regardless of
the privilege shows a lack of trust in the traditional rationale, as well as a
disregard for prior courts' determination of the need to encourage
accurate and candid government reporting.
Second, the traditional justification invalidates the O'Connor court's
argument that significant deterrents to candid reporting would exist even
after recognition of a privilege. The mere possibility that clients lie to
their attorneys because of pride or fear or embarrassment hardly delegitimizes the attorney-client privilege. Traditionally, privileges are
justified only if the benefit gained by protecting the information
outweighs the impediment to the search for truth. If the report drafters
are likely lying, then recognition of the privilege creates little or no loss
of credible evidence because virtually any potential benefit gained would
outweigh the impediment to truth.
The U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Swidler & Berlin v. United
States3. 8 has proven that the existence of other deterrents is not a proper
basis for assuming the privilege would not work. In Swidler & Berlin, the
Independent Counsel argued that one more exception to the attorneyclient privilege would have only a "minimal" impact because other
exceptions already existed.359 The Court responded that such uncertainty
in a privilege's application could create client fear resulting in inhibited
disclosure and that fear of uncertainty is precisely the reason the Court
had previously rejected a balancing approach to the attorney-client
privilege." ° The Court explained that an assumption that people may
already question a privilege's trustworthiness, based on existing
exceptions, is not an appropriate basis for making a privilege ruling and
" '
could contribute to the general erosion of the privilege.36
Finally, the "unfairness" argument ignores the unfair predicament of
companies that engage in honest and voluntary self-assessment that
would be embarrassing and damaging if publicly exposed. The

357. Indeed, under the "Image Theory" of evidentiary privileges, the legal system bestows
privileges to the groups most likely to lie or refuse to testify to preserve the image and legitimacy of
the legal system. See Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, supra note 327, at
1498-99; see also In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1310, 1327 (D. Nev. 1983).
358. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
359. Id. at 409-10.
360. See id. at 409 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
361. Seeid. at410.
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O'Connorcourt deemed it unfair for the government to force companies
to create reports that can be used against them by plaintiffs. However, it
is not less unfair to force companies who engage in voluntary critical
self-assessment to disclose the assessments simply because they chose to
create the potentially adverse evidence. Companies who exceed the legal
requirements to uncover discrimination probably do so to avoid litigation
or to create a fair work environment for philosophical reasons. In light of
Title VII's purposes, these voluntary efforts should be encouraged by
protecting the self-critical reports from disclosure. These companies are
perhaps more committed to meeting Title VII's purposes and more likely
to take additional voluntary action based on their self-assessments. It
would thus be more unfair to subject these companies to disclosure of
private assessments because they are taking greater efforts to effectuate
the purposes of Title VII. This voluntary effort to eradicate discrimination is precisely the type of corporate behavior a self-criticalanalysis privilege originally sought to foster.362
The O'Connor opinion thus entrenches the Webb court's dichotomy
between government-mandated reports and voluntary self-assessments,
while apparently failing to understand, or possibly disagreeing with, the
basic reasoning supporting the traditional justification for privileges.
O'Connor nonetheless became one of the most quoted opinions in selfcritical-analysis jurisprudence and carried a precedential force unjustified
by its reasoning.
H.

Post-O'Connor

Most courts after O'Connorcontinued to follow the "objective" facts
versus "subjective" analysis distinction-the distinction debated in
Banks and made a "factor" for application of the self-critical-analysis
privilege under Webb and O'Connor-by ordering production of
statistics and other facts contained in affirmative action reports. 63
However, courts tended to adopt the various arguments put forth in
O'Connor and apply the three-prong test with no independent analysis,

362. See Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 251 (D.D.C. 1970), afl'd, 479 F.2d 920
(D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 53 F.RLD. 283 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
363. See, e.g., Woods v. Coca-Cola Co., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 151, 154-55 (N.D. Ga.
June 10, 1982); Penk v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 99 F.RLD. 506, 507 (D. Or. 1982);
Jamison v. Storer Broad., 511 F. Supp. 1286, 1296-97 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd inpartand rev'd in
part on othergrounds, 830 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1987).
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so that the flawed reasoning became masked by the sheer number of
court decisions upholding the precedential "standards." 3"
Resnick v. American DentalAss 'n365 is an excellent example of a court
applying the O'Connor factors with virtually no policy analysis. The
American Dental Association (ADA) attempted to use the self-criticalanalysis privilege in an employment discrimination suit to withhold (1) a
"personnel practices study" conducted by a private management
consulting firm and (2) documents from employee relations committee
meetings.366 The ADA made no claim that its consultants' work involved
government-required reports-unlike the defendants in Banks,
O'Connor, and Webb. 367 The court declared that it "need not decide
whether to embrace" the privilege, stating that to the extent it has been
applied, the standards set forth in O'Connorhad been met.168 Because the
"ADA alone chose to undertake the [self-critical assessment]
activities .... [n]either that fairness rationale nor that effective
enforcement rationale [set forth in O'Connor] operates here., 369 By

364. See, e.g., Spencer Sav. Bank v. Excell Mortgage Corp., 960 F. Supp. 835, 843 (D.N.J. 1997)
("Where self-evaluation has been voluntarily '[u]ndertaken, neither that fairness rationale nor [an]
effective enforcement rationale operates'. Accordingly, the justifications in support of applying the
privilege to government-mandated reports bear no relevance to [the] ruling today.") (citations
omitted); Tharp v. Sivyer Steel Corp., 149 F.R.D. 177, 182 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (discussing O'Connor
factors and stating that "[tihose courts which have adopted application of the privilege, however,
have placed.four limitations on its application") (emphasis added and citations omitted); Steinle v.
Boeing Co., 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 272, 278-79 (D. Kan. Feb. 3, 1992) (holding that
privilege is limited to government-mandated reports); Vanek v. Nutrasweet Co., 59 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) $ 41,600, 71,455-56 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ("Since any self-critical analysis that was performed
was a voluntary decision on the defendant's part, other authorities support an argument that the
information requested by plaintiff is not privileged.") (citations omitted); Hardy v. New York News,
Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Virtually every court has limited the privilege to
information or reports that are mandated by statute.") (citations omitted); Witten v. A.H. Smith &
Co., 100 F.R.D. 446, 450-51 (D. Md. 1984); Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678, 684 (N.D.
Ind. 1985) ("When [the privilege] has been adopted, the courts have consistently applied [the
O'Connor] standards.") (emphasis added and citations omitted); see also Dowling v. American
Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding no privilege for voluntary routine
safety reviews on vessel in Jones Act lawsuit). Some courts, however, took note of O'Connor but
did not specifically apply the factors. See, e.g., Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 98 F.R.D. 27 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
365. 95 F.R.D. 372 (1982).
366. Id. at 374.
367. See id.
368. See id.
369. Id. at 374-75 (emphasis added). Again, the court failed to recognize or discuss the latitude
employers have in making the required reports, or the idea that, whether required or voluntary, more
accurate, candid reports would be made if a privilege protected critical analysis from disclosure.
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relying on O'Connor's "factors," the Resnick court's finding that
voluntary undertaking of self-critical analysis does not implicate the
policies supporting the privilege entirely misses the original basis for the
self-critical-analysis privilege-to encourage companies to evaluate
thoroughly and candidly their antidiscrimination policies to effectuate
greater compliance with antidiscrimination legislation.
The Resnick court specifically stated that no enforcement scheme like
that under Executive Order 11,246 is "implicated" to support its
O'Connor-basedargument that no confidentiality is needed to create an
effective incentive structure for voluntary self-evaluations, because they
are not a part of the enforcement scheme set forth in Title VII and its
regulations a 0" Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court has condoned voluntary
action to effectuate Title VII's purpose and has stated that Congress'
intent in promulgating Title VII was to eradicate all vestiges of
discrimination, which includes voluntary actions by employers to meet
this fundamental goal.37 '
The Resnick court's focus on the "implications" of the enforcement
scheme set forth in Executive Order 11,246 as a justification for the
voluntary-mandatory distinction makes no theoretical sense. The fact that
voluntary evaluations are not required by law means greater incentives
are needed to encourage employers to undertake self-assessment; indeed,
O'Connor essentially argued that because government reports are
required, the need for confidentiality to encourage their production is
lessened.372 The Resnick court's reasoning subverts Title VII's overall
purposes to one specific regulation promulgated to help effectuate those
purposes and gives employers a disincentive to work voluntarily towards
EEO in any way that produces documents. Resnick exemplifies the way
in which sensible privilege law analysis has been lost through reliance on
the "standards" set forth in Webb and O'Connor, resulting in
irreconcilable policy arguments that in some instances clash with the
Note also that the court did not accept the attorney-client privilege as a basis for nondisclosure since
the attorney's involvement was "tangential." See id.
370. See id.
371. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (upholding
voluntary AA plan as consistent with Title VII's purpose and stating that in enacting Title VII,
Congress's intent was to spur "employers and unions to self-examine and self-evaluate their
employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an
unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history") (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405,417-18 (1975)).
372. Chrysler Corp. v. O'Connor, 86 F.R.D. 211, 217 (D. Mass. 1980).
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basic concern that prompted Executive Order 11,246-to encourage selfevaluation as a means to eradicate discriminatory practices.
.

Focus on Confidentiality

Two years after Resnick, a Maryland federal district court in Witten v.
A.H. Smith & Co.3 73 reiterated the "necessary" standards set forth in
Webb and O'Connor, but then declined to recognize the privilege by
modifying the pertinent inquiries and virtually eviscerating the privilege.374 The issue was whether to compel production of the defendant's
AA plan materials in a race discrimination suit brought pursuant to §
1981 and Title VII.3 75 The defendants argued that the reports were
irrelevant or constituted privileged information based on the self-criticalanalysis privilege.3 76 After acknowledging the split of authority and the
O'Connorstandards for applying the privilege, the Witten court held that
FRE 501 gives federal courts the flexibility to develop rules of privilege
on a case-by-case basis.377
The Witten court then set forth Wigmore's "four fundamental
conditions necessary to establish a privilege against disclosure of
communications" and analyzed the case under these factors.3 78 First, the
court said that there could be no expectation of confidentiality.3 79 The
federal procurement regulations state that the information in the reports
will be used to effectuate the purposes of Title VII, so consequently little
merit exists in the argument that such reports should remain confidential
and precluded from use in Title VII suits.380 Moreover, the split in
authority regarding the privilege militates against an expectation of
confidentiality; the fact that many courts have ordered production despite
a claim of a self-critical-analysis privilege makes an expectation
" '
insupportable.38

373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

100 F.R.D. 446 (D. Md. 1984).
See id. at 450-52.
See id. at 445.
See id. at 449-50.
See id. at 451 (citing 120 Cong. Rec. 40,891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate)).
Id. at 452; see infra text accompanying note 432 for Wigmore's four factors.
379. See Witten, 100 F.R.D. at 452.
380. See id.
381. See id.
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Second, the Witten court deemed protection of the reports "not
necessary to assure the continued status of the relationship presently
existing between the federal procurement agencies and the parties
contracting with the government.,18 2 The court stated that "it has not
been demonstrated that disclosure would significantly discourage the
amount of voluntary compliance" and referred to the O'Connor
reasoning that deterrents to candid self-evaluation exist that are unrelated
to the confidentiality issue.383 Other deterrents to candor and high goal
setting present in every case include compliance reviews (which
encourage low AA plan goal setting because failure to meet the goals can
cost the company the contract or its status as a prime contractor) and the
use of plans in litigation (a company's compliance with its AA plan is
"regularly considered by courts as evidence of a defendant corporation's
attention to a problem or as an affirmative defense to a particular claim
of discrimination"). 3" Thus, the Witten court concluded that not assuring
confidentiality provides no more incentive to lessen candor and goal
setting than is already present by these factors.385
The third factor-that the relationship must be one that the
community thinks worthy of sedulously fostering-was "not a matter of
dispute," and the fourth factor was a judgment call: a "cost-benefit"
analysis of harm to the "confidential" relationship versus benefit to
society if disclosure is required.386 The Witten court found that AA plans
could contain useful information of intent and motivation and decided
that considering the difficulty of proving intent in discrimination cases,
the plaintiff's
need significantly outweighed any possible decrease in
387
quality.
The Witten court placed undue weight on Wigmore's factors and
failed to conduct a full privilege analysis as called for by FRE 501.
Although the court recognized its discretion and flexibility under FRE
501, it applied Wigmore's factors in lieu of the original privilege analysis
based on reason and experience envisioned by FRE 501. Wigmore's
382. Id. at 453.
383. Id. at 452 (emphasis added). The court appears to want empirical proof of the privilege's
effect on communications but does not mention that there is no proof that the privilege does not
encourage more candid communication, relying instead on theories about "other deterrents" set forth
by O'Connorand courts that relied on O'Connor.

384. Id. at453.
385. See id. at 452-54.
386. Id. at453-54.

387. See id. at 454.
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factors were not developed with the corporate context in mind and
should be refashioned as balancing social benefits of confidentiality
against its social costs.388 By using Wigmore's factors instead of a full
utilitarian analysis or even Webb's and O'Connor's factors, the Witten
court eviscerated the privilege because the first Wigmore factor can
never be met with regard to government reports, particularly considering
the split of authority in the privilege's application. Furthermore, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that under FRE 501, courts are not bound by any
prior rules or standards for applying privileges.389 That is, a court's duty
under FRE 501 is to conduct original analysis, not simply to apply old
privilege standards.39 Just as an entrenched expectation of confidentiality is not controlling, neither should a lack of an expectation be
determinative or given any more weight than is appropriate in light of
reason and experience. It is as if the Witten court had decided to begin
the demise of the self-critical-analysis privilege and "found" firm
grounds against the privilege's application in Wigmore's first factor,
therefore giving it great weight.
Witten's other stated basis for no expectation of confidentiality-that
the regulation put companies on notice that reports are not confidentialis also not persuasive. The court assumed that the regulation's language,
stating that the reports "'shall be used only in connection with the
administration of the Order [Executive Order 11,246], the administration
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and in furtherance of the Order and that
Act,"' equates to a legislative mandate that the reports be turned over to
private litigants.3 9' Instead, this language could mean that the documents
are limited to administrative use because no specific mention is made of
non-administrative use and because "only" qualifies "used," indicating a
limitation on the documents' use. But even assuming the regulatory
language supports a litigant's right to the documents,392 the U.S. Supreme
388. In Wigmore's day, corporations were not nearly as commonplace as today; hence,
Wigmore's analysis focused solely on personal privileges and cannot simply be applied
mechanically to corporations. See Bush, supranote 277, at 639-41 & n.282.
389. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-48 (1980) (rejecting previous formulation of
spousal testimonial privilege and holding that only witness-spouse has privilege to refuse to testify
against other spouse).
390. Of course, the fact that Wigmore was against the spousal testimonial privilege may be
another reason the Trammel Court did not consider Wigmore's four factors. See id. at 45.
391. Witten, 100 F.R.D. at 452 (citing 41 C.F.R. § 1-12.811 (1983)).
392. For example, affirmative action studies must be forwarded to the appropriate government
agencies who may disclose them to other government agencies; the government policy is to produce
them (unless excepted from discovery), and they are subject to FOIA requests. See Flanagan, supra
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Court's general support of the "right to every man's evidence" is at least
as important a rule to uphold.393 Yet, even this fundamental right to
evidence is subverted to the transcendent societal benefits conferred by
privileges every time a privilege is recognized.
The Witten court, like prior courts, assumed that Title VII is an
efficacious private antidiscrimination enforcement mechanism and thus
that allowing plaintiffs access to self-critical analysis would increase a
plaintiff's chances of proving the motivation and intent necessary to win
a disparate treatment discrimination claim. The court acknowledged the
difficulty of proving intent in Title VII cases, and indeed based its
decision in part on trying to help Title VII plaintiffs acquire the
ammunition necessary to meet their burden of proof. But, as argued in
Part II of this Article, Title VII litigation is not an effective way of
redressing most instances of discrimination. By basing its "cost-benefit"
analysis on the faulty assumption that additional evidence of intent
furthers antidiscrimination efforts, the Witten court ignores the nature
and prevalence of unconscious bias and the contribution truly candid
self-assessment could make to an antidiscrimination effort.
J.

The Demise of the Self-Critical-AnalysisPrivilege

Federal courts' momentum in destroying the self-critical-analysis
privilege had become strong. Courts consistently relied on factors and
analyses of previous cases, giving particular weight to O'Connor and
Witten. Courts continued, however, to find additional reasons why the
privilege was unnecessary, ineffective, or both.
In Hardy v. New York News, Inc.,39 a New York federal district court
relied on the O'Connor factors in rejecting the self-critical-analysis
privilege in a discrimination and retaliation action brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. 395 The documents were created voluntarily,
so the first O'Connor factor was not met.3 96 The court clarified that "in
the area of employment discrimination, virtually every court has limited
note 275, at 565-66 & nn.78-82; see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 706(2)(a) (1994); 41 C.F.R § 60-40.1

(1998).
393. See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (stating that "'Iflor more than
three centuries it has been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public... has a right to every
man's evidence"') (quoting 8 . Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 (3d ed. 1940)).
394. 114 F.R.D. 633,640-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
395. See id.

396. Seeid. at 641.
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the privilege to information or reports that are mandated by statute or
regulation."3'97 Therefore, the O'Connorcourt's perception of unfairness
in a rule that required companies to engage in self-critical analysis and
then surrender that ammunition to the plaintiffs did not apply.3 98
The Hardy court found that O'Connor's "balancing" factor militated
against the privilege's application. 399 The court referred to the analysis
set forth in Witten and O'Connorthat deterrents to candid self-evaluation
exist apart from threat of disclosure in discovery and, based thereon,
questioned the underlying assumption of the privilege that disclosure
would significantly discourage self-critical activity.4"0 On balance, the
Hardy court found that the plaintiffs' need to prove intent outweighed
the interest in promoting candid self-analysis and voluntary EEO
compliance, especially given the insignificant deterrent effect that the
threat of disclosure would have on the document preparation at issue in
that case.4"' The court stated that companies have an obligation to
comply with the law and as a matter of "sound business management"
will take steps to prevent litigation by making evaluations.4"' Thus, any
disincentive to conduct candid evaluations based on potential disclosure
is contrary to the "basic principles of risk management," including a
company's need to resolve minorities' grievances without litigation.4 3
The Hardy court did not consider that some businesses will exercise
"sound business judgment" and "risk management" by bulletproofing
themselves against potential discrimination lawsuits by setting low goals,
making no potentially harmful subjective findings of fact, and hiring just
enough minorities to meet minimal goals. The Hardy court's theory of
sound business judgment rests on the premise that only effective
antidiscrimination efforts lower the risk of litigation. But the ubiquitous
use of "bean counters" by automobile and other product manufacturers
belies the notion that companies seek first to comply with the law if there
are other ways to minimize "risk"-which generally means "costs" to
companies. Human justice, even human life, is but one factor in deciding
when and how to comply with the law. To assume companies' interest in
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

Id.
See id.
See id. at 643.
See id. at 641.
See id. at 641-42.

402. Id. at 642.
403. Id.
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risk management necessarily converges with the interests at stake in
antidiscrimination legislation is dangerous and naive. By refusing to
recognize the privilege, the Hardy court not only made truly critical and
candid analysis unlikely, but the court actually encouraged
companies to
44
cover their tracks in meeting their reporting requirements. 0
The Hardy court also considered the fact that the privilege has never
been applied to prevent government agencies from obtaining the
documents. 4"5 Because both the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and the private plaintiffs sought the documents in
this case and because the EEOC indicated it would bring its own motion
to compel if the private plaintiffs' motion to compel were denied, the
denial of the plaintiffs' motion would neither protect the documents from
disclosure nor eliminate the alleged chilling effect.406 Theoretically,
however, if a self-critical-analysis privilege were recognized seriously, it
would protect the privileged documents against discovery by anyone,
such as is the case with attorney-client privileged documents.
In this particular context, however, it is arguable that the U.S.
Supreme Court has spoken. In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC,0 7
the Court held that Congress struck a balance in relation to the purported
privilege against discovery of peer-review materials in Title VII cases by
not addressing the privilege when amending Title VII to include
educational institutions.4"' Since the self-critical-analysis privilege could
have been addressed in the amendments to Title VII, but was not, the
same reasoning regarding peer reviews could apply to the self-criticalanalysis privilege. Indeed, at least one magistrate has held that under the
principles of University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC and Congress' failure
to provide for a self-critical-analysis privilege, recognition of the
privilege is inappropriate.4 9 This is probably the strongest argument

404. Indeed, one company argued that if the self-critical-analysis privilege is not recognized, it
would be "forced" to conduct its reports in a manner "inconsistent with the basic goals of affirmative
action." Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1193, 1197 (D. Minn. May 3,
1988).
405. Hardy, 114 F.RLD. at 643 (quoting FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207,210 (D.D.C. 1980)).
406. See id. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that private litigants are entitled to documents in
the EEOC's possession. See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 604 (1981).
407. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
408. See 1d. at 194-95 (holding that Congress had already struck appropriate balance of interests
in Title VII actions by providing that EEOC can obtain "relevant" evidence).
409. See Arambuni v. Boeing Co., 885 F. Supp. 1434, 1440 (D. Kan. 1995).
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against recognizing the privilege in cases relating to Title VII
compliance.41 °
In Capellupo v. FMC Corp.,4 which was decided one year after
Hardy, a Minnesota federal district court rejected the privilege after
FMC boldly claimed that potential disclosure of self-evaluative materials
could cause it to be "forced to exercise the substantial discretion left to it
by the federal regulations in a manner inconsistent with the basic goals
of affirmative action."4 2 The court called FMC's position "an affront"
and emphasized the company's obligation to comply with the "law of the
'
land."413
Ironically, FMC's position essentially restates the Dickerson
court's reasoning and is consistent with the theory underlying the
traditional justification. The Capellupo court's response implicitly rejects
the notion that privileges produce candor and, as argued above, rather
naively exhibits an expectation that companies consider their legal duties
over their bottom lines. The court's position on this fundamental basis
for the self-critical-analysis privilege-the creation of better EEO policy
through candid self-evaluation-underscores the complete rejection,
based upon the reasoning in cases such as O'Connorand Witten, of the
core premise of the self-critical-analysis privilege by this time.
The Capellupo court's opinion is a harbinger of the way federal courts
in the 1990s relied largely on prior tests and analyses in determining that
no self-critical-analysis privilege exists in employment discrimination
cases. For example, although Witten's analysis is questionable and places
undue emphasis on Wigmore's factors, later courts relied heavily on the
lack of expectation of confidentiality to find the privilege inappropriate.
After discussing Witten and Wigmore's four "necessary" conditions, the
Capellupo court held that the defendant had "no expectation of privacy"
in AA plans and related documents because the regulations clearly state
that such documents must be made available to the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs and that the information can be disclosed
to others, including private parties.414 The Capellupo court also noted that
410. It would not apply, however, to self-critical evaluations unrelated to Title VII compliance,
such as purely voluntary evaluations, including unconscious-bias testing.
411. 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1193 (D. Minfi. May 3, 1988).
412. Id. at 1197 (emphasis added). The documents at issue evaluated FMC's progress under its
AA plan and discussed the company's AA goals in hiring women and minorities. See id. at 1194.
413. Id. at 1197 (citing Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633 (S.D.N.Y 1987)).
414. See id. (citing 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-40.1, 60-2.12(a)). Note that, like O'Connor's factors,
Wigmore's factors are referred to as "necessary" in spite of the fact that no single factor is necessary
under the broad language of FRE 501.
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the U.S. Supreme Court has held that individual plaintiffs are entitled to
EEOC investigation information and appeared to base its denial of the
self-critical-analysis privilege primarily on Wigmore's first factor, which
concerns the fact that the communication did not originate in
confidence. 1 5
K

Rejection of the Self-Critical-AnalysisPrivilege

In 1990, federal courts began completely rejecting the self-criticalanalysis privilege in employment discrimination cases.416 In Martin v.
415. See id. (citing EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Co., 449 U.S 590, 604 (1981)). The
Capellupo court also noted the similarity of defendant's argument to FRE 407, which renders
evidence of measures taken subsequent to an alleged harmful event inadmissible to prove negligence
or culpable conduct in connection with the event See id. at 1197-98. The court distinguished FRE
407 because it is a rule of evidence not applicable to pretrial discovery. "The better view is to permit
discovery, not only because Rule 407 is essentially a rule of public policy rather than of relevancy,
but also because subsequent remedial measures might be admissible to prove a consequential,
material fact in issue ..."Id. (citing 2 Weinstein, Evidence 407[7], at 407-37 to 407-38). In the
instant case, the court said that proving the defendant's intent to discriminate in a Title VII suit is
precisely the kind of "consequential material fact in issue" that Weinstein refers to. Id. Whether the
documents indicate a failure to perform under an AA plan is relevant to the issue of discriminatory
intent under Eighth Circuit law. See id. (citing Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465,
472 (8th Cir. 1984)); see also Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 885 F. Supp. 1434 (D. Kan. 1995); Siskonen
v. Stanadyne, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 610, 612 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (rejecting self-critical-analysis privilege
under Michigan law). The Capellupo court did not, however, notice that the U.S. Supreme Court did
not address the expectation-of-confidentiality factor or even mention any Wigmore factor in making
its decision in Trammeljust one year before ruling on the availability of EEOC documents to private
litigants. Rather, the Capellupo court relied on Witten and, like Witten, places undue emphasis on
Wigmore's first factor.
416. See Spencer Say. Bank v. Excell Mortgage Corp., 960 F. Supp. 835, 838, 844 (D.NJ. 1997)
(setting forth "proper test" for recognizing common law privilege and holding "a self-critical
analysis privilege does not exist at federal common law"); Aramburu, 885 F. Supp. at 1441 ("[lIt is
inappropriate to recognize the privilege of self-critical analysis in Title VII cases."); Tharp v. Sivyer
Steel Corp., 149 F.R.D. 177, 182 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (holding "the 'self-critical analysis' privilege
should not be recognized in the field of employment discrimination litigation"); Etienne v. Mitre
Corp., 146 F.R.D. 145, 147-49 (E.D. Va. 1993) (calling privilege "largely undefined" in age
discrimination suit and finding it inapplicable as contrary to public interests at stake in employment
discrimination cases); Williams v. Vulcan-Hart Corp., 136 F.R.D. 457, 459-60 (W.D. Ky. 1991)
(holding no self-critical-analysis privilege under Kentucky law for violation of state antidiscrimination statute); Martin v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355
(D.D.C. May 25, 1990). But see Whittingham v. Amherst College, 164 F.R.D. 124, 130 (D. Mass.
1995) (recognizing privilege, but stating that document at issue "hardly amounts to the kind of selfcritical analysis deserving of the court's protection"); Abel v. Merril Lynch & Co., 91 Civ. 6261,
1993 WL 33348, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1993) (regarding demographic statistical data in disparate
treatment and disparate impact ADEA claim and stating that "given that this Court has doubts as to
the viability of this privilege,... and that the reports sought by Plaintiff contain only 'nonevaluative facts, statistics, or other data,' the Court declines to apply the so-called privilege of selfcritical analysis in this context'); Vanek v. Nutrasweet, 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,600, at
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Potomac Electric Power Co.,417 a District of Columbia federal district
court held that no privilege for self-critical analysis exists protecting
documents from discovery in private employment discrimination
cases. 411 The Martin court condoned the Bredice decision, stating that
when a situation concerns public health and safety, it is critical not to
block efforts to identify and "correct dangerous conditions. 4 9 However,
the Martin court found that private employment discrimination suits do
not involve similarly strong policy considerations to justify shielding
self-critical documents from discovery.4 2 After noting the general
standards for recognizing a privilege under FRE 501 and relying on the
analyses of O'Connor and Witten, the Martin court went through the
reasons why the self-critical-analysis privilege would not affect internal
evaluations or discourage candid preparation of government reports.42'
Fundamentally, the Martin court did not believe that disclosure would
hinder progress toward equal employment opportunity. This is because
either (1) companies engage in aggressive self-critical analysis, resulting
in better EEO policies and a lack of fear of litigation or disclosure, or (2)
if the degree of candor in the reports is unrelated to success in creating
equal employment opportunities, then society should not care about
encouraging candor:

71,455 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (recognizing split of authority and discussing privilege as "not yet fully
established in the law" but ordering discovery); Steinle v. Boeing Co., 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 272, 279 (D. Kan. Feb. 3, 1992) (acknowledging split of authority regarding self-criticalanalysis privilege). Some courts, however, continued to recognize the privilege to a limited degree in
the employment context after 1990. See, e.g., Troupin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 F.R.D. 546,
549 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding privilege applied as to narrative, evaluative, or analytical portions of
self-evaluative documents pursuant to self-critical-analysis privilege despite "questionable force of
the reasoning behind the privilege"); Brem v. Decarlo, 162 F.R.D. 94, 101-02 (D. Md. 1995)
(protecting physician's opinion about competence of former residents based on Maryland's peerreview statute and self-critical-analysis privilege in Title VII suit, but distinguishing documents at
hand from documents unprotected in employment context because documents at hand were peerreview type documents); Cobb v. Rockefeller Univ., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 184, 186
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1991) (holding review process portion of affirmative action plan privileged). The
author of this Article could find no cases outside of the southern district of New York after 1990
where the self-critical-analysis privilege was held to prevent discovery of EEO assessment in an
employment discrimination suit.
417. 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355 (D.D.C. May 25, 1990).
418. See id. at 359.
419. Id. at 356.
420. See id. (citing FRE 407).
421. See id. at 357-59.
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Thus, either disclosure will not give companies a disincentive to be

candid, or disclosure will give a disincentive to be candid but a
decrease in candor will not slow progress toward the goal of equal

employment opportunity. In either case, disclosure will not
undermine the goal of equal employment opportunity.'
This decision reflects the most common attack on the traditional

justification-that changes in privilege law have no impact on behavior
and ultimately employers' EEO attitudes and efforts will not be affected

by privilege law.
Finally, the Martin court found that private litigation is itself an

important means of promoting EEO. Self-evaluative documents improve
private plaintiffs' ability to prove discrimination, furthering EEO goals
by allowing discovery of the documents. 4" For these reasons, the court
concluded that protecting EEO reports from discovery by private

plaintiffs would not promote sufficiently important interests to outweigh
plaintiffs' need for probative evidence.424 This case and others denouncing the privilege place trust in private litigation as a means of
promoting equal employment opportunity and ultimately find private
litigants' need for probative evidence a more compelling consideration.'
The history of the self-critical-analysis privilege in employment

discrimination cases demonstrates the inherent tension in privilege law
analysis between the need for confidentiality and the need for evidence.
Because the self-critical-analysis privilege is traditionally grounded in
utilitarian justifications, courts that refused to uphold the privilege did so

422. Id. at 359.
423. See id.
424. See id The court went on to note a number of "additional considerations" that further
convinced it that its decision was correct, including (1) because employers may use positive reports
to prove their good intentions, fairness dictates that plaintiffs should have the same opportunity with
respect to negative reports; (2) there is no expectation of confidentiality; (3) the self-critical-analysis
privilege is not grounded in any constitutional provision and has no statutory or historical basis, and
although privileges do not require such a basis, the lack thereof carries some weight; and (4) no court
of appeal has recognized the privilege and prior decisions in the Circuit, and other courts have
argued against the privilege in the employment context. See id.at 359-60.
425. See hL at 360-61; see also Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1982)
(holding where proof of intent is required, tension between plaintiff's need for evidence and
employer's confidentiality tips in favor of plaintiff) (citing Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 170-75
(1979)); Etienne v. Mitre Corp., 146 F.R.D. 145, 147 (E.D. Va. 1993) ("Over the years, this
balancing of public and private interests has become the essential consideration when a court decides
whether the [self-critical-analysis] privilege should prevent disclosure of relevant information").
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primarily by attacking the basic premise of the traditional rationale that
the privilege would affect people's behavior positively. The courts'
analyses have been unjustifiably reliant on prior holdings, elevating factspecific holdings and unsound analysis to privilege "tests" and policy
statements that are unrelated to true privilege law analysis and
inconsistent with the courts' obligation to develop rules of privilege in
accordance with sound public policy. Factual situations in early cases,
such as the fact that most documents protected by the privilege prior to
Webb were government mandated, became entrenched in self-criticalanalysis case law. Policy analysis was thus lost to the prior cases' factual
similarities. One of the strongest arguments for not recognizing the
privilege in later cases-that no expectation of confidentiality exists
given that the employer had notice that the documents must be produced
to government agencies-does not apply to voluntarily created documents. Yet, by the time the courts' opinions focused on this
confidentiality expectation argument, the requirement that the documents
be government mandated was already entrenched in the case law. There
was no careful judicial analysis of whether purely voluntary EEO selfcritical-analysis documents should be privileged. If there had been,
courts would have probably protected purely voluntary critical selfassessments, likely encompassing voluntary unconscious-bias testing.
Nonetheless, fundamental justifications for recognizing a self-criticalanalysis privilege emerge from these cases and build an argument for
protecting the results of unconscious-bias testing. First, when the desired
communications are vulnerable to "chilling," recognition of a privilege is
more likely. Second, when a great benefit to society is believed to result
from protecting the communications, or conversely, when great harm
could result from not protecting the communications, a privilege is more
probable. Third, when little or no evidence is lost on account of the
privilege, it is more likely to be recognized.
VI. COURTS SHOULD RECOGNIZE A PRIVILEGE FOR
UNCONSCIOUS-BIAS TESTING
The immediate truth exposed by unconscious-bias testing is
subordinate to the greater, but less immediate, truth that will come as a
result of increased understanding about what motivates individuals in
intergroup relations. Recognizing a self-critical-analysis kind of privilege
for unconscious-bias testing protects the more transcendent, individual
and societal truth-finding process necessary to achieve interracial and
intergroup peace from the more temporal objectives of individual
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plaintiffs in discrimination lawsuits. Considering that unconscious-bias
test results do not prove intent under Title VII,426 any loss of evidence
from recognizing a privilege is minimal and outweighed by the benefits.
Does traditional privilege law theory support a self-critical-analysis
privilege for employer testing of cognitive bias and subjective employer
analysis of its employees' unconscious mental processes? What values
must we balance in analyzing this issue?
Before embarking on an analysis of why a privilege for unconsciousbias testing is warranted by the policies expressed by courts in relation to
the formerly recognized privilege for self-critical analysis, it is important
to get a basic understanding of privilege law theory. Selected U.S.
Supreme Court cases on privilege law clarify justifications for a new
privilege and guide privilege law analysis under FRE 501. After
discussing privilege law theory and case law, this Part argues that
recognition of a qualified privilege for unconscious-bias testing is
appropriate. Finally, this Part addresses objections to unconscious-bias
testing.
A.

The Theory of Privileges

Privileges are generally viewed as impediments to truth. They
subordinate the truth-finding process to higher societal interests and thus
"impede the realization of a central objective of the legal system in order
to advance other, often less immediate, goals."427 Two primary
justifications exist in defense of privileges.428 The first and most
426. Disparate impact theory does not require proof of intent, just an employer's facially neutral
practice that impacts a protected group more harshly than other groups. Unconscious bias would not
help plaintiffs in disparate impact cases because attitude, motivation, and intent are not at issue.
Under the ADEA, unconscious-bias testing for age bias could constitute proof, since "stereotyping"
of older people is illegal under the ADEA. However, ADEA cases have generally required tangible
statements demonstrating stereotyping, so purely unconscious bias demonstrated by scientific test
results would probably not be admissible; they do not prove anything except a potential to
stereotype. See generally Krieger, supra note 6. Also, the studies have not shown a clear and definite
connection between unconscious bias and discriminatory actions, making the unconscious-bias test
results probably more prejudicial than probative. But even if the testing was probative evidence, this
author maintains that the benefits to be gained from keeping test results out of litigation outweigh the
loss of evidence.
427. See Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, supra note 327, at 1454.
428. Two other theories hold that neither of these justifications is coherent because they both
attempt to rationalize an incoherent body of law; instead, privileges can be explained only in terms
of political power. "Power Theory" argues that privilege law is "special treatment won by the power
of those privileged." Id. at 1493-98. "Image Theory" holds that privilege law can be understood as a
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influential is the traditional, utilitarian justification enunciated by
Wigmore." 9 This theory holds that privileges are justified only if the
benefit gained by protecting the information outweighs the impediment
in the search for truth.430 The goal is to encourage communication in a
relationship, but the theory is based on the unproven assumption that the
existence of the privilege encourages people to speak more candidly
because they know that what they say is protected from disclosure. Thus,
the contention is that the relationship of the parties to the communication
will suffer if the communications are not privileged. 43 Wigmore set forth
four conditions to establish a privilege: (1) the communications must
originate in confidence; (2) the confidentiality must be essential to the
full maintenance of the relation between the parties; (3) the relation must
be one that the community strongly wants to foster; and (4) the injury to
the relation caused by the disclosure of the communications must be
greater than the benefit gained by the correct disposal of litigation.432
Wigmore was a strong believer in the duty to testify and narrowly
construed the fourth factor to constrict application of the privilege to
worthy communications 43 3 and thus to systemic harms. The traditional
justification is not concerned about injury to specific litigants, but rather
balances the encouragement of communications in the relevant class
against the cost of its obstruction to truth finding. Most courts have
followed Wigmore's approach, requiring systemic harm in the balancing
test established by the fourth factor. 434 By considering only extrinsic
social policy unrelated to the interests of the individual litigants in a
particular dispute, the justification "elevates the interests advanced by
privileges to the same plane as the societal interest in ascertaining the

means of preserving the image and legitimacy of the legal system, avoiding embarrassment to the
legal system by masking its inability to compel obedience and minimizing the possibility that facts
discovered after trial would undermine the judgments made. See id.
at 1498-1500.
429. See id.
at 1472; see also Ronald J. Allen et al., Evidence 990 (2d ed. 1977); 8 John Wigmore,
Evidence § 2285 (J. McNaughton ed. 1961).
430. See Wigmore, supra note 429, § 2285.
431. See Allen et al., supra note 429, at 990.
432. See Wigmore, supra note 429, § 2285.
433. See Developments in the Law-PrivilegedCommunications, supranote 327, at 1472-74.
434. See id. at 1473; see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) (holding privileges must
serve public ends).
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truth.'
Examples of privileges justified under this theory include the
attorney-client privilege and medical and counseling privileges.436

The most common attack on this justification is that the privilege
does not affect people's behavior: either people do not know the law, so
the unknown privilege does not encourage communication, or if they do
know the law, people's need to communicate would overcome their fear
of disclosure.437 To the extent data exists, it is mixed. Some studies have

found that most people believe that they communicate more openly when
they are assured of confidentiality, and this may be especially true of
legally sophisticated corporate actors.438 Other studies demonstrate that
whether a psychotherapist-patient privilege is recognized has little
impact on patients.439 Of course, the effect of the privilege remains
unproven and is, in fact, probably incapable of proof. Social psychology
studies indicate that people are often unable to say what really motivated
them. Thus, empirical studies relying on self-reporting about whether the
existence of a privilege affected the privilege-holders' behavior are
inherently indeterminate.
The rejoinder to this attack is that the costs imposed by a privilege are
no less speculative. If the privilege encouraged a communication that
would not have otherwise occurred and then shielded that com-

munication from discovery, the result is a net "wash" for evidentiary
purposes. The exceptions to privileges and concepts such as waivers

435. Developments in the Law-PrivilegedCommunications, supranote 327, at 1474.
436. See id.at 1501, 1530. Note that other theories support these privileges as well.
437. See id. at 1474-80. For example, a person's need to communicate freely with a doctor to
gain the utmost in medical advice for her condition probably outweighs any embarrassment concerns
over disclosure of the information.
438. See Daniel W. Shurman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical
Examinationof the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 60 N.C. L. Rev. 893 (1982); Note, Functional
Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged
Communications Doctrine, 71 Yale L.J. 1226 (1962); see also Bush, supra note 277, at 637-38
(citing studies showing that 93% of corporate counsel and 79% of executives indicated concern over
attorney-client privilege at least once in preceding five years; 89% of corporate counsel and 75% of
executives believe attorney-client privilege fosters candor, and 70% of executives indicated that if
"control group" test were used to apply attorney-client privilege, they would restrict or prohibit
attorney access to lower employees) (citing Vincent C. Alexander, The CorporateAttorney-Client
Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 St. John's L. Rev. 191, 260-61 (1989)); Jessica G.
Weiner, "And The Wisdom to Know the Difference": Confidentialityvs. Privilege in the Self-Help
Setting, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 243,260-64 & nn.120-22 (1995).
439. See Edward Imwinkelried, The Rivalry Between Truth and Privilege: The Weakness of the
Supreme Court'sInstrumentalReasoning in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), 49 Hastings L.L
969,976 (1998).
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diminish the costs of the privilege and can provide access to the most
important evidence." 4 Furthermore, communications that are determined
not to be privileged cannot be forced out of unwilling witnesses, so
compelled disclosure may often result in false testimony. Finally, the loss
of a single piece of evidence will rarely make or break a case.
The emergent justification for privileges is the privacy rationale." 1
Here the focus is not on the privilege's beneficial impact to society, but
on the protection that the privilege affords to individual privacy. That is
to say, the interest in securing privacy and confidentiality to the
individuals involved in the communication is itself considered justification for whatever obstruction to truth seeking results." 2 Some say
that the marital communications privilege is based on the privacy
rationale so as to recognize and protect intimate aspects of the marital
relationship." 3 The privacy rationale raises these three issues:
(1) whether people need to keep certain communications confidential;
(2) whether this need is socially cognizable; and (3) whether the privacy
interest outweighs the need for evidence.'
Privacy is said to serve several societal objectives, such as promoting
self-evaluation, permitting emotional release, and allowing for personal
autonomy." 5 Respecting privacy against compelled disclosure is also an
end in itself, as it avoids exposing embarrassing intimacies to the public
and protects against forced breaches of confidential relationships.
Whether an alleged privacy interest is legally cognizable turns on what
courts deem worthy of protection. The balance between privacy and
society's need to find the truth depends on the facts and normative
considerations involved. Categorical balancing makes the privacy
rationale as indeterminate as the traditional justification; neither
justification can be resolved empirically.

440. See Developments in the Law-PrivilegedCommunications, supra note 327, at 1477-79.
441. See Imwinkelried, supra note 439, at 988; see also Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial
Privileges in FederalCourts: An Alternative to the FederalProposed Rules of Evidence, 62 Geo.
L.J. 61 (1973); David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal
Court Today, 31 Tul. L. Rev. 101 (1956).
442. See Developments in the Law-PrivilegedCommunications,supra note 327, at 1480.
443. See Allen et al., supra note 429, at 990; see also Charles L. Black, Jr., The Marital and
Physician Privileges-A Reprint ofa Letter to a Congressman, 1975 Duke L.J. 45, 47.
444. See Developments in the Law-PrivilegedCommunications,supra note 327, at 1481.
445. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 439, at 985-88.
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A utilitarian balancing of all interests may be more useful than the
"mutually exclusive" traditional and privacy alternatives. 6 The case for
a new privilege is strengthened by considering the privacy rationale and
the traditional justification in tandem. In the context of unconscious-bias
testing, the traditional justification can be supplemented by the need to
protect people's psyches from invasive exploitation.
The burden is on those advocating privileges to show that the benefit
to society or to the individual is greater than the costs of allowing the
privilege." 7 But the rationale used to justify the privilege will affect the
way the privilege is applied. The traditional justification requires
predictable application; otherwise, the benefit of candid communication
will be chilled by fear that a court will find the communication
unprotected in a particular case." On the other hand, because the
privacy rationale does not focus on behavioral consequences of the
privilege, certainty in application is not a major issue." 9 Thus, privileges
justified by the traditional justification should be absolute and certain,
while privacy concerns can be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
Because the main goal of the privilege for unconscious-bias testing is to
improve the content of communications, as opposed to fostering a
relationship, a traditional, utilitarian approach should be used so that
application is consistent and employers can rely upon the privilege to
protect their self-critical employment assessments. Thus, while a privacy
rationale may strengthen an argument for recognizing a privilege based
upon the tested individual's privacy,450 the primary justification must be
utilitarian.
Neither a strict rule nor a case-by-case approach is without potential
drawbacks. A predictable rule invites abuse because it allows the "bad
man" to "walk the line." Also, problems of underinclusiveness and
overinclusiveness will likely arise. Some commentators counter that

446. The two primary justifications are generally regarded as mutually exclusive alternatives even
though they can be compatible and share similar methodologies. See Developments in the LavPrivilegedCommunications, supranote 327, at 1483-86.
447. See id. at 1480; see also Swidler& Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399,409-10 (1998).
448. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 409.
449. See Developments in the Law-PrivilegedCommunications,supranote 327, at 1486-87.
450. A privilege against discovery of an individual's test results could be grounded in the privacy
rationale, but because here the goal is to encourage employers to test employees, an individual's
privacy interests are not directly on point. Nonetheless, recognizing an individual's privacy is

important for a full analysis of the privilege. For a discussion about unconscious-bias testing and the
right to privacy, see supraPart VI.D.
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certainty encourages private activity to follow a desired pattern.45'
Applying uncertain standards on a case-by-case basis risks arbitrary
results, but discretion can beneficially reduce underinclusive and
overinclusive effects of the privilege. The best privilege may be one that
appears certain in form, so that communication is not chilled, but is
uncertain in application so judges can fine-tune the privilege to reduce
inappropriate outcomes.452
B.

Standardsfor Recognizing andAnalyzing Privileges

Privilege law embodies federal common law privileges and a diverse
collection of state law privileges mostly of statutory origin. As part of the
Federal Rules of Evidence adopted by Congress in 1975, FRE 501
governs privilege law in federal courts.453 Congress declined to adopt the
Proposed Rules of Evidence,454 which set forth nine discrete privileges,455
instead opting for the more flexible language of the current FRE 501.
FRE 501 grants federal courts discretion to modify common law
privileges and to create new ones. As the U.S. Supreme Court has
explained: "In rejecting the proposed rules and enacting Rule 501,
Congress manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of
451. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981); Duncan Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1688-89 (1976).
452. See Developments in the Lav-PrivilegedCommunications, supranote 327, at 1489.
453. FRE 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of
Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State or political subdivision thereof
shall be determined in accordance with State law.
454. The Proposed Rules were drafted by the Advisory Committee and proposed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1971. After considerable controversy and criticism, Congress adopted the new
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. See Allen et al., supranote 429, at 992-95.
455. The privileges proposed were required reports, attorney-client confidential communications,
psychotherapist-patient confidential communications, prevention of spousal testimony, clergycommunicant confidential communications, political votes, trade secrets, state secrets and other
official information, and the identity of an informer. See Proposed FRE 502-510 and Advisory
Committee Notes, 51 F.R.D. 260, 260-80 (1971). For a thorough discussion of FRE 501's history,
see Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under FederalRule of Evidence
501: The Restrictive Thesis, The Expansive Antithesis, and the Contextual Synthesis, 73 Neb. L. Rev.
511 (1994).
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privilege. Its purpose rather was to 'provide the courts with the flexibility
to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis' and to leave the
door open to change."4 5 Thus, Congress recognized that the evidence
rules needed the flexibility to keep pace with society's changing values
and relational dynamics. Indeed, FRE 501 confers to federal courts a
legislative-type function to change privilege law in accordance with
changing societal norms and is thus an effective way to keep privilege
law up-to-date without the need for congressional action each time
privilege law needs modification.
The extent to which new privileges are recognized under state law
varies.4 57 State privileges are usually created by state legislatures that
consider the same utilitarian and privacy policy rationales that animate
federal court privilege review under FRE 501. These shared policy
concerns encourage crossover of privilege analysis. States often borrow
federal privilege analysis to determine the propriety of recognizing a
privilege.4" 8 Federal courts in federal question cases often look to state
law for guidance in the area of privilege, and commentators have
condoned such practice in the absence of strong countervailing federal
policy.459 Therefore, all of the arguments supporting federal court
recognition of the privilege also support state recognition of the
privilege.
Trammel v. United States4 exemplifies the Court's flexible "all
things considered" approach to effectuating FRE 501. In Trammel, the
Court modified the previous rule barring the testimony of one spouse
against the other unless both consented and held that, under modem
policy considerations, only the witness-spouse holds a privilege to refuse

456. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,47 (1980) (quoting statement by Rep. Hungate).
457. See McCormick on Evidence § 76.2, at 109 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
458. See, e.g., Siskonen v. Stanadyne, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 610, 612 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (analyzing
federal self-critical-analysis privilege and concluding that no state privilege would be recognized); In
re Subpoena Duces Tecum to the Wayne County Prosecutor, 477 N.W.2d 412 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)
(analyzing federal and state privilege law to determine applicability of work product doctrine to
work of nonparty's counsel) (Griffin, J., dissenting); State v. Cecos Int'l, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 1118
(Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (noting test for determining whether adoption of privilege is appropriate relied
on factors set forth in federal cases); Commonwealth v. Hancharik, 633 A.2d 1074 (Pa. 1993)
(relying on federal privilege analysis of marital communications privilege and privilege against
adverse spousal testimony).
459. See Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, supra note 327, at 1470 &
n.127.
460. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
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to testify against the other spouse. 461' The Court clarified the authority to
continue the development of privileges, but maintained that privileges
contravene the principle of the "public['s] ... right to every man's
evidence ' 462 and should be accepted only to the extent that excluding
relevant evidence advances a public good that overcomes the interest in
ascertaining truth.4 63 The Court found that in light of "reason and
experience," the privilege against adverse spousal testimony did not
promote interests sufficient to outweigh the need for probative evidence
in the administration of criminal justice. 4' The privilege against adverse
spousal testimony stood in marked contrast to the attorney-client, priestpenitent, and physician-patient privileges, all of which are limited to
confidential communications.46 Furthermore, the privilege originated in
the now-obsolete concept of a woman as chattel with no legal identity
separate from her husband's. Even the contemporary justification for the
privilege-to protect marital harmony-is unpersuasive; if one spouse is
willing to testify against the other, "there is probably
little in the way of
4 66
preserve."
to
privilege
the
for
marital harmony
The Court's methodology in Trammel was to recognize historical
tenets and scholarly commentary where relevant and to employ FRE 501
to make privilege law decisions that comport with contemporary societal
norms and the Court's experience. While the Court acknowledged Dean
Wignore's harsh criticism of the spousal privilege and appears even to
adopt Wigmore's fourth "factor" under the traditional justification,4 67 it
remains unbound by prior privilege analysis or "factors" per se; instead,
the Court relied on a more current, holistic analysis in light of its own
reason and experience.
In Jaffee v. Redmond,4 68 a recent case recognizing a psychotherapistpatient privilege,469 the U.S. Supreme Court showed a pronounced
reliance on privilege law analysis rooted in the traditional utilitarian
461. See id. at 53.
462. Id. at 50 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
463. See id.
464. Id. at 51-53.
465. See id. at 51.
466. Id. at 52.
467. See id. at 45.
468. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
469. See id. at 15. The Court held that the privilege extends to social workers as well because all
of the same policy considerations applied with equal force, and as a practical matter, less-expensive
social workers are utilized more often by the poor. See id. at 15-16.

1004

A Privilege for Unconscious-Bias Testing
justification. The Court held that FRE 501 requires that privileges serve
public ends,47 a position consistent with the traditional utilitarian justification and reiterated that an exception to the general rule prioritizing
truth finding can47be
justified only by a transcendent public good served
1
by the privilege.
The Jaffee Court found that because psychotherapy cannot be
effective without confidentiality, important private interests in mental
well-being are served by the privilege.472 The Court also determined the
mental health of our citizenry to be a public good of transcendent
importance. 473 Furthermore, the likely evidentiary benefit from denying
the privilege is modest because much of the sought-after communications would not occur but for the privilege.4 74
The Jaffee Court feared the Seventh Circuit's "balancing" approach
would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege:
[I]f the purpose of the privilege is to be served, the participants in
the confidential conversation must be able to predict with some
degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.
An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but
results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better
than no privilege at all.475
Here, again, the Court focuses on traditional justification arguments.
The U.S. Supreme Court has continued to reject balancing tests, most
recently in the attorney-client privilege context in Swidler & Berlin v.

470. See id at 11 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,389 (1981)).
471. See id. at 9; see also, e.g., Benton v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1352 (Ariz. Ct App. 1994)
(considering societal utilitarian policy concerns by holding that public interest in protecting victims
of crime outweighed privacy interest reflected in physician-patient privilege).
472. SeeJaffee, 518 U.s. at 10-I1.

473. See id. at 11.
474. See id. at 12. The Court also stated that the fact that all 50 states and the District of Columbia
have enacted some form of psychotherapist-patient privilege made it appropriate for federal courts to
recognize the privilege, while not recognizing the privilege in federal courts could frustrate the
purposes of the state legislation. See id. The fact that the psychotherapist-patient privilege was one
of the nine privileges proposed by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee in 1972 reinforces
the states' uniform judgment that the privilege is appropriate. See id. at 14. But see Imwinkelried,
supra note 439, at 980-82 (arguing that Jaffee Court misconstrued empirical data on whether the
privilege encourages communications that otherwise would not have occurred, and that contrary to
Court's opinion, recognition of privilege is much more costly in terms of lost evidence than Court
assumes).

475. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,393 (1981)).
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United States.476 The Court justified extending the attorney-client
privilege to protect communications after death, not through balancing,
but by finding that full candor in the attorney-client relationship could
not be otherwise assured. 477 The balancing approach is, of course, the
usual method of applying privileges under the privacy rationale: the
individual's specific privacy interest is balanced against the more general
societal need for evidence.478 By repeatedly rejecting a balancing
approach in favor of more clear demarcations of the privilege's
parameters, the Court implicitly rejected the privacy rationale in favor of
the traditional justification and its philosophical underpinnings.
Although FRE 501's language is liberal, the U.S. Supreme Court
requires substantial justification to recognize a privilege, particularly
where Congress has declined an opportunity to provide protection. In
University of Pennsylvania. v. EEOC,479 the U.S. Supreme Court was
asked to recognize a common law privilege protecting academic peerreview materials from subpoena.480 The Court affirmed the Third
Circuit's holding that a university does not enjoy a special privilege that
would require a judicial finding of particularized necessity beyond mere
relevance before pertinent peer review could be disclosed to the
EEOC.48' The Court reiterated the general rule that privileges are created
only when they promote interests that outweigh the need for probative
evidence.482 The Court also stated that FRE 501's authority should not be
exercised expansively, 48 3 especially where, as here, Congress did not
provide for the privilege even after it had considered the relevant
competing concerns when it extended Title VII to educational
institutions.484 Congress had already struck the balance of interests:
unless specified otherwise in the statute, the EEOC may obtain
476. 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998).
477. See id. at 408.
478. See supranotes 441-52 and accompanying text.
479. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
480. See id. at 188.
481. See id. at 189-92.
482. See id. at 189.
483. See id.
at 189-92.
484. See id. at 192-93. Moreover, the fact that Congress afforded a "modicum of protection" for
confidential records such as peer-review materials in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8 (1994), which made it
unlawful for EEOC employees to make public any information obtained pursuant to its discovery
powers, weakened the petitioner's contentions that Title VII's subpoena enforcement provisions do
not give the commission an unqualified right to acquire all "relevant" evidence and that the Court
should create a privilege for safeguarding confidential records. Id.

1006

A Privilege for Unconscious-Bias Testing
"relevant" evidence.485 The Court feared that recognizing a privilege for
universities may inspire a "wave of similar privilege claims" by other
employers who further speech and learning in society, such as writers
and musicians." 6 Finally, the fact that the petitioner's privilege claim
lacked a constitutional, statutory, or historical basis distinguished 487
it from
the precedents the petitioner cited in support of its privilege claim.
The Court recently discussed the burden under Fed. Evid. R. 501 of
showing that "reason and experience" require a departure from the
prevailing common law rule. In Swidler & Berlin, Deputy White House
Counsel Vincent Foster consulted an attorney about an investigation by
the Office of Independent Counsel. 488 The attorney took handwritten
notes of the meeting with Foster, and nine days later, Foster committed
suicide.48 9
The grand jury subpoenaed the attorney's notes, but the law firm of
Swidler & Berlin invoked the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine. The federal district court refused to order production of the
notes.490 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed,
concluding that the attorney-client privilege was not absolute, as some
posthumous exceptions to the privilege have been recognized, such as
the testamentary exception. 491' The appellate court felt that the risk of
posthumous revelation in the criminal context would have little or no
chilling effect on client communications, but the costs of protecting the
communications after death were high.492
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, 493 finding that most cases
discussing the attorney-client privilege have presumed or held outright
that the privilege survives death and that the testamentary "exception" is
grounded in furtherance of the client's interests, as opposed to the
interest in criminal justice.494 Therefore, under FRE 501, the Independent
Counsel bears the burden of showing that "reason and experience"
485. See id at 194.
486. See id.

487. See id. at 194-95.
488. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).

489. See id. at401-02.
490. See id. at 402.

491. See id.
492. See id.
493. See id. at 411. Justice O'Connor dissented, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas.

494. See id.at 405.
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require overruling the common law rule that the attorney-client privilege
survives death.495 The Independent Counsel argued that the testamentary
exception reflects a policy judgment that settling estates outweighs any
posthumous interest in confidentiality and that the interest in determining
whether a crime has been committed should trump client confidentiality. 496 The Court disagreed, stating that this interpretation did not
square with the lower courts' acceptance of testamentary disclosure.497
On policy grounds, the Swidler & Berlin Court recognized that
posthumous application of the privilege encourages full and frank
disclosure and that clients' fear that disclosure after death could hurt
family members or create civil liability may diminish candor. 498 The
Court stated that any loss of evidence caused by the privilege is justified
in part because without the privilege, the client may decide not to
disclose the evidence in the first place.49 9 The Court disagreed that
limiting the proposed exception to criminal cases would have a minimal
impact on client candor." The Court noted that clients do not always
know whether or not their confidential disclosures may become relevant
to a civil or criminal matter and determined that this uncertainty could
inhibit disclosure.5"' This fear of uncertainty is why the Court has
consistently rejected a "balancing test" for the privilege. 2 Furthermore,
the Court rejected the argument that recognizing one more exception
would not result in harm because such recognition would erode the
privilege without reference to common law principles or "reason and
experience."50 3

495. See id. at 405- 06.
496. See id. at 406.
497. See id.
498. See id. at 407.
499. See id. at 408.
at 408-09.
500. See id.
501. See id. at 409.
502. Id.(citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)).
503. See id.at 410. In part because of the unavailability of empirical evidence on the effect of
posthumous termination of the privilege, the petitioner failed to make a showing sufficient under
FRE 501 to overturn the common law. See id. at 411. The dissent argued that the cost of recognizing
an "absolute" posthumous privilege is "inordinately high" and advocated a balancing test. Id. at 41314. One example the dissent gave when the privilege could be outweighed by fairness concerns was
when a criminal defendant seeks disclosure of the deceased client's confession of the crime for
which he is being tried. See id. at 416. Again, the Court features traditional justification principles
such as encouraging candor through certain application of the privilege and recognizes that very
little evidence may be lost through the privilege, because without it, the communication may not
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The U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence indicates that recognizing or
modifying a privilege should not be done without the proponent proving
that the privilege is justified first by "reason and experience" in light of
any historical bases and contemporary societal norms, and second by a
public good transcending the general rule that litigants have "a right to
every man's evidence."5 " 4 The Court is more persuaded by traditional
justifications and disinclined to accept the privacy rationale's
"individual" justification per se, at least when it is inconsistent with the
nature and facts or circumstances of the relationship. Thus, in the context
of the spousal privilege-a privilege generally considered grounded in
privacy concerns-the Court was willing to subvert the individuals'
privacy interests to the societal interests of truth finding in criminal
cases, at least where the marital relationship is in "disrepair" and the
privilege has no parameters to prevent abuse. 5 So, while a privilege
proponent should make policy arguments based on the privacy rationale
where appropriate, it is probably more effective to justify the privilege
under the traditional, utilitarian rationale and to focus on the public
benefits the privilege would serve." 6 Also, where Congress has declined

have been made. See Great Am. Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 540 So.
2d 1357, 1358 (Ala. 1989) (noting purpose of attorney-client privilege is to encourage candor); State
v. Pavin, 494 A.2d 834 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (noting same and holding no public policy
interest in granting privileged status to purported lie).
504. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. 399; Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996); Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
505. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52.
506. Although corporations do not enjoy a right to privacy, privacy arguments can still
persuasively buttress other privilege arguments. See Bush, supra note 277, at 599. Although this
Article argues for a privilege for employers, the employees/test-takers' right to privacy in protecting
their psychological processes also supports an unconscious-bias testing privilege. The U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized that individuals' privacy interests may include controlling the dissemination of
private information about themselves, and the privacy rationale supports controlling dissemination of
information exposed by unconscious-bias testing. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977);
Developments in the Law-PrivilegedCommunications, supra note 327, 1543-48 & n.1 10. For a
discussion on testing as an invasion of employees' privacy interests, see infra Part VI.D.1. Note also
that psychology testing done as part of the individual's therapy would be covered by the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, at least when done with the expectation of confidentiality for
personal testing. See, e.g., In re Doe, 649 P.2d 510 (N.M. Ct App. 1982) (finding that for purposes
of privilege, "communication" is defined broadly and includes information gained by personal
examination and observation, verbal communications, exhibition of body parts, and inferences and
conclusions drawn therefrom). However, psychology tests performed at the behest of the employer
for EEO policy purposes probably would not be covered by the psychotherapist-patient privilege
because there is no expectation of confidentiality. See State ex rel. Leas, 303 N.W.2d 414,420 (Iowa
1981) (holding that psychologist's testimony regarding psychological testing was not privileged at
hearing on parental rights because communications were not related to diagnosis or treatment and
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an opportunity to enact the privilege, some deference will be paid to
Congress' decision, particularly where no historical, constitutional, or
statutory privilege basis exists and50the
privilege sought may precipitate a
7
"wave" of similar privilege claims.
C.

PrivilegeLaw Principlesand CourtAnalysis Support a Privilege
for Unconscious-Bias Testing

Courts should recognize a privilege for unconscious-bias test results to
encourage companies interested in taking proactive measures to eradicate
discrimination. The promotion of unconscious-bias testing not only has
the immediate benefit of enabling employers to make prudent personnel
decisions and initiate individual self-analysis and improved behavior, but
it also has the more long-term benefit of contributing to the data on
discrimination and providing insight on the direction of future research
and changes in employment discrimination law. If unconscious-bias
testing proves effective in predicting and preventing unlawful
discrimination, such testing may become at the least a practical necessity
for risk-management purposes. However, if discoverable, test results
could expose employers to Title VII liability under Professor
Oppenheimer's model of liability, as they may demonstrate constructive
knowledge of the propensity for discrimination. 8
Principles emerge from the cases discussing privilege law and the selfcritical-analysis privilege that support the propriety of a privilege for
unconscious-bias testing along the lines of the self-critical-analysis
privilege. First, courts are more likely to recognize a privilege when they
believe the desired communication will be chilled without a privilege.
The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized the privilege holders' need to rely
on a privilege to encourage candor in Jaffee and Swidler & Berlin."
Although early courts addressing a self-critical-analysis privilege, such
as the Banks and Dickerson courts, manifested a belief that a privilege
would impact the content, candor, and quality of government-mandated
reports, later courts were not impressed by this argument."' After

were not expected to be confidential); see also Hager v. Bellingham Sch. Dist., 74 Wash. App. 49,
871 P.2d 1106 (1994).
507. See University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 194-95 (1990).
508. See supra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
509. See supra notes 468-507 and accompanying text.
510. See supra notes 416-26 and accompanying text.
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O'Connor, courts began doubting that government reports would be
chilled; because they were required, companies would prepare them
regardless of a privilege, and in any case, other "deterrents" to candid
self-criticism exist. Coupled with these arguments, some courts
discussing the self-critical-analysis privilege, such as the Martin court,
exhibited a basic disbelief that companies' EEO practices would change
on account of changes in the law.5"
Voluntary unconscious-bias testing presents a more compelling case
for privilege than evaluative portions of government-mandated reports.
First, little question exists that without an evidentiary privilege, the
testing will not be done. Test results will likely indicate a high level of
unconscious bias among most test takers.512 The test results may serve as
fodder for accusations of bigotry and intentional discrimination even
though the tests do not measure the kind of intent required in a Title VII
disparate treatment claim and despite the fact that a high level of
unconscious bias does not necessarily result in discriminatory conduct. 3
Although an employer could rightly object that the test results are
irrelevant to prove discrimination or that the test results are more
prejudicial than probative," 4 the fear that this potentially damaging
evidence could come out in trial makes unconscious-bias testing risky for
employers without a privilege. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly
criticized a case-by-case privilege application method because uncertainty regarding a privilege's application could create fear on behalf of
the privilege holder, chilling the disclosure sought to be fostered and
making the privilege "little better than no privilege at all." '
Second, a privilege is more likely to be recognized where the
proponent justifies the privilege on the utilitarian grounds that the
privilege will greatly benefit society or that failing to recognize the
privilege could greatly harm society. The U.S. Supreme Court in Jaffee
emphasized the need for a privilege to advance a public good." 6 As the
Martin court put it, "better [EEO] reports and evaluations are not an end
511. See supra notes 416-26 and accompanying text.
512. See supra note 254.
513. There is still some question about the relationship between unconscious bias and
discriminatory action. See supranotes 48-57 and accompanying text.
514. SeeFRE402,403.
515. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (citing Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393
(1981)); see also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998) (citing Upjohn v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).

516. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9.
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in themselves, but the means to an end."5' 17 So even assuming recognition
of a privilege encourages unconscious-bias testing, will such testing
benefit society?
Unconscious-bias testing's potential benefit to society in terms of
better race relations is unprecedented and may prove to be
unparalleled.518 We are taught as children to be fair. Yet without an
understanding of what part each of us plays in perpetuating a racially
divided society-with the attendant injustice, danger, and unhappinesswe cannot hope to achieve fairness or peace. Unconscious-bias testing
may be a first step in breaking down the ubiquitous ignorance that has
permeated and perpetuated unhealthy interracial interaction for decades.
Furthermore, one cannot overstate the danger in not taking whatever
steps are possible to create a more harmonious community. Not only are
hate crimes and riots endemic in our recent history, but they are probably
only the tip of an iceberg: we cannot continue to oppress growing
segments of our society without increased violence and social unrest.
Oppressed out-group members are dying unnecessarily as a direct result
of socioeconomic hardship and discrimination in health care.519 Many
minorities cannot even secure employment, with health coverage or not,
due to unconscious and unintended assumptions about their worth as
employees.52 Discriminatory employment practices deprive minorities of
income, employment benefits, money for education, and hope for a better
life. The Bredice court was concerned with creating better health care
among elite hospitals by recognizing a privilege for doctors to criticize
each other's practices without fear of disclosure.5"' Bredice's concern
about better health care among prestigious hospitals pales by comparison
to the danger our society imposes on minorities, and ultimately society as
a whole, by allowing discrimination to continue. If a means for
uncovering and dispelling discriminatory attitudes or at least mitigating
their effects exists, it is hard to imagine a more compelling reason to
recognize a privilege to encourage use of that means. There is arguably

517. Martin v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355, 357 (D.D.C. May
25, 1990).
518. Some empirical proof of the societal benefit unconscious-bias testing can achieve is
currently available, and the data is growing. See supra Part III.A.
519. Seesupranotes 156-58 and accompanying text.
520. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
521. See Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970), afJ'd, 479 F.2d 920
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
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no greater benefit to society than creating more fair opportunities and
more justice for all of its members.
Third, when little or no evidence is lost on account of the privilege,
the privilege is more likely to be recognized. As the self-critical-analysis
privilege evolved, courts expressed increasing concern over Title VII
plaintiffs' need for probative evidence, particularly considering that Title
VII requires proof of intent." Thus, the loss of potentially the best proof
of intent was found to significantly outweigh any loss in the quality of
mandatory government reports.sn
Little or no evidence would be lost by recognizing a privilege for
unconscious-bias testing. First, the test results probably will not be
produced without a privilege protecting them from discovery. If the
evidence is produced and then protected only as a result of the privilege,
the result is a net evidentiary "wash"-a traditional, utilitarian argument
in favor of privileges for communications that otherwise would not take
place.524 Second, proof of unconscious bias is not relevant evidence
under Title VII. Unconscious bias does not prove intent to discriminate
in disparate treatment cases. In disparate impact cases, unconscious bias
does not prove facial neutrality or disparate impact. While unconsciousbias testing arguably provides evidence of the potential for stereotyping,
which may be probative in mixed-motive or ADEA cases, the test results
are probably legally insufficient proof because unconscious bias does not
necessarily cause the subject to apply the stereotype in any particular
context. Third, the test results are probably much more prejudicial than
probative and therefore would be inadmissible regardless of a privilege.
In any event, the evidence lost would be outweighed by the expected
societal benefit warranting protection of the test results."s

522. See, e.g., Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 641-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
523. See Witten v. A.H. Smith & Co., 100 F.R.D. 446,454 (D. Md. 1984).
524. See paragraph accompanying note 440.
525. "Long term accessibility to vital information must not be sacrificed on the altar of immediate
discovery needs." Note, supra note 276, at 1088. Also, to the extent unconscious-bias testing is
conducted in response to discrimination complaints, it may be excluded from trial use under FRE
407 as a "subsequent remedial measure." Note, supra note 277, at 1341-42. However, FRE 407
does not prevent discovery of the documents, and the need for confidentiality of this type of
information makes it more amenable to privilege analysis, that is, a discovery bar is necessary to
protect the interests at stake. See id. at 1346-47, 1352-55. Also, evidence excluded under FRE 407
can be admissible to prove control or feasibility, making less than a privilege for unconscious-bias

testing dangerous for employers and contrary to the public policy of encouraging testing. See id. at
1342 n.18.

1013

Washington Law Review

Vol. 74:913, 1999

Fourth, to the extent privacy arguments support recognizing a
privilege in addition to utilitarian arguments, the privilege is more likely
to be accepted.1 6 Unconscious bias test takers have a privacy interest in
their test results. The testing promotes self-evaluation and selfactualization in addition to personal, emotional, and spiritual growthprivacy interests specifically recognized by cases and scholars addressing
the privacy rationale.2 7 Exposing test results could humiliate an
individual who holds an egalitarian self-image-the same individual
likely to benefit the most personally from unconscious-bias testing.
Probing people's unconscious minds makes them particularly vulnerable,
and forced disclosure of our minds' contents beyond the limited scope
necessary to achieve the benefits of the testing is an unreasonable
intrusion.
Because the policy justifications for utilitarian-based privileges
require predictability in the privilege's application, it is important to
clarify standards for the privilege's application and to focus on how to
assure privilege holders that their communications will not be disclosed
and how to curb employer abuse of that privilege. As a practical matter,
most companies will employ consultants to test their employees for
unconscious bias. Although some testing is offered via the Internet,528 it
would be difficult to monitor employees' testing and to keep track of the
test results without some organized structure. Considering that at least
one company will start offering unconscious-bias testing to corporate
clients, 2' employers will likely turn to psychology experts rather than
attempt to handle specialized psychological testing in-house.
Principles governing the admissibility of scientific evidence may
inspire a "test" for the applicability of the unconscious-bias privilege that
could assure employers that the results of their tests are valid, meet the
privilege's objectives, and are not subject to discovery. One way to
assure the inviolability of the privilege may be to condition its
application on the employer utilizing a method generally accepted as
scientifically accurate by the scientific community similar to the former
Frye v. United States530 test for admissibility of expert witness testimony
526. For a discussion on invasion of privacy, see infra Part VI.D.1.
527. See supranote 445 and accompanying text.
528. See, e.g., supra note 246.
529. Social psychologists Anthony G. Greenwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji are setting up a
company to offer this service. Telephone Interview with Anthony G. Greenwald, supra note 11.
530. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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" ' Alternatively, as a condition precedent
relating to scientific evidence.53
to recognizing the privilege, the employer could be required to make a
showing under FRE 702 as interpreted by Daubert v. Merrell Dow
53 2 before conducting unconscious-bias testing in order
Pharmaceuticals
to have a trial judge make a preliminary assessment of the validity of the
test methodology. Because companies run by social psychology experts
would presumably employ accepted unconscious-bias tests-such as
Greenwald and Banaji's IAT-such testing would satisfy either of these
conditions. In time, certain methodologies would become accepted for
legal purposes, and only unconscious-bias testing performed by experts
using an accepted methodology would be protected.
The privilege must have parameters to prevent abuse. Because the
premise for an unconscious-bias-testing privilege is to encourage
exploration and analysis of EEO practices and is based in part on the
notion that employment discrimination litigation is ineffective, test
results should not be discoverable unless they are abused by the
employer in such a way that demonstrates an employer's intent to misuse
the test results. The hope is that a privilege will encourage employers to
use unconscious-bias test results to create more fair supervisory relationships, performance reviews, promotional decisions, and overall EEO
policy. Also, fundamentally, the expectation is that as people begin to
recognize the dissociation between their conscious beliefs and
unconscious bias, this will spur processes to reverse automatic processing, making employment discrimination less likely. The results of
these tests should be kept out of litigation to the extent possible to create
employer trust in the privilege's application.

531. See idt at 1014. Under the Frye rule, scientific testimony was admissible only if the tests at
issue had gained "general acceptance" within the scientific community. Thus, if a party sought to
introduce an expert, it was up to the court to pass judgment on the general acceptance of the expert's
methodology, based on testimony or judicial notice, prior to allowing the expert to testify before the
jury. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993), that the Frye test was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under Daubert,general
acceptance is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence; rather, the trial
judge acts as a "gatekeeper," making his or her own preliminary assessment of the scientific validity
of the methodology and reasoning underlying the proffered scientific testimony. See id. at 592-93.
One "pertinent consideration" the Daubert Court discussed is whether the scientific theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication, although "[t]he inquiry envisioned by
Rule 702 is... a flexible one." Id. at 594. In the case of unconscious-bias testing, judges would
probably initially need to hear from experts regarding the validity of the testing, although in time
certain methodologies would be recognized as valid.
532. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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Employers should be barred from introducing favorable unconsciousbias testing as well. One of the reasons courts disallowed a self-criticalanalysis privilege is because employers had been using EEO selfassessments to shield themselves from liability, so it was unfair to
prevent plaintiffs from using them to prove liability. Not allowing either
party to use unconscious-bias test results will dispel this fairness
argument. At the same time, not allowing employers to use the results for
their own benefit in litigation will screen out employers who exploit
unconscious-bias testing for motives ulterior to creating a more
egalitarian work environment and will prevent attempts to misrepresent
test results.
Review of employer's response to the test results could also curb
abuse. For example, availability of the privilege may be conditioned on
the employer actually removing personnel decisionmaking authority
from supervisors who demonstrate unconscious bias against their
subordinates. This condition must be easy to satisfy or it could vitiate the
privilege's promise of nondisclosure. The employer would not need to
prove that fewer complaints of discrimination occurred after the
personnel changes; instead, the employer must demonstrate only that it
took steps consistent with the test results to minimize the potential
impact of its supervisors' unconscious bias. Thus, if a supervisor showed
a strong unconscious bias against blacks, but no bias against Hispanics or
Asians, she could continue to review the work of the Hispanics and
Asians, but her black subordinates should be assigned to a different
supervisor. The employer would have to keep records of its test results
and subsequent personnel changes in order to present to a court for in
camera review in case the privilege is challenged. The expert
psychologists conducting the tests should also keep records of the testing
results, in the event the employer fails to produce test results upon
challenge.
It is impossible to overemphasize that personnel changes consistent
with the test results, rather than an increase or decrease in discrimination
complaints, is the key to this condition. The goal of the privilege is to
encourage employers to dismantle discrimination by attacking it from
where it begins, to expose the depth of bias to employers so they can take
action against it, and to inform and motivate individuals to "break the
habit" of discrimination. While unconscious-bias testing promises to
reduce discrimination and complaints of discrimination, few employers
would dare conduct the tests if doing so risked inviting liability.
Therefore, whatever conditions are required for the privilege's
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application, they must be clear, easy to understand, and within the
employer's control.
By the same token, however, employers who conduct unconsciousbias testing for impermissible motives may expose themselves to liability
if they do not take antidiscrimination actions consistent with the test
results. An extreme and unlikely example illustrates this point. Suppose a
company owned by racists tests for unconscious bias in order to identify
employees who appear unbiased for public relations purposes, but who
still have underlying racist political beliefs. Then, the company promotes
these most-biased individuals or gives them supervisory authority over
group members against whom they demonstrated bias. This practice
would not satisfy the second condition that test results and subsequent
personnel changes be consistent with antidiscrimination efforts, so the
test results would not be privileged and could be used to show intent to
discriminate by the employers.5 33
The result is a privilege that appears very reliable and yet can be finetuned by judges to deny nondisclosure to employers who use
unconscious-bias testing for impermissible purposes. With overcrowded
dockets and mandatory alternative dispute resolution, some may question
whether we have the resources to support the judicial oversight of an
unconscious-bias testing privilege and its conditions. But with Title VII's
effectiveness in serious question, AA plans on the decline, and hate
crime and other societal ills on the rise, perhaps the better question is not
"Can we afford to do this," but rather, "Can we afford not to?" If the
societal benefits are even close to what the research anticipates, the
immediate costs of encouraging unconscious-bias testing will be
substantially outweighed, and as a result courts should recognize a
privilege for unconscious-bias testing by employers.
D.

Response to Expected Objections to Unconscious-Bias Testing

Objections to unconscious-bias testing may include the assertions that
it invades individual privacy or deprives freedom of belief protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The federal constitutional rights
to privacy and freedom of thought are implicated only where the
employer is a state actor534 or where federal or state law requires the
533. Again, unconscious bias does not prove intent to discriminate. However, in the example
given, the employer's actions create an inference of intent to discriminate per se.
534. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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testing. Therefore, employees would have no federal constitutional
grounds to challenge voluntary testing conducted by private employers.
However, some state constitutions extend protections for privacy and
freedom of thought to private, as well as government, actors. 35
Furthermore, private employees may bring state tort actions to vindicate
the same privacy concerns that the federal Due Process Clause protects.
More fundamentally, the policy concerns expressed in constitutional
analysis of privacy and free speech are equally important in the private
sector and must be addressed.
1.

The Right ofPrivacy

The Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from government
deprivations of "liberty" without due process. 36 Privacy is one aspect of
liberty secured by the Due Process Clause. The government cannot
infringe upon fundamental rights such as privacy unless strict scrutiny is
met-that is, the government must have a compelling interest in the
activity or prohibition that infringes on the right and the government's
3
method must be narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interest.1 1
In 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Griswold v.
Connecticut539 the constitutional right to privacy rather than grounding
privacy in substantive due process.54 Justice Douglas found the
fundamental right to privacy implicit in the provisions of the Bill of

535. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. 1, § 1; Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991).
536. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
537. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499-502 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); see
generally Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1971).
538. See generallyMoore, 431 U.S. 494; Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Whalen, 429 U.S. 589.
539. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
540. See id. at 482 (concluding that Connecticut law prohibiting use and distribution of
contraceptives violated right to privacy by prohibiting married people from using contraceptives).
There were several other opinions in Griswold.Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Brennan, concurred, but emphasized that the Ninth Amendment was authority for the Court
to protect nontextual rights such as privacy. See id. at 487. Justice Harlan's concurrence prefigured
the modem view that the right to privacy protected by the liberty aspect of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 499-502. Justice White also concurred, and stated that the law
would be unconstitutional even under a rational basis standard. See id. at 505. Justices Black and
Stewart dissented, finding no right to privacy protected by the Constitution. See id. at 508.
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Rights,5 4' declaring that the "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance [and that various] guarantees create zones
of privacy.5 142 Later cases did not follow Douglas's penumbra approach,
and in any event, the application of the Bill of Rights to the states
throuah the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes
even the penumbral approach to privacy essentially a due process
analysis. 3 The right of privacy has also been grounded in the Equal
Protection Clause, such as in Eisenstadt v. Baird,'4 in which the Court
deemed unconstitutional a law that prohibited distributing contraceptives
to unmarried persons but allowed distribution through physicians to
married persons."5 Justice Brennan wrote for the Court that "[i]f the right
to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child." ' 6 Of course, the analysis of fundamental rights is
essentially the same under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection
Clause, the main difference being how the constitutional arguments are
phrased. 47 The Ninth Amendment also provides textual support for the
Court's protection of nontextual rights, such as privacy.5 41 However, the
Court has almost never used the Ninth Amendment as support for the
right to privacy per se.549
Fundamental privacy rights other than reproductive rights have also
been recognized under the Constitution pursuant to the due process and
Equal Protection Clauses and include the right to marry, medical

541. See id. at 484-85. Justice Douglas lived through the Lochner era and probably avoided a
substantive due process analysis based on concerns over putting too stringent a limit on states'
ability to exercise their police power to control societal ills and inhumane practices. See Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating New York law making it criminal for baker to allow his
employees to work more than 60 hours per week as unreasonable and unnecessary interference with
individual's right of personal liberty). Lochner, of course, has been explicitly rejected by the Court
on several occasions. See, e.g., Whalen, 429 U.S. at 596 & n.18.

542. Griswold,381 U.S. at 484-85 (citations omitted).
543. Erwin Chemerinsky, ConstitutionalLaw PrinciplesandPolicies§ 10.3.2, at 658-61 (1997).
544. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).

545. See Id. at 453.
546. Id.
547. See Chemerinsky, supranote 543, § 10.1.1, at 639.
548. U.S. Const. amend. IX.
549. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486-98 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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treatment rights, and the right to travel."' After Griswold, the Supreme
Court has grounded privacy rights in the liberty aspect of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than in the Equal
Protection Clause or the "penumbra" of the Bill of Rights.5 Privacy has
been said to encompass two categories: an individual's interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters and the interest in making certain
kinds of important decisions. 52
Employees involuntarily subjected to unconscious-bias testing could
claim the testing invades their right to privacy. They could argue that
they have a fundamental right to keep secret their innermost unconscious
beliefs about other people-a privacy interest arguably more sensitive
even than one's contraceptive privacy, for at least contraceptive choices
are conscious and voluntary unlike one's cognitive functioning.
Intuitively, the right to control access to unconscious thoughts seems
more fundamental than conscious choices such as traveling, medical
treatment, or even marriage.
The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that a right to control personal,
private information may exist. In 1977, in Whalen v. Roe, 53 the Court
considered whether the right to privacy includes the right to control
access to one's medical treatment history." New York State maintained
a centralized computer file that identified patients with prescriptions for
certain addictive drugs and the prescribing doctors.55 The computer files
were a response to concerns that these addictive drugs were being
diverted into illegal channels and abused. The patients claimed both
types of privacy interests in their medical treatment and expressed
concern that misuse of the computerized data would stigmatize them as
drug addicts. 6
The Whalen Court rejected the argument that these public records
infringed upon the patients' right of privacy. 7 The Court found the state
550. See Chemerinsky, supra note 543, ch. 10; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1971).
551. See, e.g., Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-04; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
552. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600.
553. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
554. See id.
at 591.
555. See id.
556. See id. at 595.
557. See id. at 598. The doctors also claimed that the law interfered with their freedom to practice
medicine, which the Court summarily rejected. See id. at 604.
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to have an important interest in monitoring abuse and illegal distribution
of prescription drugs." 8 Medical information is routinely given to
hospital personnel, insurance companies, and public health agencies, and
disclosure to the state is not an impermissible invasion of privacy.5 9 The
Court discussed the security system set up to prevent inappropriate
access to the data, the destruction of the data after five years, and the fact
that employees who failed to maintain proper security over the
information were subject to civil and criminal penalties."6 Thus, the
Court found the state database to be a reasonable and constitutional
exercise of the state's police power. 6' However, the Court also
acknowledged the concept of a constitutional privacy right to control
information that is "personal in character and potentially embarrassing or
'
harmful if disclosed."562
As a result, a government employer that
conditions employment on an unconscious bias test could arguably
violate test-takers' constitutional right to privacy. 63
At least one federal district court has upheld a government employer's
psychological testing of employees against privacy challenges. In
McKenna v. Fargo,"' the court considered the constitutionality of
standardized psychology tests that included questions on religious,
political, and familial relationships as a condition of employment as a
firefighter. 65 The McKenna court relied on the dicta of Whalen v. Roe to
conclude that the right of privacy extends to employer-mandated
psychological testing because of the disclosure of highly personal
information:
In this case, the degree and character of the disclosure is far greater
and more intrusive [than in Whalen v. Roe]. The evaluation looks
deeply into an applicant's personality, much as a clinical
558. See id. at 508.
559. See id.at 602.
560. See id.at 593-95.
561. See id.at 598-600.
562. Id. at 605.
563. In accordance with the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine, termination by a government
employer for failing to submit to testing could raise issues regarding deprivation of a property right
without due process, if the testing is a privacy violation, and continued employment is conditioned
on submitting to it. See Chemerinsky, supra note 543, § 7.3.1-7.3.2; see also Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
564. 451 F. Supp. 1355 (D.N.J. 1978), aff'd, 601 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1979).

565. See id. at 1357. The tests included the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI)
and a number of other standardized tests. See id. at 1359-61.

1021

Washington Law Review

Vol. 74:913, 1999

psychologist would if requested to do so by an applicant... [This
testing] involves a loss of the power individuals treasure to reveal
or conceal their personality or their emotions as they see fit, from
intimacy to solitude. Involuntary disclosure of such a unique
kind... distinguishes this case from Whalen ....That privacy
interest is 66sufficiently burdened ...to call constitutional protection
5
into play.
However, in applying strict scrutiny, the court found that the
psychological testing was not an impermissible violation of the right to
privacy and upheld the government's use of the tests. 67 The court found
that the tests were narrowly tailored to meet the state's interest in an
effective fire department because they identified "applicants whose
emotional make-up makes them high risk candidates for the job of
firefighting. 5 68 The court stated that the revelations of the psychological
evaluation may save the lives of the unqualified applicants or others.569
In the same vein, to the extent unconscious-bias testing invades an
employee's right to privacy, the testing is justified by the employer's
compelling interest in preventing employment discrimination.570 Social
psychology research indicates that to redress employment discrimination
effectively, one must redress unconscious bias. Unconscious-bias testing
is narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling purpose of eradicating
invidious discrimination. Unconscious-bias testing tests only for bias, not
for general personality traits, such as religious beliefs, sexual
preferences, or other unrelated aspects of one's personhood, and thus
unconscious-bias testing does not unnecessarily invade the test-takers'
privacy. Employers have a legal obligation to prevent discrimination
similar to the fire department's obligation to provide reliable,
emotionally stable firefighters in fire emergencies: failure of either has a
serious impact on the well-being of innocent citizens.
566. Id. at 1380-81.
567. See id. at 1382.
568. Id.
at 1381.
569. See id.The court also found that there were not less intrusive alternatives available but
directed the city to limit the length of time the test records would be kept. See id. at 1382.
570. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1990) (holding government
"unquestionably has a compelling interest in remedying past and present [race] discrimination by a
state actor"); Board of Dir. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (finding any
infringement on Rotary members' right of expressive association on account of California's Unruh
Civil Rights Act is justified by state's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against
women and minorities).
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Other professionally developed psychology tests, such as the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) and the California
Psychological Inventory (CPI) are often used in the employment context

without regard to employees' or applicants' privacy rights.57 ' Personality
tests, like unconscious-bias testing, expose traits the subject may be
unaware of and may even adamantly deny. 72
In California, at least one case has indicated that standardized

psychological testing may be an unconstitutional invasion of privacy
under the California Constitution. Under the California Constitution, the
right to privacy is liberally construed and applies to private actors as well
as state actors." 3 In California, both state and private employees might

assert that unconscious-bias testing is an unconstitutional intrusion into
private thoughts that is not justified by an employer's desire to identify

employees likely to discriminate. A review of a California Court of
Appeal's analysis of personality testing challenged on privacy grounds,
however, militates against the success of a privacy challenge to

unconscious-bias testing.
In Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp.,574 a California Court of Appeal
reversed a lower court's denial of job applicants' motion for a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the use of MMPI and CPI testing
pending the outcome of the lawsuit. 75 The court found the injunction
appropriate because the plaintiffs had shown a reasonable probability of

571. See, e.g., Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co, 431 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1982) (determining employer not
liable for terminating employees for their refusal to answer questions on employer's questionnaire
because most questions were relevant to employer's job qualifications and presented no invasion of
privacy, affirming trial court's directed verdict for employer on privacy claim); see also Bennett v.
County of Suffolk, 30 F. Supp. 2d 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying summary judgment to challenge to
MMPI and CPI on Title VII and religious freedom grounds); Shirsat v. Mutual Pharm. Co., 169
F.R.D. 68 (ED. Pa. 1996) (holding employer was entitled to conduct MMPI on plaintiff-former
employee in action in which plaintiff's mental state was at issue); Colbert v. H-K Corp., 4 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 529 (N.D. Ga. July 2, 1971) (upholding use of intelligence and personality
tests, as they were professionally developed, related to job performance, recommended by
psychologist, and not intended to discriminate); Scott v. State, No. 96A-06-001-RRC, 1996 WL
769222 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996) (ordering MMPI by employer's expert witness).
572. See Cuddy v. Wal-Mart Super Ctr., Inc., 993 F. Supp 962 (W.D. Va. 1998) (granting
defendant's summary judgment on ADEA claim in situation where although plaintiff denied such
traits as being "bitter" or believing the "world owed him something," those traits were confirmed by
standardized personality inventory (Orion) test).
573. See Cal. Const. art. 1, § 1; Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., I Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 83 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991).
574. 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 83 (Cal. CL App. 1991).
575. See id.at 79.
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claim that the tests infringed on their
prevailing on the merits of their
6
constitutional right to privacy.1
To pass muster under the California Constitution, any violation of the
right to privacy of job applicants must be justified by a compelling
interest and the employer must demonstrate a clear, direct nexus between
the nature of the employment duties and the content of the test that
constitutes a privacy infringement-essentially a strict scrutiny
standard.577 The test questions at issue related to the applicants' religious
beliefs and sexual orientation; the security officer positions involved
approaching, questioning, and possibly detaining shoplifting suspects at
Target stores. The employer's claim that the test bore a relationship to
emotional fitness and that it had seen an overall improvement in the
security officers' performance since implementing the tests did not
constitute a compelling interest or satisfy the nexus requirement.7 8
Although a final determination was never reached,579 the opinion clarifies
that a compelling interest and clear nexus between psychological tests
and job responsibilities are necessary for an employer to infringe
lawfully upon employees' right to privacy in California.
Even under California's more liberal privacy standards, unconsciousbias testing is constitutionally permissible. First, employers have a
compelling interest-indeed, a legal obligation-to take steps to avoid
workplace discrimination, particularly among employees who make
employment decisions for other employees. The weight of empirical
psychological studies shows that unconscious-bias testing advances that
interest by pinpointing where discrimination is most likely to occur and
allowing the employer to take steps to prevent discrimination. The need
for unconscious-bias testing, and all of its potential benefits to society,
outweighs any privacy interests involved.58 °

576. See id. at 86.
577. See id. at 85.
578. See id. at 86.
579. The parties stipulated to dismiss review. See Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 862 P.2d 148
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
580. Cases upholding the use of employer drug testing based on the employer's interest in
protecting the safety of its employees and the public outweighing the right to privacy can be used as
additional support for unconscious-bias testing. See, e.g., Plane v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 1070
(W.D. Mich. 1992). While drug testing is distinguishable in that it reveals employees' conscious,
deliberate use of drugs, the privacy concerns are similar, as are the employer's interests in protecting
its employees from unnecessary and preventable harm.
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Recognition of a privilege for unconscious-bias testing actually
enhances the privacy interests of individuals tested. Under current law,
employers are free to subject employees to psychological testing, and the
test results are not privileged per se.
Finally, individual privacy concerns can be lessened substantially by
redacting identifying information from test results. Under a qualified
privilege, a court deciding the privilege's applicability can compare test
results and subsequent personnel changes by referring to positions and
job responsibilities on the one hand and test results on the other, rather
than by referring to names or other identifying information. To the extent
a plaintiff seeks to prove discrimination through a negligence theory of
liability or by showing the employer intentionally kept highly biased
persons in decisionmaking positions, the plaintiff can demonstrate either
without specifically naming the particular employees tested. Thus,
neither an in camerareview to determine the privilege's applicability nor
evidence presented to a factfinder need identify the particular individuals
tested or their test results.
Privacy analysis turns on how important it is to engage all available
methods to eradicate discrimination. It simply seems wrong to protect
people's privacy interests in harboring negative stereotypes about
others-stereotypes they are unaware of and often would like to
change-to the detriment of innocent people routinely oppressed on
account of these stereotypes. Justice requires that the balance tip in favor
of allowing unconscious-bias testing, considering that the limited
infringement on privacy interests is necessary to combat discrimination.
2.

Freedom of Speech andBeliefs

Unconscious-bias testing does not violate the First Amendment.
Employees may try to resist unconscious-bias testing based on First
Amendment concerns of freedom of thought and conscience, arguing that
unconscious-bias testing interferes with their right to think and express
stereotypical thoughts. Employees could argue that unconscious-bias
testing is politically correct "thought control" and the thin edge of the
wedge of governmental oppression of individual autonomy and ideology.
A short review of the First Amendment's purpose and analysis, however,
reveals that unconscious-bias testing actually enhances the underlying
social benefits the First Amendment seeks to encourage and protect.
Although there is no single, universally accepted purpose of the First
Amendment, there are a number of traditional arguments for why
freedom of speech and beliefs should be regarded as fundamental rights.
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These include self-governance (democracy works better if candidates are
encouraged to speak freely and voters are better informed);58' discovery
of truth (truth emerges from open debate in the "marketplace of
ideas");58 advancement of autonomy (human spirit "demands selfexpression");58 3 and promotion of tolerance (free speech helps segments
of society to understand one another's ideas). 84
Fundamentally, the First Amendment seeks to protect people from
censorship or punishment for expressing their views-particularly
criticism of the government. England's use of prior restraints on
publication and law of sedition motivated the Framers to write the First
Amendment. The First Amendment's raison d'etre is to protect the
expression and dissemination off all viewpoints and data, to prevent
oppression, and to allow people to speak freely, gather information, and
learn about themselves and the world. Justice Brandeis eloquently
summed up the First Amendment's ideals in Whitney v. California:585
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the
State was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the
arbitrary .... They believed that freedom to think as you will and
to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people;.., it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope, and
58 6
imagination.
Unconscious-bias testing does not violate the First Amendment
because the tests do not suppress speech or beliefs, but rather they
identify subconscious stereotypes to prevent acts of discrimination.
Obviously, a state actor could not punish an employee for unconscious
bias any more than it could for explicit racist speech or beliefs. 87 The
581. See Chemerinsky, supra note 543, § 11.1.2.
582. See id.
583. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
584. See Chemerinsky, supra note 543, § 11.1.2 & n.39.
585. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
586. Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
587. See, e.g., National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977);
Chemerinsky, supra note 543, § 11.3.3.4.
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testing does not dictate what beliefs employees may hold or express."'

The purpose of unconscious-bias testing is to protect others from the
harm that may result from those beliefs. The individuals tested are free to

maintain their bias, but they are not free to manifest that bias in illegal
acts of discrimination.
The First Amendment right of free speech and beliefs assumes that the
individual knows the content of the speech or belief protected. The
overall objective is to allow expression of information or opinions
individuals wish to advance or advocate. With unconscious bias, the testtaker is necessarily uninformed about her bias, and therefore, there is no
"speech" or "belief' to express, disseminate, or protect. Unconsciousbias testing simply does not implicate the First Amendment because the

test-takers are not even aware of their unconscious bias until after the
testing and are free to maintain whatever beliefs they choose
thereafter. 89 Thus, this argument is consistent with federal court analysis
of free speech and personality testing.
The court in McKenna v. Fargoheld that testing for emotional fitness

does not implicate freedom of beliefs.59 The employer did not see the
raw testing data, but instead relied on summaries made to predict
whether the subject could withstand the psychological pressures involved

588. The U.S. Constitution does not preclude private employers from making employment
decisions based on employees' speech or beliefs. However, Title VII and some state statutes protect
against adverse employment decisions by private employers based on certain personal beliefs, such
as religious beliefs. See, e.g., Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a).
589. Note also that, to the extent social psychologists are correct in believing that our unconscious
bias results largely from cultural and media messages that we do not "choose," but are inundated
with from an early age, the entire "marketplace of ideas" concept underlying the First Amendment is
called into question: the "free trade of ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market" is hindered when ideas creating unconscious
bias are planted in our minds without our acceptance or consent. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). That is, according to some social psychologists, we are not
choosing our biases in an open market, but rather, have no choice in the matter, making First
Amendment analysis inapposite. At least one court has opined that subliminal messages are not
protected by the First Amendment because (1) they do not advance any theories supporting free
speech (such as Holmes's marketplace-of-ideas concept, or individual self-fulfillment and selfrealization); (2) an individual has a First Amendment right to be free from unwanted speech; and
(3) the listener's right to privacy outweighs the speaker's right of free speech when subliminal
messages are used. See Vance v. Judas Priest, Nos. 86-5844, 86-3939, 1990 WL 130920 (D. Nev.
Aug. 24, 1990). Unconscious bias is similar to subliminal messages in that it affects us beyond our
level of awareness, so we do not exercise conscious choice about it
590. See McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355, 1377-78 (D.N.J. 1978), aff'd, 601 F.2d 575 (3d
Cir. 1979).
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" ' The employer thus did not attempt to deny employment
in firefighting.59
based on protected beliefs, but rather attempted to identify personality
traits incompatible with firefighters' duties. The court noted, however,
that the potential for abusing psychological testing is clear, and it would
be unconstitutional to reject a candidate based on his beliefs under the
guise of rejecting the emotionally unfit.592
The employer is obligated to use the unconscious-bias test results to
match employees with job responsibilities that reduce the potential for
discrimination. The testing is not conducted to control the employees'
beliefs, but instead to adjust personnel to decrease the likelihood of
unconscious bias manifesting in unlawful and harmful acts toward
innocent out-group members. The First Amendment protects racist
views, not racist acts in employment; the purpose of unconscious-bias
testing is to prevent "bias-inspired conduct" 593 and not to dampen beliefs
or speech.
Employees may argue that compulsory unconscious-bias testing
violates their right not to speak. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
the right not to speak.5" In West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,595 the Court declared unconstitutional a state law requiring
children to salute the flag because it compelled an affirmation of a
belief.596 More recently, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,597
the Court held that the First Amendment protects a person's right to
591. See id. at 1377.
592. See id.
at 1377-78.
593. See Chemerinsky, supra note 543, § 11.3.3.4. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that
enhanced penalties for hate crimes are constitutional, stating that the law
singles out for enhancement bias-inspiredconduct because this conduct is thought to inflict
greater individual and societal harm .... [B]ias-motivated crimes are more likely to provoke
retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite community
unrest. The State's desire to redress these perceived harms provides an adequate explanation for
its penalty-enhancement provision over and above mere disagreement with offenders' beliefs or
biases.
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993) (emphasis added and citations omitted).
594. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("[T]he right of freedom of thought
protected by the First Amendment ...includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain
from speaking at all ....The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are
complementary components of the broader concept of'individual freedom of mind.' ").
595. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
596. See id.at 633, 642; see also Wooley, 430 U.S. 705 (holding it unconstitutional to punish
person for blocking out portion of his license plate which contained New Hampshire state motto
"Live Free or Die").
597. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
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speak anonymously.598 In invalidating an Ohio law that required contact
information on voter publications, the Court determined that the decision
to remain anonymous, as with other publication content decisions, is
protected by the First Amendment's freedom of speech provision."' The
Court emphasized that authors may choose anonymity to preserve their
privacy or because of fear that their expressions will cause retaliation or
ostracism."0 But whatever the motivation for choosing anonymity, any
interest in disclosure as a condition for entry into the marketplace is
clearly outweighed by the interest in ensuring the entry of anonymous
works into the public domain."° This case supports the right not to speak
because it protects the speaker's choice about the content of speech and
allows the speaker to withhold speech at the speaker's discretion.
However, unconscious-bias testing can be distinguished from "right
not to speak" cases because those cases assume that the would-be
speaker knows the content of the speech and has decided not to advance
it, thereby expressing an opinion or choice by refusing to speak.
Unconscious-bias test-takers are not conscious of their cognitive content
and are therefore unable to form an opinion about that content or to
exercise the right to disagree with it or withhold it for content-based
purposes by not speaking. Nothing in unconscious-bias testing or
application of test results in the employment context prevents the testtaker from maintaining the bias or refusing to talk about it. The testing is
done for the purpose of preventing discriminatory acts, not regulating
speech.
Unconscious-bias testing not only does not impinge on an
individual's right to believe and speak as she pleases, but actually
enhances the values underlying the First Amendment by exposing
information important to an individual's right to choose her beliefs in
accordance with the true facts. The testing advances the discovery of
truth in the "marketplace of ideas" by uncovering bias and by
contributing critical information about the reality of racism and
discrimination. It enhances autonomy because people cannot freely
598. See id. at 357.
599. See id. at 341-42. Note that the Court applied "exacting scrutiny," which requires that a
statute be "narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest," to analyze the constitutionality of
the Ohio law's burden on the "core political speech" involved in the case. Id. at 347. Previously, the
Court applied "strict scrutiny" to test content-based restrictions on political speech. See, e.g., Meyer
v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
600. See Mclntyre, 514 U.S. at341-42.

601. Seeid. at 342.
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express themselves when they are ignorant about who they are and why
they do what they do. Understanding oneself is a prerequisite for true
autonomy and self-actualization. Perhaps most importantly, unconsciousbias testing promotes tolerance of others. White Americans who feel
affirmative action has "gone too far" or that minorities take advantage of
their status may experience an epiphany when confronted with statistics
regarding unconscious bias.
CONCLUSION
Racial and gender statistics demonstrate that America is a land
entrenched with injustice and stark socioeconomic stratification. Equal
employment opportunity is critical to creating socioeconomic justice for
all Americans.
Employment discrimination statutes were enacted to provide a remedy
for victims of discrimination, as well as to deter discrimination. But
discrimination laws do not, and cannot, redress what social psychologists
believe is the most common form of discrimination-stereotyping
resulting from implicit associations made beyond people's conscious
control. New psychology research offers an alternative to litigation as a
means to deter and redress discriminatory practices. Unconscious-bias
testing provides hope for an objective, clear, and efficacious means of
identifying, and working to solve, the problem of discrimination in
employment.
The potential benefits of unconscious-bias testing are far-reaching
and many. Merely recognizing that we harbor biases against others gives
us the power of knowledge to take proactive steps to minimize the likely
impact of such bias. Perhaps more importantly, discovering our own
biases is a necessary first step toward reversing implicit associations and
also provides data necessary to break the chain of "behavioral
confirmation." As more people understand the serious social implications
and magnitude of injustice resulting from unconscious bias, in part from
confrontation with the raw statistics that unconscious-bias testing can
achieve, our society may begin the process of racial enlightenment we
need to work toward racial harmony and justice.
Use of unconscious-bias testing in employment settings is a critical
step in addressing economic injustice. However, employers are unlikely
to conduct the testing at this time because evidence law does not
encourage it, but rather discourages it by failing to provide protection
against liability based on test results. Thus, a qualified evidentiary
privilege should be recognized so that unconscious-bias testing can be
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used as an effective tool to make changes in employment practices to
further equal employment opportunity.
The law should respond to recent breakthroughs in the psychological
understanding of discrimination by encouraging unconscious-bias
testing. The potentially metamorphic social benefits unconscious-bias
testing can achieve underscore the need for a privilege to protect test
results to encourage their use. Hopefully, in time, we will break away
from unfair, unconscious stereotypes and create an America where
prosperity and peace is equally attainable for all.
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